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Abstract 
The conservation of biodiversity is a daunting and complex public policy challenge. Over 
the past three decades, two clear themes have emerged in conservation science, policy and 
practice: greater experimentation with market-based policy instruments (MBIs); and an 
increased concern over the effectiveness of conservation policies. These two themes are 
interrelated, as a key driver of the rise in prominence of MBIs has been the promise of more 
effective, efficient and equitable conservation than that which is possible under ‘traditional’ 
regulatory approaches. However, scarce evidence is available on the efficacy of regulatory 
policies and MBIs alike, and it has been argued that “better theory, better methods, and 
better data” are required if conservation policies are to be more frequently and rigorously 
evaluated for effectiveness. This focus on the technical challenges of policy evaluation is 
incomplete, as effectiveness of conservation policy is influenced not only by the choice of 
policy instrument or combination thereof, but also the actors involved, the relevant 
institutional, social and political contexts, and decisions made at various stages of the 
policy process.  
In this thesis, I investigate the challenges and complexities associated with conservation 
policy in Australia, an advanced and politically stable economy. Using an interdisciplinary, 
mixed methods approach, I consider regulatory and market-based policy responses to a 
major driver of biodiversity loss, deforestation, and evaluate what outcomes, opportunities 
and risks these policies present for conservation.  In Chapter Two, I document the recent 
shift away from ‘command and control’ policy responses to deforestation in Australia, and 
towards self-regulation and MBIs. Despite this change in policy style, little is known of 
their efficacy. In Chapter Three, I use a spatially explicit bent-cable regression model to 
evaluate what effect regulatory policies have had on the rate of deforestation in 
Queensland, Australia. I find some evidence of a policy effect after adjusting for covariates, 
but extreme variation in regional deforestation trends reduces this effect at the state level. 
In Chapter Four, I present findings which confirm that carbon farming is economically 
viable in degraded Queensland agricultural landscapes under an estimated $5 t CO2e
-1 
carbon price. In practice however, large-scale reforestation has not occurred despite being 
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the ‘rational’ option, in part due to policy complexity and political uncertainty. In the final 
three empirical chapters, I consider challenges in the design, implementation and evaluation 
of biodiversity offset policy. In Chapter Five I describe a mathematical framework used to 
underpin the Australian Environmental Offsets Policy, which was designed to deliver ‘no 
net loss’ outcomes for protected matters. I subsequently illustrate in Chapters Six and 
Seven that improvements to policy design do not necessarily lead to better policy outcomes, 
due to complexities that emerge through policy implementation in the context of multi-
actor, multi-level environmental governance. I draw on qualitative data from interviews 
with key informants to describe potential risks to biodiversity outcomes under current offset 
policy settings, including: ambiguous responsibility for long term security and 
management, fragmentation within government departments at the federal and state levels, 
and a lack of transparency and public accountability. I conclude the thesis and provide 
future research directions in Chapter Eight. 
Key words 
Deforestation, evaluation, public policy, biodiversity conservation, environmental 
governance, market based instruments, environmental regulation, mixed methods, 
interdisciplinary research 
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CHAPTER ONE:   
Introduction 
“Conservation is not rocket science; it is far more complex.” 
Eddie Game et al. (2014) Conservation in a wicked complex world; challenges  
and solutions. Conservation Letters 7(3): 271–277  
 
This thesis examines contemporary policy responses to biodiversity loss, and the challenges 
and complexities associated with the design, implementation, and evaluation of biodiversity 
policy instruments in an advanced and politically stable economy. Over the past few decades, 
two clear themes have emerged in the science, policy, and practice of biodiversity 
conservation. First, there has been increased interest in and experimentation with a diversity 
of policy instruments aimed at conserving and restoring biodiversity. The role and favour of 
state-based regulation has declined, and economic instruments and hybrid forms of 
governance have risen in prominence (Boisvert et al., 2013; Dovers, 2013; Gunningham and 
Young, 1997; Hutton et al., 2005; Lockie and Higgins, 2007; Lockwood and Davidson, 
2010). Second, the effectiveness of conservation policies, programs and projects has become 
a key issue of concern for scientists, practitioners and policymakers. Debate and discussion 
about conservation effectiveness, evidence-based policy, and impact evaluation are now 
commonplace in ecology and conservation science journals (Adams and Sandbrook, 2013; 
Baylis et al., 2016; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Haddaway and Pullin, 2013; Miteva et al., 
2012; Pullin and Knight, 2009; Sutherland et al., 2004, 2015).   
These two themes are interrelated, as a key driver for the increased use and discussion of 
economic instruments in conservation has been the promise of more effective, efficient and 
equitable conservation than that which is possible under ‘traditional’ regulation administered 
by the state (Bishop et al., 2009; Kareiva and Fuller, 2016; Lockie, 2013). However, studies 
from the public policy, environmental politics, governance and economics literatures 
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(hereafter, the ‘policy sciences1’) have long argued that institutional and political context, the 
interests, values, and motivations of policy actors, and the availability of resources to monitor 
and enforce policies will all influence policy outcomes; regardless of the choice of policy 
instrument type (Damiens et al., 2017; Dovers and Hussey, 2013; Gunningham and Sinclair, 
1999; Hahn and Stavins, 1992; Jordan et al., 2013). Biodiversity conservation problems are 
frequently highly complex, and involve trade-offs between multiple objectives, values and 
interests. It is therefore necessary to consider a diverse range of perspectives and tools to 
comprehensively analyse conservation policy. This thesis draws on theory, principles and 
methods from the policy sciences and conservation science to investigate what opportunities 
and risks stem from the application of regulatory and economic policy instruments to the 
conservation of biodiversity.  
In this chapter, I first summarise why polices have emerged to address biodiversity loss, 
describe the rise of diverse policy instruments and trends in their use, and then outline recent 
efforts to better understand the effectiveness of conservation policies. I provide a short 
background to key concepts and principles from the policy sciences, and discuss their 
relevance in the context of biodiversity conservation. I then introduce my study region of 
Australia: a ‘megadiverse’ nation which has experimented extensively with regulatory and 
market-based policy instruments over the past 30 years. Finally, I outline my research 
questions, methodological approach, and provide an overview of the structure of the thesis. 
Conserving biodiversity in the Anthropocene  
As the human enterprise shifts planet Earth into a new geological age (Crutzen, 2006; Lewis 
and Maslin, 2015; Steffen et al., 2007), transgresses several planetary boundaries (Rockstrom 
et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015), and drives the extinction of species at a rate that is orders 
of magnitude higher than what would occur without anthropogenic influence (Ceballos et al., 
2015; Pimm et al., 1995, 2014; Pimm and Raven, 2000), the question of how society can 
                                                 
1 The term policy sciences was first popularized by Lasswell to describe a “contextual, problem-oriented, 
multi-method” approach to understanding and analyzing public policy processes (Lasswell, 1971). However, 
in this thesis I use the term ‘policy sciences’ to more broadly refer to academic disciplines which employ a 
diversity of theories and policy analysis approaches – both quantitative and qualitative – to examine the 
design, implementation and evaluation of policy instruments.  
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effectively respond to these challenges remains daunting and complex (Colloff et al., 2017; 
Game et al., 2014).   
Biodiversity, or biological diversity, encapsulates the diversity of ecosystems, species and 
genes which make up the natural world2 (Groombridge and Jenkins, 2002).  Human activities 
have long influenced the distributions and viability of species and ecosystems, beginning 
with the megafaunal extinctions during the Pleistocene (Burney and Flannery, 2005; Miller 
et al., 1999; Rule et al., 2012). However, the growth of the human economy since the 
industrial revolution has occurred at a pace and scale not seen at any other point in history 
(Steffen et al., 2011), and it is widely acknowledged that anthropogenic influence is driving 
the current global mass extinction event (Barnosky et al., 2011; Novacek and Cleland, 2001). 
New species require tens of thousands of years to evolve (Barnosky et al., 2011; Weir and 
Schluter, 2007), yet at least 38% of all known species are facing extinction in the near term 
(Vié et al., 2009), and whole ecosystems are also at risk of extinction (Keith et al., 2013; 
Nicholson et al., 2009).  
Loss of habitat remains the principle driver of this trend (Brook et al., 2003; Evans et al., 
2011; Sodhi et al., 2004), which is ultimately determined by global forces such as rising 
population and consumption (Lambin et al., 2001). Globally, deforestation is increasing: 
climbing from 2.7 million ha per annum between 1990 and 2000, to 6.3 million ha per annum 
between 2000 and 2005 (Lindquist et al., 2012). The most recent global assessment indicates 
230 million ha of forest was lost between 2000 and 2012 (Hansen et al., 2013). Habitat loss 
not only contributes to species decline, but alters the provision of ecosystem services, and 
affects the ability of biological systems to support human needs (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005; Vitousek et al., 1997). Ecosystem services such pollination, nutrient 
cycling, water purification, climate regulation and pest and pathogen control are reliant on 
the maintenance of biodiversity (Cardinale et al., 2012; Dirzo et al., 2014; Hooper et al., 
2012). Despite international efforts to slow habitat loss and protect biodiversity, to date these 
                                                 
2 Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) defines biological diversity as “the variability 
among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems 
and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystem.” https://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/default.shtml?a=cbd-02  
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efforts have not been sufficient to stem the decline (Butchart et al., 2010, 2015; Hoffmann et 
al., 2010). 
Policy responses to biodiversity loss 
Efforts to stem the decline of biodiversity and associated ecosystem services have 
traditionally been in the form of conserving areas of land and sea for protection in national 
parks and conservation areas (Margules and Pressey, 2000). The first national park in the 
world was Yellowstone National Park, declared by the United States Congress in 1872 
(Haines, 1977). This marked the beginning of a trend in the protection of areas primarily for 
the preservation of the environment in a “natural state”, up until the present day where 
approximately 14.7% of the terrestrial and 4.12% of marine environments (UNEP-WCMC 
and IUCN, 2016) are designated as protected areas. The most recent commitment under the 
Convention for Biological Diversity called for 17% of each terrestrial biome and 10% of the 
marine realm to be protected by 2020 (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011) 
Over the past three decades, biodiversity conservation efforts have diversified beyond 
establishing protected areas, toward a larger selection of policy instruments (Barton et al., 
2017; Gunningham and Young, 1997; Howlett et al., 2009; Jordan et al., 2013; Wurzel et al., 
2013; Young and Gunningham, 1997). This trend has partly been driven by a recognition that 
effectively conserving biodiversity requires on-ground management across all landscapes 
and tenures (Fitzsimons, 2015; Wilson et al., 2010), as well as concerns that protection does 
not always equate to genuine conservation gains (Andam et al., 2008; Miteva et al., 2012; 
Pressey et al., 2015). The emergence of the modern environmental policy agenda in the 1970s 
marked the beginnings of this diversification in environmental policies (Jordan et al., 2013), 
on the heels of growing public concern about the state of the environment (Carson, 1962; 
Ehrlich, 1968; Meadows et al., 1972). This decade saw the first United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1972, the United States Endangered Species 
Act 1973 come into force, and the European Union was granted an environmental mandate 
for the first time, with the introduction of the first EU Environmental Action Programme 
(Knill and Liefferink, 2013). However, it was not until after the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) was adopted at the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro (the Earth Summit) 
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that interest and experimentation with diverse environmental policy instruments diffused into 
biodiversity conservation.  
From government to governance: the diversification of policies for 
biodiversity conservation 
Policies for environmental protection, including biodiversity conservation, have traditionally 
been administered by the state in the form of regulation (also known as ‘command and 
control’ policy). Regulatory instruments seek to control activities that are detrimental to 
biodiversity via explicit directives on how or to what extent activities should be carried out 
(Boisvert et al., 2013; Gunningham and Young, 1997; Pirard, 2012; Young and Gunningham, 
1997). Government therefore has the primary role in creating rules, setting standards, and 
ensuring that industries comply with regulations by carrying out monitoring, enforcement 
and compliance checks.  
With the rise of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) from the 1970s onwards 
(Jordan et al., 2003b, 2005, 2013), the role of non-state actors in governing the environment 
has increased in prominence (Adger and Jordan, 2009; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Newell et 
al., 2012). Businesses, non-government organisations (NGOs), and community organisations 
increasingly operate alongside government to influence environmental actions and outcomes 
through the use of market-based and voluntary policy mechanisms. This transition from 
government to governance reflects a broader societal decline in the role of the state, and in 
the neoliberalisation of natural resource management and biodiversity conservation (Agrawal 
and Lemos, 2007; Boisvert, 2015; Lockie and Higgins, 2007; Lockwood and Davidson, 
2010; Newell et al., 2012; Stavins, 2003).  These changes have occurred alongside the 
increased importance of multi-level, adaptive, collaborative and networked forms of 
environmental governance (Benson et al., 2013; Folke et al., 2005; Wurzel et al., 2013; 
Wyborn, 2015). An understanding of how such governance systems operate is crucial for 
identifying how they can be strengthened for biodiversity conservation purposes (Agrawal 
and Lemos, 2007; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2006).  
Of these NEPIs, market-based instruments (MBIs, also known as economic or incentive-
based instruments) are perhaps the mostly widely discussed, studied, and divisive (Büscher, 
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2008; Ehrenfeld, 2008; Holmes et al., 2016; Muradian et al., 2013; Penca, 2013; Sandbrook 
et al., 2013; Stavins et al., 1998). The use of market-based instruments in conservation aims 
to facilitate biodiversity protection and management through financial self-interest, and may 
generate other environmental, social and economic co-benefits for firms and local 
communities. Examples include payments for ecosystem services (PES, Engel et al., 2008; 
Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2013; Whitten et al., 2017; Wunder, 2007, 
2013), biodiversity offsetting (Bull et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2016), individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs) for fisheries (Costello et al., 2008; Grafton, 1996), and carbon farming (S A 
Bekessy and Wintle, 2008; Evans et al., 2015).  
Considerable scholarship exists within the conservation literature on the design and 
application of MBIs (Engel et al., 2008; Gonçalves et al., 2015; Jack et al., 2008; Pirard, 
2012) and the potential economic, social and ecological opportunities delivered by such 
instruments (S A Bekessy and Wintle, 2008; Bishop et al., 2009; Evans et al., 2015; Gardner 
et al., 2013; Muradian et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2016). MBIs for biodiversity conservation 
are now widely dispersed, yet like all policy interventions, there is frequently limited 
information on what outcomes are being delivered (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; May et al., 
2016; Miteva et al., 2012; Pattanayak et al., 2010). While the diversity of policy instruments 
applied to conserve biodiversity has increased dramatically over the past three decades, there 
remains considerable uncertainty about the effectiveness of conservation policies and 
programs. 
Which conservation policies and programs are effective?  
There has been substantial public and private investment in biodiversity conservation 
activities (McCarthy et al., 2012; Waldron et al., 2013), yet biodiversity as a whole continues 
to deteriorate. Now, as the world edges closer to the end of the 2011-2020 commitment period 
of the CBD (2010), there is increasing interest and concern over the scale and effectiveness 
of current policies and programs aimed to address biodiversity loss at international, national 
and regional scales (Butchart et al., 2015, 2016; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Miteva et al., 
2012; Rands et al., 2010; Venter et al., 2014).    
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The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) contended that “Few well-designed 
empirical analyses assess even the most common biodiversity conservation measures”, and 
Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006) thereafter called for greater use of evaluation in conservation 
policy and practice. Without evidence, scientists and practitioners are said to rely on “myth, 
intuition and anecdote” to design and implement conservation policies and programs (Ferraro 
and Pattanayak, 2006; Pullin et al., 2004; Sutherland et al., 2004), which can lead to sub-
optimal or even detrimental outcomes for biodiversity (Pullin and Knight, 2009). While an 
evidence base is building for the effectiveness of protected areas (Andam et al., 2008; Ferraro 
et al., 2013; Hockings et al., 2015; Joppa and Pfaff, 2011) and some on-ground management 
conservation actions (Sutherland et al., 2015), empirical evaluations, as a rule, continue to be 
rare (Curzon and Kontoleon, 2016; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014; Miteva et al., 2012). Data 
scarcity, system complexity, large spatial and temporal scales, inadequate methodological 
techniques, and a lack of evaluation expertise amongst conservation scientists and 
practitioners have been cited as key barriers to evaluation in conservation (Baylis et al., 2016; 
Ferraro, 2009; Mickwitz, 2003). Yet policy scholars have long warned that the effectiveness 
of policies (and the evaluation thereof) is highly dependent on the social, political and 
institutional contexts in which they are developed and implemented (Dovers and Hussey, 
2013; Gunningham and Young, 1997; Hahn, 1989; Hahn and Richards, 2013; Jordan et al., 
2013; Primmer, 2017).   
Applying a policy lens to biodiversity conservation  
Conservation science and policy can benefit from research undertaken in fields such as public 
policy and administration, political science, environmental politics and environmental 
governance (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2006; Biesbroek et al., 2015; Cairney et al., 2016; Dovers, 
1996; Dovers and Hussey, 2013; Jordan et al., 2013). Indeed, Dovers and Hussey (2013, p 
22) have argued: 
“A tendency to ignore basic policy knowledge from other areas (such as public policy, 
public administration, law, economics and political science) is, we believe, a 
weakness of much environment and sustainability policy thinking.” 
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In this thesis, I draw on theories and lessons from these disciplines to examine the 
effectiveness of policies for biodiversity conservation, and the context in which they are 
made. I describe a series of case studies which outline policy instruments for responding to 
a key driver of biodiversity loss: deforestation3. I consider regulatory and market based policy 
responses to deforestation in Australia, which is a useful study region for this analysis due to 
its richness in biodiversity, and high rate of human-induced forest loss despite the 
introduction of a series of policy interventions over the past 30 years. I demonstrate through 
these case studies how evaluation can be challenging or problematic due to various technical, 
governance and policy design issues, and illustrate where possible how these issues can be 
overcome to improve decision making. Although I recognize the continued importance of 
protected areas (Margules and Pressey, 2000; UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2016; Worboys et 
al., 2015) and community based conservation efforts (Borrini-Feyerabend and Hill, 2015), 
this thesis focusses on the design, implementation and evaluation of regulatory and market 
based policy instruments given these instruments have been a major contemporary focus of 
biodiversity policy in Australia.  
The next section will provide background to key concepts from the policy sciences: namely, 
the policy process, policy instrument choice, and policy evaluation. I will then revisit these 
issues to examine how they translate to a biodiversity conservation context.  
Background to the policy sciences 
The policy sciences draw upon insights from multiple disciplines, including public policy 
and administration, law, economics, political science and governance. There are theoretical 
and methodological differences between the disciplines, and the choice of focus. For 
                                                 
3 Deforestation refers to the direct human-induced removal of forest cover whereby the land is subsequently 
converted to a non-forest use that is long-term or permanent (Watson et al., 2000). ‘Forest’ is defined under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) classification system as vegetation that is at 
least 2 metres high, with a minimum of 20 percent canopy cover (Furby, 2002). I consider only native forest 
(not plantations) used for non-forestry purposes in this thesis. Although the loss of non-forest habitat such as 
grassland and shrubland is also a significant conservation issue, deforestation is still the dominant form of 
habitat loss in Australia and internationally. Further, satellite imagery of these non-forest vegetation types is 
still limited, rendering quantitative analysis of temporal and spatial trends difficult. Nevertheless, the policy 
instruments considered in this thesis – namely native vegetation regulations, carbon farming, and biodiversity 
offsetting – are still broadly applicable to non-forest vegetation such as grassland and shrubland.  
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example, economics tends to focus predominantly on the identification of a goal (problem 
formulation), and the means to achieve that goal (instrument choice) (Baumol and Oates, 
1988; Goulder and Parry, 2008; Stavins et al., 1998) as the key components of policy making. 
However, scholars of political science, public policy and governance emphasise that policy 
making must be cognizant of the relevant social and political context, and satisfy multiple 
criteria, including equity and political acceptability (Dovers and Hussey, 2013; Howlett, 
1991; Lasswell, 1971; Sterner, 2002).  
The policy process 
Public policy comprises of decisions made by individuals and organisations within 
government, which are influenced by actors4 operating within and outside government 
(Howlett et al. 2009). The purpose of public policy, as described by Dovers (2005, 2013), is 
to “change the behaviours of individuals, households, firms, communities, and governments 
engineering society for determined ends”. The practice of policy making is described as the 
policy process, or policy cycle (Althaus et al., 2012; Brewer and DeLeon, 1983; Bridgman 
and Davis, 2000; Cairney, 2012; Dovers and Hussey, 2013; Howlett et al., 2009; Lasswell, 
1971; Weimer and Vining, 2010). Numerous models of the policy process exist, and vary 
marginally with respect to the number, order and names of the stages of the process (Howlett 
et al. 2009). Critics of the policy process argue that policymaking is rarely as simple and 
linear as the model implies (Bridgman and Davis, 2003; Everett, 2003), or even that there is 
no order or coherence to the process at all (as per the ‘garbage can’ model popularised by 
Kingdon (1984) and Cohen and colleagues (1972)). Nevertheless, the concept of a policy 
process serves as a useful tool by which to understand and analyse the messy, real-world 
complexities of policy making.  
Figure 1.1 illustrates two representations of the policy process (Cairney, 2012; Howlett et al., 
2009) which highlight not only its different stages, but also the participation of different 
policy actors within the process. Agenda setting (or problem-framing) is where all policy 
                                                 
4 In this thesis I refer to policy actors as any individual or organisation that interacts formally or informally 
with policy processes either directly or indirectly. Policy actor is used synonymously with stakeholder, as any 
individual or organisation with an interest or concern with a policy process. Policymakers are government 
actors who are directly involved in designing and implementing public policy.   
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actors comprehend and formulate the policy problem – that is, the problem which society 
wishes to solve in light of relevant social, environmental and economic goals (Dovers and 
Hussey; 2013; Howlett et al.; 2009). Biodiversity loss, unsustainable rates of deforestation 
and climate change are examples of broad policy problems.  The policy universe refers to the 
broader community individuals and organisations both within and outside government 
(Howlett et al. 2009). Policy principles and goals are formulated by a smaller policy 
subsystem, which may be led by government actors who seek input from members of the 
community who are concerned with or have expertise in a policy problem. For example, the 
‘no net loss’ principle of many biodiversity offset policies (Bull et al., 2016; Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 2012d; Maron et al., 2016) was informed and 
influenced by members of the scientific community, the business sector and regulated 
industries, environmental groups and broader political and societal trends.  
 
Figure 1.1. The policy cycle (left), and the policy cycle-actor hourglass (right), adapted from Cairney 
(2012) and Howlett et al. (2009) respectively.  
Public policy decisions and the selection of policy instruments are ultimately made by a small 
number of government decision makers, but the implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
phases incorporate an increasing number of policy actors with diverse interests and 
motivations (Howlett et al., 2009). 
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Policy instrument choice  
The selection and implementation of policy instruments is at the core of administering public 
policy (Hood, 2007; Jordan et al., 2013). Policy instruments are the ‘tools’ used by 
governments to implement policies and achieve policy goals, and a wide range of instruments 
and variations thereof exist. The selection of policy instruments should ideally be based on 
evidence of their relative suitability for addressing a particular issue, though ideological and 
political preferences also influence policy instrument choice (Dovers and Hussey, 2013; 
Hood, 1986). For the purpose of this thesis I focus only on a subset of instruments applied in 
the context of biodiversity conservation (Gunningham and Young, 1997; Miteva et al., 2012; 
Young et al., 1996), namely regulatory, and market-based instruments. It has been widely 
argued by economists (Cole and Grossman, 2002; Hahn, 1989; Stavins et al., 1998; 
Tietenberg, 1990), and increasingly by ecological and conservation scientists (Bishop et al., 
2009; Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian, 2015; Kareiva and Fuller, 2016; Ring et al., 2010a), 
that economic instruments are a superior means of delivering environmental outcomes as 
compared to ‘command-and-control’ regulation. This assertion is informed partly by the 
perceived failure of regulation in controlling environmental degradation, as well as the 
popularization of neo-liberal economic rationalism over the last several decades.  
Regulation is considered the default or ‘traditional’ type of policy instrument used for 
environmental protection (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999). Regulatory instruments 
effectively specify both the outcome and the means to deliver it, and can be particularly well 
suited to situations where there is a high risk of detrimental and irreversible outcomes in the 
absence of policy intervention (such as in many biodiversity conservation problems, 
(Gunningham and Young, 1997; Perrings and Pearce, 1994). However, regulation is the least 
flexible form of governance, and critics argue it can be inefficient, intrusive, inequitable, and 
slow to respond to new information and changing conditions (Gunningham and Grabosky, 
1998; Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999).   
Market-based instruments have been particularly popularised in biodiversity conservation 
and natural resource management since the late 1990s (Hajkowicz, 2009; Lockie, 2013; 
Young et al., 1996). MBIs broadly aim to influence behaviour to meet policy objectives 
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through a ‘carrot’, as opposed to a regulatory ‘stick’ approach.  Economic instruments 
encompass a diversity of policies, including eco-certification and labelling (termed as 
‘market friction’), price-based mechanisms (such as pollution taxes), and cap-and-trade 
environmental markets (Dargusch and Griffiths, 2008; Lockie, 2013; Stavins, 2003).  There 
is a tendency for MBIs to be described as an “opportunity” to deliver positive economic and 
social outcomes alongside biodiversity conservation instruments (Bishop et al., 2009; 
Kareiva and Fuller, 2016; Ring et al., 2010b), yet genuine “win-wins” are rare (Howe et al., 
2014; Muradian et al., 2013; Phelps et al., 2012b) and likely only to occur where stakeholder 
interests align (Hahn and Hester, 1989).  
Economic instruments are claimed to achieve either the same level of environmental 
protection at a lower cost than command and control alternatives; or deliver better 
environmental outcomes for the same cost (Hahn and Stavins, 1991; Hockenstein et al., 1997; 
Salzman and Ruhl, 2000; Stavins, 2003). However, this assertion is described as overly 
simplistic by scholars who argue that an understanding of the varied institutional and political 
contexts in which policy making occurs is fundamental (Boisvert, 2015; Hahn, 1989; Hahn 
and Hester, 1989; Jordan et al., 2013; Primmer, 2017), and ultimately influences the 
effectiveness and efficiency of any policy instrument. Indeed, Cole and Grossan (2002) 
contends that much of this literature “reflects a normative presumption that only such 
“economic” instruments have any possibility of producing an efficient outcome”. In reality, 
effective policy making generally requires a diversity of instruments to be implemented as 
part of a policy mix, while remaining cognisant of economic, political and social contexts 
(Dovers and Hussey, 2013; Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Hahn, 1989; Howlett et al., 
2009; Young and Gunningham, 1997).   
Policy evaluation 
Evaluation is a crucial component of the policy process (Dovers and Hussey, 2013) which 
can give insight to the relative merits of different approaches (Bottrill and Pressey, 2012; 
Crabbé and Leroy, 2008; Mickwitz, 2003; Rossi et al., 2004; Vedung, 2000). Scriven (1991) 
provides the most general definition of evaluation, referring to it as “the process of 
determining the merit, worth, or value of something, or the product of that process”. Policy 
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instruments may be judged according to a wide range of criteria, including their cost, social 
or environmental outcomes, feasibility of implementation, equity implications, flexibility of 
use, information requirements and dependability (Dovers and Hussey, 2013; Gunningham 
and Young, 1997). In this thesis, I am primarily interested in the environmental outcomes 
delivered by policy responses to deforestation. I refer to policy effectiveness to describe 
whether a policy has capacity to or has delivered the environmental outcomes as per its stated 
objective.   
In the context of the policy process, evaluation is most frequently referred to as the last 
“stage” (Figure 1.1), wherein the process of implementing a policy and the outcomes 
delivered by the intervention are retrospectively assessed with respect to the policy objective. 
However, “evaluation” may also be used to describe prospective analyses which aim to 
predict the potential opportunities, risks, and costs of an intervention during the policy 
formulation or design phase. I distinguish between these two broad approaches by describing 
the evaluation of the value or merit of a policy after it has been developed and implemented 
as ex post evaluation, and prospective policy analysis as ex ante evaluation (Crabbé and 
Leroy, 2008; Rossi et al., 2004). Since I consider both existing and emerging policy 
instruments for biodiversity conservation in this thesis, I draw on a range of ex ante and ex 
post evaluation methods.  
Quantitative methods are commonly used for ex ante evaluation given their ability to predict 
the potential outcomes from policies under varying scenarios and assumptions. Examples of 
ex ante evaluation studies in the conservation literature include those which estimate the 
potential biodiversity benefits of protected area expansion (Venter et al., 2014; Watson et al., 
2011) and reconfiguration (Fuller et al., 2010), quantify the carbon sequestration and 
biodiversity opportunities from forest governance interventions (Chapter Four, Carwardine 
et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2015), and determine the likelihood of biodiversity offset policies 
to achieve a ‘no net loss’ of  biodiversity (Chapter Five, Bull et al., 2016; Gordon et al., 
2011).  
Of course, even the best designed ex ante evaluation cannot fully capture the realities of 
policy implementation, and so ex post evaluation is crucial for policy learning and 
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improvement. Both qualitative and quantitative methods may be used for ex post evaluation 
depending on its purpose, intended audience, the available data, and which component of the 
policy is being assessed (Margoluis et al., 2009; Rossi et al., 2004). Ferraro (2009) has argued 
that “the fundamental problem of evaluation” is in determining what would have occurred in 
the absence of the intervention i.e., the counterfactual. The counterfactual is frequently 
assumed, ignored or obfuscated in environmental policies (Maron et al., 2013; Maron et al., 
2015), which makes ex-post evaluation extremely difficult. Establishing a counterfactual 
scenario is a pre-requisite for the use of experimental and quasi-experimental impact 
evaluation methods (Ferraro, 2009; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014; Greenstone and Gayer, 2009; 
White, 2009) which aim to quantify the causal link between a policy intervention and a 
variable of interest. However, even in cases where it may not be possible or desirable to 
conduct a strict impact evaluation, counterfactual thinking can assist in the design of non-
experimental and qualitative evaluations which seek to establish what effect a policy 
intervention has had on an outcome relative to other contributing factors (Ferraro, 2009; 
Margoluis et al., 2009; Rossi et al., 2004).  
Recent debate in the conservation literature on the need for conservation policies and 
programs to be more frequently subject to ex-post evaluation has almost exclusively focussed 
on experimental and quasi-experimental designs (Margoluis et al., 2009). Some scholars have 
hypothesised that a of lack awareness and expertise in impact evaluation techniques is 
preventing more widespread knowledge of the effectiveness of conservation interventions 
(Baylis et al., 2016; Ferraro, 2009; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Miteva et al., 2012). 
However, as outlined below, this argument obscures two key issues.  
First, there is an assumption that the barriers to ex-post policy evaluation are purely technical, 
and are simply a matter of “better theory, better methods, and better data” (Miteva et al., 
2012). In a recent survey, Curzon and Kontoleon (2016) found that awareness of impact 
evaluation amongst conservation practitioners and policymakers was extremely high, but 
more widespread use of such evaluation methods was largely prevented by financial and time 
constraints. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Illustration of an observed outcome under a policy or program (solid curve), and plausible
 
counterfactual 
 
scenarios 
 
(dotted 
 
lines). 
 
The 
 
policy 
 
or 
 
program 
 
effect 
 
(‘impact’) 
 
is 
 
the 
 
difference
 
between the observed outcome and the unobservable counterfactual. Adapted from Rossi et al. 
(2004)
Keene and Pullin
 (2011) acknowledged that the impediments to an ‘effectiveness revolution’ 
in  conservation  are  not  only  technical,  but  cultural  and  political.  Organisations  that  are 
responsible  for  designing  and  implementing  conservation  policies  and  programs,  whether 
they be government or non-government, can be reluctant to conduct or publish evaluations
 
in the event a ‘failure’ leads to political or financial repercussions
 
(Dovers and Hussey, 2013;
Keene and Pullin, 2011; Kleiman et al., 2000; Redford and Taber, 2000). Evaluation is also 
difficult when monitoring data is proprietary or
 
otherwise inaccessible
 
(Curtis et al., 1998;
Lindenmayer et al., 2017).
Second, the characterisation of impact evaluation techniques as ‘best practice’ overlooks the 
value
 
and 
 
rigor
 
of 
 
well-designed 
 
non-experimental 
 
and 
 
qualitative 
 
evaluations. 
 
Non-
 
experimental 
 
quantitative 
 
evaluation 
 
designs, 
 
such 
 
as 
 
those 
 
which
 
measure 
 a  variable  of 
interest before and after an intervention, have less capacity to infer causality but can be used 
in situations where the available data is simply not amenable to a quasi-experimental design
(Margoluis et al., 2009). In Chapter Three, I use a hierarchical bent-cable regression model 
to 
 
quantify 
 
the 
 
effect 
 
of 
 
regulatory 
 
policies 
 
on 
 
the 
 
deforestation 
 
rate 
 in  Australia.  Despite
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using the most up to date spatial imagery of deforestation events across the continent, the 
complexity and ubiquity of policies regulating the clearing of native vegetation across all 
Australian jurisdictions meant that even a synthetic control impact evaluation approach 
(Abadie et al., 2010, 2015) was not feasible. Our results demonstrate that the bent-cable 
model is a promising technique for detecting changes in the rate of deforestation in response 
to policy interventions introduced over time, and indicate that caution should be taken to 
avoid any premature claims of policy effectiveness prior to conducting an ex-post evaluation.  
While quantitative evaluation methods can estimate what the impact of a policy intervention 
is to varying degrees of confidence, they cannot easily explain why or how these effects may 
have occurred. Qualitative evaluation approaches allow a far deeper examination of a 
particular case study, which can suggest why a policy intervention may or may not be 
working (Margoluis et al., 2009; Yin, 2009). Techniques such as interviewing, surveys and 
focus groups can reveal crucial information on the institutional and political context in which 
a policy is implemented (Blaikie, 2009; Hay, 2010; Yin, 2009), and provide evidence in the 
form of perceptions, knowledge and behaviour that can be used to improve conservation 
policy and programs (Bennett, 2016; Bennett et al., 2017; Moon and Blackman, 2014; St. 
John et al., 2014). Particularly since conservation interventions are increasingly governed by 
multiple actors with varying motivations and objectives (Adger and Jordan, 2009; Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006; Newell et al., 2012), qualitative methods can provide powerful insights into 
the whole policy process, and how these governance systems ultimately influence 
environmental outcomes. Chapters Six and Seven use qualitative methods to understand the 
governance ‘landscape’ of biodiversity offsetting in Australia, and the barriers and enablers 
to effective policy implementation. The lack of accessible data on the environmental 
outcomes being delivered by biodiversity offset policy in most jurisdictions worldwide 
(Brown et al., 2013; Lindenmayer et al., 2017; Maron et al., 2016; May et al., 2016; 
Pawliczek and Sullivan, 2011) makes a quantitative evaluation of policy ‘impact’ close to 
impossible.  
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Research approach 
Study region 
Australia is renowned not only for its diversity of endemic species and ecosystems 
(Mittermeier and Mittermeier, 1997), but also for its poor extinction record. For example, 
nearly half of all global mammalian extinctions in the last 200 years have occurred in 
Australia (Short and Smith, 1994), and this process of defaunation is ongoing (Dirzo et al., 
2014; Woinarski et al., 2010, 2011, 2015). At least 1,257 endemic plant species, 480 animals 
and 74 ecological communities currently are listed as vulnerable, endangered or critically 
endangered under Australia’s federal Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act (EPBC) 1999 (Cresswell and Murphy, 2016). The primary threats to Australia’s 
biodiversity are habitat loss, invasive vertebrate and plant species, and changed fire regimes 
(Evans et al., 2011; Kingsford et al., 2009). Deforestation in Australia is globally significant 
(Evans, 2016; FAO, 2001; Keenan et al., 2015; Macintosh, 2012): close to 300,000 hectares 
of forest was cleared in the state of Queensland alone in 2014-15 (Department of Science, 
Information Technology, Innovation and the Arts, 2016).  
Australia has a federal system of governance, with environmental matters primarily regulated 
by eight state and territory governments (Council of Australian Governments (COAG), 1992; 
Peel and Godden, 2005), except for ‘matters of national environmental significance’ which 
are under the jurisdiction of the federal EPBC Act. Regulatory controls on deforestation 
emerged in the 1980’s, and by the mid-2000’s were in place in each state and territory 
(Bricknell, 2010; Evans, 2016). Australian governments have also experimented extensively 
with MBIs (Dovers, 2013; Gunningham and Young, 1997; Lockie and Higgins, 2007), and 
have been early adopters of biodiversity offsetting (Gibbons and Lindenmayer, 2007; 
McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Miller et al., 2015) and carbon farming (Macintosh and 
Waugh, 2012; van Oosterzee et al., 2014). As an economically wealthy nation, with strong 
governance arrangements and relatively small population, Australia has the capacity to 
effectively conserve its biodiversity, should it choose to (Lindenmayer, 2015; McDonald et 
al., 2015; Ritchie et al., 2013; Woinarski et al., 2017) 
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Thesis aim and research questions 
In this thesis, I investigate regulatory and market-based policy responses to a key driver of 
biodiversity loss, namely deforestation, and seek to evaluate what outcomes, opportunities 
and risks these policies present for conservation. I pursue this broad research aim by 
addressing the following sub-questions: 
1. What are the contemporary drivers of, trends in, and policy responses to 
deforestation in Australia? 
2. What effect have regulatory policies had on the rate of deforestation in Queensland, 
Australia? 
3. What are the potential economic, biodiversity and climate mitigation benefits that 
could be delivered by an emerging market-based policy instrument (namely, 
carbon farming) for agricultural landscapes in Queensland, Australia? 
4. What are the key challenges in the design, implementation and evaluation of 
biodiversity offset policy? 
5. What are the barriers and enablers to delivering positive outcomes for biodiversity 
from the Australian biodiversity offset policy? 
The three key case studies examined in this thesis – namely, regulatory controls on 
deforestation, carbon farming, and biodiversity offsetting in Australia - were chosen because 
of their potential to examine contemporary policy responses to biodiversity loss, and the 
challenges and complexities associated with the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
biodiversity policy instruments in an advanced and politically stable economy. Although the 
focus of this thesis is biodiversity conservation policy in Australia, there is scope for the 
findings to be transferable to other suitable social-ecological-institutional contexts.  
Methodological approach 
This thesis uses an interdisciplinary, mixed-methods approach (Creswell and Clark, 2011; 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Interdisciplinary research 
enables a more holistic perspective on a research question that a single discipline cannot fully 
appreciate, in this case through a rigorous investigation of all components of the policy 
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process: design, implementation and evaluation. I draw upon both positivist and 
constructionist methodologies (Moon and Blackman, 2014), in recognition of the need to use 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to answer my research questions.  The 
specific methods used in each part of the thesis are described in more detail within their 
respective Chapters, but I provide a brief overview here: 
In Chapter Two, I use document analysis to generate a history of the native vegetation 
policies introduced across Australia over the past four decades. I then analyse remotely 
sensed forest extent and change imagery using the ‘raster’ package in the R statistical 
software and ArcGIS to quantify the rate and extent of deforestation in Australia from 1972 
to 2014. Results of this quantitative analysis are subsequently used in Chapters Three and 
Six.  
In Chapter Three, I use a nonlinear mixed-effects bent-cable regression model to determine 
the extent to which regulations have influenced the rate of deforestation in Queensland, 
Australia since 1988. 
For Chapter Four, I develop and implement a spatially explicit discounted cash-flow 
analysis to determine the economic viability of carbon farming in the agricultural landscapes 
in Queensland, Australia.  I use MATLAB to implement the cash-flow analysis and analyse 
the results using R statistical software and ArcGIS. 
In Chapter Five, I describe the contributions I made to the design of an offset metric used 
as part of the Australian EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy (2012). Specifically, I 
outline the mathematical framework which underlies the ‘no net loss’ offset policy objective, 
and facilitates the quantification of biodiversity losses and gains from an offset exchange.   
In Chapter Six, I discuss key findings from Martin et al. (2016), which used a structured 
content analysis of submissions made to a public inquiry on the effectiveness of biodiversity 
offsetting in Australia. I also describe results from Maron et al. (2015) which draws on 
estimates of deforestation in each Australian state and territory, as quantified in Chapter 
Two.  
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Chapter Seven draws on data I collected through semi-structured interviews with 
policymakers, practitioners and industry proponents who have had direct experience with the 
implementation of biodiversity offset policy in Australia. I analyse interview data 
thematically using MAXQDA software.  
Thesis structure 
The thesis is in the form of compilation, where I answer my research questions through the 
publication of articles in the peer-reviewed scientific literature.   
In Chapter Two I introduce the broad policy problem examined in this thesis – deforestation 
–which is the major threat to biodiversity persistence in Australia and worldwide. Here, I 
provide a detailed history and critique of native vegetation policies introduced across 
Australia over the past four decades. I document the recent shift away from ‘command and 
control’ policies towards self-regulation and incentive-based policy instruments. Despite this 
change in preference in policy instrument type, very little is known of the effectiveness of 
regularity policy responses to deforestation in Australia, let alone more recent approaches 
such as biodiversity offsetting and carbon farming. The remainder of the thesis examines 
three of the policy instruments described in Chapter Two: ‘command and control’ regulatory 
policies, carbon farming, and biodiversity offsetting.  
In Chapter Three, I use a spatially explicit bent-cable regression to collectively model 
deforestation for 50 local government areas (LGAs) across Queensland, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of regulatory policies introduced to reduce deforestation. I show for the first 
time what (if any) role policy has had on the historical rate of deforestation, relative to 
macroeconomic, climatic, institutional and biophysical drivers.  
In Chapter Four, I consider a case study of carbon farming in Queensland, which holds 
significant promise for incentivising large-scale restoration of degraded agricultural land. I 
demonstrate that assisted natural regeneration is a viable land use for large parts of 
Queensland, and is considerably more cost-effective than the more commonly used method 
of environmental plantings. Although the economics are sound, it is likely that policy 
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complexity, uncertainty, and socio-cultural barriers have limited the adoption of carbon 
farming to below the level expected by some scholars.  
In the final three chapters, I present a detailed analysis of challenges to the design, 
implementation and evaluation of biodiversity offsetting. A Preamble briefly introduces the 
history of biodiversity offset policy in Australia and internationally, and outlines the 
motivation for the remaining chapters. Chapters Five and Six synthesise and expand upon 
the contributions I made to five co-authored publications (see Appendix Five), which 
address key technical and governance issues affecting biodiversity offset policy, as 
summarised by Maron and colleagues (2016). I first present the rationale behind the selection 
of an appropriate discount rate when evaluating the equivalence of biodiversity losses and 
gains, that explicitly accounts for a species risk of extinction (Chapter Five). This research 
contributed to the design of the loss-gain metric described by Gibbons and colleagues (2016), 
and was adapted for use in the Australian Government’s Environmental Offset Policy (2012). 
In Chapter Six, I conduct a preliminary examination of the governance of biodiversity 
offsetting by drawing on published work and new analysis.  I highlight key findings from 
Martin et al. (2016), which draws upon a recent Senate inquiry into the effectiveness of 
biodiversity offsetting in Australia to elicit the perceptions of key stakeholders on offset 
policy principles, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Drawing on literature from 
the policy sciences, I then describe a number of governance challenges affecting biodiversity 
offsetting, including agency problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard, and 
challenges for monitoring and policy evaluation. I argue that agency theory is a useful lens 
through which to examine the efficacy of policy implementation in the context of multi-actor 
governance, and to understand the behavior of policy actors engaged in contractual 
relationships such as in biodiversity offset trades. I conclude Chapter Six by considering the 
findings of Maron and colleagues (2015), which critically analyse the baseline assumptions 
of offset policies in eight Australian jurisdictions by comparing their assumed rates of 
biodiversity loss with actual rates of deforestation (as per Chapter Two). I argue that the 
implausibly high baseline assumptions made by these policies demonstrates that adverse 
selection is undermining the potential environmental outcomes from biodiversity offsetting 
in Australia.  
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My final contribution to this case study, and to my thesis, examines the governance 
dimensions of biodiversity offsetting in greater detail. A key gap in the literature on 
biodiversity offsetting and environmental policy more broadly, is a focus on the socio-
political context in which policy is developed and implemented. The policy actors involved, 
their motivations and objectives, and the institutional and organizational incentives in place 
all influence the capacity or inclination for environmental policy to be effectively, efficiently, 
and fairly implemented (Chapter Seven). My findings indicate that although improvements 
in offset policy and metric design has provided regulators and proponents with more guidance 
on how to implement offset policy, key barriers remain in the way of achieving positive 
biodiversity outcomes from offsetting: namely policy uncertainty, lack of capacity for 
effective oversight, limited public accountability, an inability to make offsetting 
commercially viable, and the use of offsetting in a piecemeal, non-strategic approach. 
I conclude the thesis and provide future research directions in Chapter Eight. 
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Figure 1.3. Thesis structure. Research sub-questions 1 to 5 and corresponding Chapters are indicated 
in red text.  
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Research significance 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge and conservation policy through: 
• The most comprehensive review and analysis to date of the drivers of, trends in, 
and policy responses to deforestation in Australia (Chapter Two);  
• The development of new methodological approaches and analytical frameworks; 
specifically, the bent-cable regression model with spatial adjacency weightings as 
applied in Chapter 3, and the mathematical framework for evaluating the capacity 
for offsets to achieve ‘no net loss’ from the perspective of threatened species time 
preference in Chapter 5; 
• New empirical findings which illustrate the effectiveness of regulatory policies for 
reducing deforestation in Queensland, Australia (Chapter Three), the potential 
effectiveness of carbon farming (Chapter Five), and the barriers and enablers to 
effective implementation of biodiversity offset policy in Australia (Chapter Seven); 
• The consideration of biodiversity conservation in the context of key lessons from 
the policy sciences, including the application of agency theory to understanding the 
dynamics of policy actors as part of the governance of biodiversity offsetting 
(Chapter Six) 
• The direct application of research in this thesis to the development (Chapter Five) 
and continual improvement (Chapter Seven) of biodiversity offset policy in 
Australia.  
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Abstract 
Australia’s terrestrial environment has been dramatically modified since European 
colonisation. Deforestation – the clearing and modification of native forest for agricultural, 
urban and industrial development – has been, and remains a significant threat to Australia’s 
biodiversity. Substantial policy reform over the last 40 years has delivered a range of policy 
instruments aimed to control deforestation across all Australian States and Territories. 
Despite these policy efforts - as well as strong governance and high institutional capacity - 
deforestation rates in Australia were nonetheless globally significant at the turn of this 
century.  Legislation introduced in Queensland and New South Wales during the mid-2000s 
was at the time seen to have effectively ended broad-scale clearing; however, recent policy 
changes have raised concerns that Australia may again become a global hotspot for 
deforestation. Here, I describe the deforestation trends, drivers and policy responses in 
Australia over the last four decades. Using satellite imagery of forest cover and deforestation 
events across Australia between 1972 and 2014, I present a comprehensive analysis of 
deforestation rates at a fine resolution. I discuss trends in deforestation with reference to the 
institutional, macroeconomic and environmental conditions which are associated with 
human-induced forest loss in Australia. I provide a detailed history and critique of the native 
vegetation policies introduced across Australia over the last 40 years, including recent 
legislative amendments and reviews. Finally, I comment on future prospects for curbing 
deforestation in Australia, including the role of incentive-based policies such as carbon 
farming, private land conservation and biodiversity offsets. Despite being a highly active 
policy space, very little is known of the effectiveness of policy responses to deforestation in 
Australia, and whether the recent shift away from ‘command and control’ policies will 
necessarily lead to better outcomes. My analysis demonstrates the need for an effective 
policy mix to curb deforestation in Australia, including a greater focus on monitoring, 
evaluation and policy learning.
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Introduction 
Habitat loss is recognized as a major threat to biodiversity within the Oceania region 
(Kingsford et al., 2009). Globally and within Oceania, Australia is significant for both its 
megadiversity (Mittermeier and Mittermeier, 1997), and the extent to which its terrestrial 
species and ecosystems have been impacted by human activities (Evans et al., 2011; 
Mittermeier et al., 1999; Myers et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2011). Prior to European 
colonisation, approximately 30% of Australia’s terrestrial area was covered in ‘forest’ 
(Barson et al. 2000; Bradshaw 2012) – defined as forest and woodland dominated by trees 
up to 2 metres high, with at least 20% canopy cover and a minimum area of 0.2 hectares 
(Furby, 2002). Since that time, around 40% of this original forest extent has been subject to 
deforestation: cleared or extensively modified for agricultural, urban or industrial 
development (Barson et al., 2000; Bradshaw, 2012; Graetz et al., 1995; Lindenmayer, 2005). 
Much of Australia’s remaining forest, shrubland, grassland and open woodland ecosystems 
are now degraded or fragmented (Kirkpatrick, 1994; Norton, 1996; Tulloch et al., 2016).  
As a developed nation, with strong governance arrangements, a high level of institutional 
capacity and a relatively small population, it might be expected that deforestation in Australia 
should be slowing towards a ‘forest transition’ –the cessation and eventual reversal of forest 
loss (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Rudel et al., 2005). Yet 
at the turn of the 21st century, Australia’s deforestation rate was the sixth highest in the world 
(ACF, 2001; FAO, 2001), and the latest statistics suggest that Australia’s deforestation may 
again become globally significant (Bulinski et al., 2016; Department of Science, Information 
Technology, Innovation and the Arts, 2015).  
The environmental impacts of deforestation cannot be disputed. Clearing, modification and 
fragmentation of native vegetation erodes soil, contributes to salinity, and are key drivers in 
the decline of woodland birds, reptiles and mammals (McAlpine et al., 2002; Norton, 1996; 
Saunders, 1989). Land clearing, the local term for deforestation, has been repeatedly 
identified as the most significant threat to terrestrial biodiversity in Australia (State of the 
Environment 2011 Committee, 2011). Deforestation is also a major contributor to human 
induced climate change. In the base year of the Kyoto Protocol (1990), greenhouse gas 
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emissions due to deforestation in Australia equated to 132 Mt CO2-e, or 25% of the country’s 
total emissions (Australian Government, 2013; Macintosh 2012). However, deforestation in 
Australia is also a deeply political issue, and has been a prominent topic of debate between 
environmentalists, farmers and foresters over the last four decades (Lindenmayer, 2014). The 
drivers, trends and policy responses to deforestation cannot be fully understood without 
reference to its institutional5 and macroeconomic dimensions, in addition to its ecological 
impacts and limits.   
The history of deforestation in Australia was most recently examined by Bradshaw (2012), 
who draws upon the first systematic nation-wide study of land cover change over 1990-1995 
(Barson et al., 2000), as well as the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005) and National 
Carbon Accounting System (NCAS, Australian Greenhouse Office, 2003) to document the 
trends in forest loss and degradation across Australia from European settlement up until 2005. 
Bartel (2004, 2008) provides the most detailed reviews of Australia’s native vegetation 
policies to date, and highlights the importance of the use of satellite imagery to monitor 
deforestation and to evaluate policy effectiveness. However, significant changes have 
occurred in the policy landscape since the publication of Bradshaw (2012) and Bartel (2004, 
2008). Legislation introduced from 2005 in the historically high deforestation States of 
Queensland and New South Wales had arguably marked the end of broad-scale land clearing 
in Australia (McGrath, 2007; Taylor and Dickman, 2014). Yet since 2010, a nationwide trend 
towards the relaxation of native vegetation regulations may be leading to increased 
deforestation (Bulinski et al., 2016), and so an up-to-date summary of deforestation trends, 
drivers and policy responses is needed. 
Notwithstanding the extensive commentary that exists on Australia’s protected areas (Taylor 
et al., 2011; Watson et al., 2011), natural resource management (Hajkowicz, 2009; Lockie 
and Higgins, 2007; Robins and Kanowski, 2011), and forestry policy (Kirkpatrick, 1998; 
Lane, 1999; Norton and Mitchell, 1993), there has been comparatively limited examination 
of the policy responses to deforestation (Bartel, 2003, 2004, 2008; Macintosh, 2012). 
                                                 
5 Institutions incorporate formal (laws, property rights) and informal (traditions, cultural and social norms) 
rules (North, 1991). In this paper I focus on formal institutions, though recognise that cultural factors are also 
important drivers of deforestation behaviour (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000; Bartel and Barclay, 2011).  
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Although the impacts on biodiversity from the loss and degradation of native forests through 
commercial forestry operations are well documented (Lindenmayer, 2014), deforestation due 
to agricultural, urban and industrial development on private land, particularly since the 1970s, 
has had far more widespread impacts (Australian Government, 2013; Barson et al., 2000).  
Here, I provide a comprehensive review of policy instruments aimed to control deforestation 
in Australia over the last four decades. I focus specifically from 1970 onwards for three 
reasons. First, the early history of deforestation in Australia has been covered extensively 
elsewhere (Bartel, 2004, 2008; Bombell and Montoya, 2014; Bradshaw, 2012; Rolfe, 2000; 
Seabrook et al., 2006), but there has been comparatively limited focus on its policy 
dimensions (c.f Bartel, 2004; 2008), and no analysis of contemporary policy trends from 
2005 onwards. Second, in the context of Australia’s history since European colonisation, 
government regulation of deforestation is only a fairly recent phenomenon. Deforestation for 
agricultural development has historically been incentivized by the Federal and state 
governments through low-cost finance, tax concessions, cheap land and lease conditions 
which required the removal and management of native vegetation (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2002; Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000; Seabrook et al., 2006). The majority 
of these incentives were removed by the 1980s, when public concern over the environmental 
effects of deforestation began to rise (Council of Australian Governments, 1992).  Finally, 
nationally-consistent spatial data on deforestation events developed as part of the National 
Carbon Accounting System (NCAS) are now available from 1972 up to 2014 (Australian 
Department of the Environment, 2015).  
I first present a comprehensive analysis of deforestation rates at a fine resolution, by 
analysing satellite imagery of forest cover and deforestation events across Australia between 
1972 and 2014.  I discuss these statistics by State, land use and land tenure. Next, I provide 
a detailed history and critique of native vegetation policies across Australia, including recent 
legislative amendments and reviews. I conclude with an analysis of policy trends with 
reference to the broader macroeconomic trends over the last 40 years, and comment on future 
prospects for curbing deforestation in Australia, including the role of a more diverse range 
of policy instruments.  
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Deforestation trends and drivers 
Data analysis and methodology 
I draw upon the most recent national-scale spatial data to describe deforestation trends over 
time (Australian Department of the Environment, 2015). The Australian Government 
compiles fine-resolution data of land cover change as part of the NCAS (NCAS, Furby, 2002; 
Lehmann et al., 2013). The NCAS uses over 7,000 Landsat MSS, TM and ETM+ images to 
map forest extent and change at a 25 metre resolution across the Australian continent, 
excluding the treeless inland desert areas and grasslands.  Note that these spatial data exclude 
native vegetation types which do not meet the height, canopy cover and area thresholds of 
‘forest’ as defined by Furby (2002), meaning that the loss of grassland, shrubland and open 
woodland is not captured by this analysis. While I discuss deforestation trends specifically 
with reference to data on forest extent and change, I refer to the policy responses to 
deforestation as ‘native vegetation policies’, which recognises that clearing of non-forest 
vegetation is often (but not always) regulated in addition to the clearing of forest.  
Data on forest extent and change are available for twenty-three epochs (instances in time) 
from 1972 to 2014 in the intensive land use zone only (Graetz 1995), where the majority of 
landscape modification has occurred.  Forest change events were attributed to human 
intervention, meaning that “natural” forest change attributable to factors such as fire (and 
associated recovery), dieback, salinisation, drought and seasonal flushing were removed 
(Furby, 2002). Prior to 2004, annual data on deforestation events are not available within the 
NCAS, and are instead captured within multi-year epochs. For example, the 1972 epoch 
contains deforestation events over a five year period from 1972 to 1977. Following expert 
advice (Australian Department of the Environment, 2015; Reddy, S, pers. comm.), I 
converted deforestation events contained within the twenty-three epochs into annual values 
over forty-three years from 1972 - 2014. Further details are provided in the Supplementary 
Material (Appendix One).  
The amount of arable land available to clear has been highlighted previously as an important 
factor influencing deforestation behavior (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000; Bartel 2004; 
2008). In particular, Bartel (2004) suggests that native vegetation policies introduced in 
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South Australia in the 1980s may have had little effect simply because there was scarce 
primary (remnant) forest remaining on land suitable for agricultural development. As such, 
an exploration of deforestation trends in the context of the amount of primary forest 
remaining intact is warranted. To derive an estimate of the amount of primary forest 
remaining over time, I assume that the forest extent in 1972 (the earliest epoch in the data 
set) is all primary forest. I then deduct the primary deforestation events each year from the 
remaining primary forest extent from the previous year. This calculation resulted in an 
estimate of primary forest remaining from 1972-2014. I derive an estimate of deforestation 
occurring on reforested land (regrowth deforestation) by considering deforestation events 
which occurred on land classified as non-forest in 1972, as well as land which was deforested, 
and subsequently reforested and deforested again over the 1972 – 2014 time period. In reality 
much of the forest extent in 1972 would in fact be regrowth forest, so the results I present 
here should be considered in the context of this simplifying assumption. While the total 
amount of deforestation would be unaffected by this assumption, the primary deforestation 
statistics should be regarded as an overestimate, and the regrowth deforestation as an 
underestimate. 
I use the most recent national datasets (ABARES, 2010; Geoscience Australia, 1993) to 
summarise deforestation trends by land use and tenure. Note that land use and tenure data are 
not available over the full time series, so these summaries should only therefore be considered 
as an estimate. I use the ‘raster’ package (Hijmans and van Etten, 2012) in R Statistical 
software (R Development Core Team, 2017) for all raster processing.  
Trends in deforestation  
From 1972 to 2014, over 7.2 million hectares of primary forest was cleared across Australia. 
The total land forested in 1972 was 101 million hectares, hence the primary deforestation 
that has occurred up to 2014 represents a 7% reduction in this extent. An additional 9.5 
million hectares of regrowth forest was cleared over this period (Figure 2.1). The majority 
of this deforestation has occurred in Queensland, where 9.7 million hectares of forest has 
been cleared, of which 3.6 million was primary deforestation.   
Chapter Two: Deforestation in Australia 
 
 
32 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Distribution of total deforestation events (including primary and regrowth deforestation) 
attributed to human intervention from 1972 – 2014. Forest change attributable to “natural” factors 
such as fire, dieback, salinisation, drought and seasonal flushing is not shown. Data is sourced from 
the National Carbon Accounting System (NCAS), Australian Department of the Environment (2015). 
The greatest overall deforestation occurred in the decade of 1980 – 1989; where close to 4.7 
million hectares of native vegetation (including 2.4 Mha of regrowth) was cleared across the 
country (Figure 2.2). Total deforestation has declined in the following decades, however 
regrowth deforestation increased again in the 2000s, during which Queensland cleared 1.5 
Mha of regrowth vegetation. The rate of primary deforestation has still substantially 
decreased since the 1970s, when extensive tracts of forest in southwestern Western Australia 
and Queensland were cleared for agricultural development (Barson et al., 2000; Graetz et al., 
1995).  
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Figure 2.2 Amount of deforestation (total, primary and regrowth) per decade, from 1972-2014, for all 
Australian states and territories (excluding Australian Capital Territory).  
As indicated by Figure 2.3a, the majority of deforestation has occurred for pasture, with much 
smaller percentages for cropping, forestry, urban development and mining. A surprisingly 
high percentage of clearing occurred in conservation areas and minimal use areas; however 
this may not be an accurate representation and should be regarded as an estimate only, given 
the use of the 2005-2006 land use layer (ABARES, 2010). Only a small percentage of 
deforestation has occurred on public land (2%, Figure 2.3b), with the remainder occurring 
on freehold (78% over 1972-2014) and leasehold land (20%). Deforestation has occurred 
disproportionally on freehold land, relative to the percentage of total land mass held in this 
tenure (31%, Geoscience Australia, 1993).  
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Figure 2.3. Percentage of total deforestation in each decade, by (a) land use (as of 2005-06, above) 
and (b) land tenure (as of 1993, below). Data are sourced from ABARES (2010) and Geoscience 
Australia (1993), respectively. 
Relative to the amount of primary forest remaining, there has generally been a decline in 
primary deforestation in each State over time (Figure 2.4), although an increase in the rate of 
deforestation can be seen in several states in the early 1990s and early-mid 2000s. At the 
national scale, there is an overall declining trend in deforestation, and a link to the amount of 
primary forest remaining to clear is also apparent (Figures 2.5a,b). There appear to be some 
relationships between deforestation in Australia over time and key macroeconomic and 
climatic variables (Figure 2.5), though this requires further analysis to confidently attribute 
any change in these variables to the rate of deforestation. Similarly, a rigorous quantitative 
evaluation is needed to reliably establish what effect the introduction of native vegetation 
policies over the past four decades has had on deforestation in Australia. 
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Figure 2.4.  Deforestation as a percentage of primary forest remaining, with separate Loess (local 
regression, Cleveland and Devlin (1988)) curves for primary and regrowth deforestation, for all 
Australian states and territories (excluding Australian Capital Territory). Grey shading indicates a 95 
% confidence interval around the Loess curve. 
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Figure 2.5. Trends in national-scale deforestation and key macroeconomic variables. Data points area 
shaded by year (1972: dark blue, to 2014: light blue). A Loess curve is fitted to each plot, and grey 
shading indicates a 95 % confidence interval. Plots are total deforestation versus: (a) Year, (b) Extent 
of primary forest remaining, (c) Log-transformed total rainfall (Evans, 2014), (d) Gross domestic 
product per capita (current USD) (The World Bank, 2015) , (e) Agriculture, value added (% total 
GDP; value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs) (The World Bank, 2015), (f) Farmer’s terms of trade (ABARES, 2015).  
A history of native vegetation policy in Australia 
Deforestation is mainly regulated at the State level in Australia (Bricknell, 2010). Land 
clearing has been listed as a Key Threatening Process under the Federal Government’s 
Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) (EPBC Act) since 2001 
(Department of the Environment, 2001; Lindenmayer, 2005). The Federal Government has 
limited jurisdiction over State environmental matters unless there are impacts on ‘matters of 
national environmental significance’ (MNES) such as a threatened species or ecological 
communities, or activities on Commonwealth land (Peel and Godden, 2005). This means that 
(a)  
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
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vegetation communities generally receive no federal protection until they have already been 
extensively cleared (Tulloch et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, several attempts have been made to deliver a coordinated, national approach to 
the management of native vegetation. Since 1997, various commitments to address the 
decline in native vegetation have been made through nationally-funded programs and 
frameworks (Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, 2001). The Natural 
Heritage Trust funding package aimed to deliver no net loss of native vegetation within 
Australia by July 2001.  This goal was not met (Beeton et al., 2006). The most recent 
framework outlines a target for a net national increase in native vegetation extent and 
connectivity by 2020 (COAG Standing Council on Environment and Water, 2012). This 
framework, like others before it, is not prescriptive or binding.  
The current environmental offsets policy under the EPBC Act aims to compensate for 
significant impacts on MNES relative to a ‘business as usual’ baseline (Australian 
Government, 2012; Maron et al., 2013), which as described by Maron et al. (2015) is one of 
ongoing biodiversity decline. Although not directly related to native vegetation policy and 
management in the State jurisdiction, the declining baseline assumed by the national 
environmental offsets policy suggests that the national target of a net increase in native 
vegetation is not expected to be met.  
Protected areas can play a key role in reducing deforestation if genuine averted losses can be 
secured, and deforestation is not simply displaced elsewhere (Andam et al., 2008; Miteva et 
al., 2012; Pressey et al., 2015). Australia's National Reserve System is focused primarily on 
meeting goals for the conservation of biodiversity (NRMMC 2009; Watson et al., 2011), and 
it is not known whether the system as a whole has had an impact on deforestation in Australia. 
However, Pressey (2002) demonstrated that protected areas in New South Wales are biased 
towards steep and infertile public land, rather than on privately managed land where 
deforestation is generally higher. State-level policies designed to regulate deforestation on 
private (freehold and leasehold) land are therefore the main focus of this paper.     
For the remainder of the paper, I focus primarily on policy reforms that have occurred in the 
historically high-deforestation states of Queensland, New South Wales, Western Australia, 
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South Australia and Victoria. The majority of clearing for agriculture in Tasmania occurred 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Kirkpatrick, 1991), and was not regulated until 2002 when the 
Forest Practices Act 1985 was amended to prohibit non-commercial clearing of forest for 
agricultural purposes (Bricknell, 2010).  Limited deforestation has occurred in the Northern 
Territory, as its rangelands are generally suitable for grazing in their natural state (Australian 
Greenhouse Office, 2000). Controls were introduced in 2002 under the Planning Act 1999 
and Pastoral Land Act 1992 (Table 3). With a total area of 2,358 km², deforestation in the 
Australian Capital Territory is insignificant relative to other Australian jurisdictions, and 
policies dealing specifically with native vegetation have only recently been introduced 
(Bricknell, 2010).  
In the following section, I describe how policy responses to deforestation have evolved in all 
Australian jurisdictions over the last four decades. I also provide a comprehensive summary 
of major native vegetation policies implemented at the Federal, State and Territory levels 
from 1970 to 2016 in Tables 2.1 to 2.4. 
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Table 2.1. Major native vegetation policies over 1970-1989 
Jurisdiction Year Policy name Policy intent 
Instrument type 
(Gunningham and 
Sinclair, 1999) 
Details Source 
South 
Australia 
1980 
Heritage Agreements under 
the South Australian Heritage 
Act 1978 
To maintain or improve native 
vegetation with high 
conservation value on private 
land 
Voluntarism, 
Economic 
Legally binding agreements between the Crown and 
individual (current and future) landholders. Financial 
incentives provided to cover fencing costs, 
management assistance and advice; state and local 
overnment land charges are waived. 
Harris, 
2013; Slee 
1997 
1983 
Development Control 
Regulations under the 
Planning Act (PA) 1982 
To curb native vegetation 
clearance 
Command and 
control 
Prescribed vegetation clearance as a class of 
development that required consent of the South 
Australian Planning Commission. Applied to clearing 
for agricultural purposes and commercial harvesting. Harris, 2013 
1985 
Native Vegetation Act (NVA) 
1985 
To curb native vegetation 
clearance 
Command and 
control, Economic 
Clearing controls removed from PA 1982 and placed 
under NVA 1985. Compensation is paid to those 
refused clearing approval, and offered financial 
assistance to 
landholders prepared to enter a Heritage Agreement 
to protect remnant native vegetation. 
AGO 2000; 
Harris, 
2013; Slee 
1997 
Western 
Australia 
1978 
Country Areas Water Supply 
Act (CAWSA), Part IIA, 1976  
To protect quality of water 
supply from salinity 
Command and 
control 
Vegetation clearance controlled in 6 south western 
catchments (about 5% of rural parts of the State)  Slee, 1997 
1986 
Soil and Land Conservation 
Act (SALCA)1945  
Conservation of soil and land 
resources, and  mitigation of 
the effects of erosion, salinity 
and flooding 
Command and 
control 
In 1986, it became a requirement under the SALCA 
1945 to obtain a notice of intention to clear for areas 
of 1ha or more 
Bennett, 
2002; Slee, 
1997 
Victoria 
1989 
Amendment S16 to the State 
Section of the Planning 
Scheme (SSPS) under the 
Planning and Environment 
Act 198 
Nature conservation and land 
management (soil, 
watercourses, greenhouse 
carbon loads, groundwater, 
dryland salinity control)  
End of broad-scale clearing in 
Victoria 
Command and 
control 
Planning permits are required to remove, destroy 
or lop native vegetation. Applied statewide to 
freehold, leasehold, Crown land (except Crown land 
used for forestry, and national parks).  The Act 
specifically rules out the payment of compensation. Slee, 1997 
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Table 2.2. Major native vegetation policies over 1990-1999 
Jurisdiction Year Policy name Policy intent 
Instrument type 
(Gunningham and 
Sinclair, 1999) 
Details Source 
Commonwealth 1999 
Environmental Protection 
and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act (1999) 
Protection of Matters of 
National Environmental 
Significance 
Command and 
control 
Limited remit over vegetation clearance, only if 
"significant impact"   
South Australia 1991 
Native Vegetation Act (NVA) 
1991 
To retain native vegetation.  
End of broadscale clearing 
in South Australia 
Command and 
control 
End of compensation payments under NVA 198.  
Applies to freehold and leasehold land, with 
exception of certain urban areas.  
Harris, 2013; Slee, 
1997 
New South 
Wales 
1995 
State Environmental 
Planning Policy (SEPP) No. 
46 under the Environmental 
Planning & Assessment 
(EP&A) Act 1979 
To prevent inappropriate 
native vegetation clearance 
Command and 
control 
Clearing of native vegetation (> 2 ha/annum) 
prohibited except with development consent of the 
Director-General of the Department of Land and 
Water Conservation (DLWC) and National Parks 
and Wildlife Service (NPWS) 
Bombell and 
Montoya, 2014; 
Slee, 1998 
1998 
Native Vegetation 
Conservation Act  (NVCA) 
1997 
Conservation and 
management of native 
vegetation in accordance 
with the principles of 
ecologically sustainable 
development 
Command and 
control, Economic 
Brought all the clearing of all native vegetation in 
NSW under one regulatory regime (including 
leasehold land in Western Division). Regional 
vegetation management plan specified where 
clearing could occur. Provided some financial 
incentives for landholders to protect native 
vegetation. 
Bombell and 
Montoya, 2014; 
Smith, 1999 
Queensland 1995 Land Act 1994 
Sustainable resource use and 
development 
Command and 
control 
Control of vegetation clearing on leasehold and 
State lands 
AGO 2000; Slee, 
1998 
Victoria 1997 
Victoria's Biodiversity 
Strategy 1997 Biodiversity conservation 
Voluntarism, 
Information 
State-wide target of ‘no net loss’ of native 
vegetation by 2001 (baseline 1999). 'Net gain' 
target from 2002 
Department of 
Natural Resources 
and Environment, 
1997 
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Table 2.3. Major native vegetation policies over 2000-2009 
Jurisdiction Year Policy name Policy intent 
Instrument type 
(Gunningham and 
Sinclair, 1999) Details Source 
Commonwealth 2001 
National Framework for the 
Management and Monitoring 
of Australia’s Native 
Vegetation  
To reverse the long-term 
decline in the quality and 
extent of Australia’s 
native vegetation cover by 
June 2001 
Voluntarism, 
Information 
Provided the framework for the implementation 
of the Natural Heritage Trust Partnership 
Agreement between the Commonwealth and the 
State and Territory Governments.  
Natural Resource 
Management 
Ministerial Council, 
2001 
South Australia 2002 
Native Vegetation Act (NVA) 
1991 
Permitted clearing 
conditional on achieving 
'significant environmental 
benefits' 
Command and 
control, Economic 
Landholders could apply for financial assistance 
for delivering 'significant environmental 
benefits', enter into a Heritage Agreement or pay 
into a Native Vegetation Fund 
Bricknell, 2010; South 
Australian Government 
2002 
New South 
Wales 
2005 
Native Vegetation 
Regulation 2005 under the 
Native Vegetation Act 
(NVA)2003  
To end broadscale 
clearing except where the 
clearing will improve or 
maintain environmental 
outcomes 
End of broad-scale 
clearing in New South 
Wales  
Command and 
control, Economic 
Permits required to clear vegetation, granted on 
condition of improving or maintaining 
environmental outcomes. Approval not required 
to clear regrowth vegetation or for routine 
agricultural activities 
Productivity 
Commission, 2004 
2008 
BioBanking under 
Threatened Species 
Conservation (Biodiversity 
Banking) Regulation 2007 
To address the loss of 
biodiversity values from 
habitat degradation Economic 
Created a market where biodiversity credits 
could be bought and sold 
Department of 
Environment and 
Climate Change 2007, 
Gibbons 2009 
Queensland 
2000 
Vegetation Management Act 
1999 
To preserve endangered 
ecosystems,  prevent land 
degradation, maintain 
biodiversity 
Command and 
control 
Regulates the clearing of vegetation on freehold 
land. Clearing of regrowth vegetation still 
allowed 
Kehoe, 2009; 
McGrath, 2007 
2003 
Vegetation (Applications for 
Clearing) Act 2003 
To restrict vegetation 
clearing 
Command and 
control 
Imposed a moratorium on applications to clear 
remnant vegetation on freehold and leasehold 
land  McGrath, 2007 
2004 
Vegetation Management and 
Other Legislation Bill 2004  
Command and 
control  
Kehoe, 2009; 
McGrath, 2007 
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2006 
Vegetation Management and 
Other Legislation Bill 2004 
To end broadscale 
clearing of remnant 
vegetation.  
End of broadscale 
clearing in Queensland 
Command and 
control 
A ballot for clearing of 500,000 hectares was 
held in September 2004. All clearing permits 
issued under the ballot expired on 31 December 
2006. Development applications guided by State 
Policy for Vegetation Management (2006). 
Provided $150 million of financial assistance 
over five years 
Giskes, 2004; 
McGrath, 2007 
2008 
Queensland Government 
Environmental Offsets 
Policy (QGEOP) 
incorporating the Policy for 
Vegetation Management 
Offsets (2007) 
To counterbalance 
unavoidable, negative 
environmental impacts 
that result from a 
development. 
Command and 
control, Economic 
A vegetation management offset may be secured 
to meet the performance requirements of a 
Regional Vegetation Management Code under 
the Vegetation Management Act 1999. 
Proponents may directly secure and manage an 
offset, engage a third party, or pay into an offset 
fund. 
Queensland 
Government, 2008 
2009 
Vegetation Management and 
Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2009 
To regulate clearing of 
regrowth vegetation 
Command and 
control 
Amendments to the VMA 1999 to protect 'high 
value regrowth' Taylor, 2015 
Victoria 2003 
Victoria’s Native Vegetation 
Management - A Framework 
for Action (2002) 
To achieve a state-wide 
Net Gain in the extent and 
quality of native 
vegetation 
Command and 
control, 
Information 
Given regulatory force in 2003 when changes 
were made to the Victoria Planning Provisions 
(VPP). Framework must be considered when 
assessing proposals to clear vegetation 
Department of 
Sustainability and 
Environment, 2010 
2006 BushBroker 
To facilitate achievement 
of state-wide Net Gain 
target Economic 
Created a market where native vegetation credits 
could be bought and sold 
Nemes et al., 2008; 
O’Connor, 2009; 
Stoneham et al., 2003  
Western 
Australia 
2004 
Environmental Protection 
(Clearing of Native 
Vegetation) Regulations 
2004 under the  
Environmental Protection 
Act 1986  
Conservation, 
preservation, protection, 
enhancement and 
management of the 
environment 
Command and 
control 
Amendments introduced provisions for 
regulating the clearing of native vegetation on all 
land in Western Australia via a permit system. 
Approval conditions may include establishing a 
vegetation offset or contribution to an offset fund Squelch, 2007 
2006 
Environmental Offsets 
Position Statement no. 9 
To achieve a ‘net 
environmental benefit' 
from new developments 
Command and 
control, Economic 
Formalised offsetting provisions in Western 
Australia after being considered on an ad-hoc 
basis since at least 2000 
Environmental 
Protection Authority, 
2006, 2008; Hayes and 
Morrison-Saunders, 
2007 
Tasmania 2002 Forest Practices Act 1985 
To regulate non-
commercial clearing 
Command and 
control 
Amendments in 2002 prohibit non-commercial 
clearing of forest for agricultural purposes 
Bartel, 2004; 
Bricknell, 2010 
Northern 
Territory 2002 
Land clearing guidelines 
2002 under the Planning Act 
(PA) 1999 and Pastoral 
Land Act (PLA) 1992 
To minimise the impact of 
land clearing on natural 
resources 
Command and 
control 
Clearing on freehold, Crown and indigenous land 
regulated by PA 1999, where landholders are 
required to obtain a permit to clear more than 1ha 
of native vegetation. Consent required to clear on 
pastoral land under the PLA 1992 
Northern Territory 
Government, 2005 
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Table 2.4. Major native vegetation policies over 2010-2016 
Jurisdiction Year Policy name Policy intent 
Instrument type 
(Gunningham 
and Sinclair, 
1999) Details Source 
Commonwealth 
2012 
Australia’s Native Vegetation 
Framework 
To deliver a net national 
increase in native vegetation 
extent and connectivity by 
2020 
Voluntarism, 
Information 
Framework to guide actions across government 
strategies, policies, legislation and programs 
related to native vegetation managemen 
COAG Standing 
Council on 
Environment and 
Water, 2012  
2012 
EPBC Act Environmental 
Offsets Policy 
To maintain or improve 
viability of Matters of 
National Environmental 
Significance 
Command and 
control, Economic 
Limited remit over vegetation clearance, but 
relevant as assumed baseline trajectory of 
biodiversity decline runs counter to goal of 2012 
Native Vegetation Framework 
Australian 
Government, 
2012 
New South 
Wales 
2013 
Native Vegetation Regulation 
2013 under the NVA 2003 
To deliver a balanced regime 
of environmental protection 
and efficient agricultural 
management 
Self-regulation, 
Information 
Self-assessable codes to be made for certain 
common clearing activities without the need for a 
permit 
Byron et al., 
2014; Lane, 2013; 
Parker, 2013 
2014 
NSW biodiversity offsets 
policy for major projects 
To achieving long-term 
conservation outcomes while 
enabling development 
Command and 
control, Economic 
Currently applies only to state significant 
development and infrastructure, but recommended 
for expansion to all development activities by 
Byron et al., 2014 
Byron et al., 
2014; 
Queensland 
2011 
Queensland Biodiversity 
Offset Policy (version 1)  
To ensure that there is no net 
loss of biodiversity 
Command and 
control, Economic 
Offsets may be provided directly, through a third-
party, or as a payment to a trust fund 
Department of 
Environment and 
Resource 
Management, 
2011 
2012 
Vegetation Management 
Regulation 2012 under the 
Vegetation Management 
Framework Amendment Act 
2013 
To reduce red tape and 
regulatory burden, simplify 
vegetation management 
framework, and maintain 
sustainable vegetation clearing 
practices to protect native 
vegetation 
Self-regulation, 
Information 
Introduced a series of self-assessable codes for 
vegetation clearing, removed regulations on 'high 
value' regrowth clearing, introduced permitted 
clearing for necessary environmental clearing, 
high and irrigated high value agricultural clearing 
Taylor, 2013; 
2015 
2014 
Queensland Biodiversity 
Offset Policy Version 1.0 and 
Version 1.1 under the 
Environmental Offsets 
Regulation 2014 and 
Environmental Offsets Act 
2014 
To counterbalance significant 
residual impacts on matters of 
national, State or local 
environmental significance 
Command and 
control, Economic 
Offsets may be provided directly, through a third-
party, or as a financial settlement 
State of 
Queensland, 2014 
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2016 
Vegetation Management 
(Reinstatement) and Other 
Legislation Amendment Bill 
2016 
To reduce deforestation rates 
and consequential carbon 
emissions 
Command and 
control 
If passed, the Bill would reinstate the Vegetation 
Management Act 1999 as per the 2009 
amendments. The protection of high value 
regrowth would be extended to three additional 
Great Barrier Reef catchments, and environmental 
offsetting would be required for all residual 
impacts on prescribed environmental matters 
rather than only significant residual impacts 
State of 
Queensland, 2016 
Victoria 2013 
Permitted clearing of native 
vegetation – Biodiversity 
assessment guidelines (2013) 
To improve and strengthen the 
regulatory system to deliver 
better outcomes for the 
environment and the 
community 
Self-regulation, 
Command and 
control, 
Information 
Replaces "Victoria’s Native Vegetation – A 
Framework for Action" as incorporated document 
in the Victoria Planning Provisions (VPP). Permit 
required to clear vegetation only where there is a 
"high risk" to biodiversity 
Department of 
Environment and 
Primary 
Industries, 
2013a,b 
South Australia 2013 
Native Vegetation 
(Miscellaneous) Amendment 
Act 2013 
To deliver more flexible 
arrangements for managing 
native vegetation  
Command and 
control, Economic 
Amendments to the NVA 1991 to introduce a the 
Third Party Significant Environmental Benefit 
Offsets Scheme 
South Australian 
Government, 
2013 
Western 
Australia 
2011 
WA Environmental Offsets 
Policy 
To ensure economic and 
social development may occur 
while supporting long term 
environmental and 
conservation values 
Command and 
control, Economic 
‘Like for like' no longer required, offset must be 
‘proportionate’ to the significance of the 
environmental value being impacted 
Western 
Australian 
Government, 
2011 
2013 
Environmental Protection 
(Clearing of Native 
Vegetation) Regulations 2004 
under the Environmental 
Protection Act 1986  
To reduce unnecessary 
regulatory burden without 
compromising significant 
environmental values 
Command and 
control 
Amendment in 2013 allows landholders to clear 
up to 5 hectares per year on individual properties, 
and maintain cleared areas for pasture for up to 20 
years without requiring a permit 
Department of 
Environment 
Regulation, 2014 
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The beginnings of reform: 1970 - 1989 
The beginnings of policy reform occurred in South Australia, which by 1975 had cleared 
75% of the native vegetation within its agricultural zone (nearly 20% of the total State area; 
Australian Greenhouse Office 2000; Bartel 2004). The State’s first policy effort in 1980 
aimed to provide incentives for the retention of native vegetation on private property via 
legally binding agreements. Heritage Agreements were the first example of conservation 
covenants in Australia (Bartel, 2004), and provided financial assistance to cover land, fencing 
and management costs, but did not compensate for the opportunity costs agricultural 
production. Landholders who engaged with Heritage Agreements were those who held 
conservation-oriented values, whereas the policy did little to change the behaviour of 
landholders who were clearing extensively (Harris, 2013). Once it became clear that Heritage 
Agreements had failed to reduce deforestation, the State’s first clearing controls were 
attached to the Planning Act 1982, which also included an extensive compensation scheme. 
In 1983, the requirement under the Crown Lands Act 1929 to clear vegetation as a condition 
of lease was removed (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000). With the introduction of the 
Native Vegetation Management Act (NVMA) 1985, South Australia became the first State in 
Australia to restrict the clearing of native vegetation on private property (Table 2.1, Bartel 
2004). The introduction of the Native Vegetation Act (NVA) 1991 removed the compensation 
arrangements which were part of the NVMA 1985.  Clearing permits are granted under the 
NVA 1991 on the condition of vegetation being compensated elsewhere, making South 
Australia arguably the first State to adopt environmental offsetting. Despite being an early 
adopter of native vegetation policies, South Australia may be an example of a State where 
deforestation rates have declined simply because there was little land left to clear (Bartel 
2004, Figure 2.4).   
Early policies in Western Australia were focused on soil conservation and the control of 
salinity (Table 2.1, Australian Greenhouse Office 2000). Statewide controls on the rate and 
extent of clearing were introduced in 1986 under the Soil and Land Conservation Act 
(SALCA) 1942 which required landholders to obtain a permit to clear 1ha or more of native 
vegetation (Slee, 1998). In Queensland, deforestation was still strongly encouraged by 
Government. Concerns were raised by scientists in the early 1980s about the extent of 
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vegetation loss in the Brigalow Belt regions and its impacts on biodiversity, but this had little 
effect on the rate of deforestation (Bailey, 1984; Seabrook et al., 2006).  
 In 1989, the Victorian Native Vegetation Retention (NVR) controls under the Planning and 
Environment Act 1987 introduced the requirement that landholders acquire a permit to 
remove, destroy or lop native vegetation. This arguably marked the end to broad-scale 
clearing in Victoria (Department of Natural Resources and Environment, 2002).   
High rates of loss: 1990 - 1999 
In response to rising public concern about environmental degradation and biodiversity loss 
(Council of Australian Governments, 1992), several state governments initiated major policy 
reforms to control deforestation (Table 2.2). In 1995, the Queensland Land Act 1994 was 
introduced to control vegetation clearing on leasehold and State land (Rolfe, 2000). At this 
time, clearing on freehold land was still regulated by local governments under the Local 
Government Act (LGA) 1993 and the Planning and Environment Act 1990 (Slee, 1998). 
Controls were also implemented in 1995 in New South Wales, with the introduction of the 
State Environmental Planning Policy no. 46 (SEPP 46). The SEPP 46 aimed to “prevent 
inappropriate native vegetation clearance and to ensure that native vegetation is managed in 
the environmental, social and economic interests of the State” (Bombell and Montoya, 2014; 
Slee, 1998). SEPP 46 was soon replaced by the Native Vegetation Conservation Act (NVCA) 
1997, which came into force in 1998. Under the NVCA, landholders were required to gain 
approval to clear native vegetation (Productivity Commission, 2004). In 1997, the Victorian 
government announced a Statewide target of ‘no net loss’ of native vegetation by 2000 as 
part of the State’s biodiversity strategy (Department of Natural Resources and Environment, 
1997).   
Despite these reforms, deforestation rates remained high (Figure 2.3). In 1999, the 
Queensland and New South Wales governments permitted the clearing of over 730,000 
hectares of native vegetation (Australian State of the Environment Committee, 2001; 
Lindenmayer, 2005).    
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A decade of reform: 2000 – 2009 
The high rates of deforestation seen in Queensland continued well into the 2000s. 
Regulations on vegetation clearing on freehold land came into force under the Vegetation 
Management Act (VMA) 1999 in 2000. However, the deforestation rate increased after the 
introduction of the VMA to 528,000 ha/year over 2001 to 2003 (Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines, 2005). It was not until 2006 that amendments to the VMA phased out 
broad-scale clearing of remnant vegetation. A moratorium on clearing applications in May 
2003 signaled the Government’s intention to end broad-scale clearing of vegetation by 2006 
(Kehoe, 2009; McGrath, 2007). This policy change has been credited with the national drop 
in deforestation from 2007 onwards (ABARES, 2014). An offsets policy was released in 
2007 to assist proponents in meeting requirements under the amended VMA, which was 
incorporated into a broader environmental offsets policy in the following year (Queensland 
Government, 2008).  Further amendments to the VMA came into force in 2009 which created 
protection for ‘high value’ regrowth (vegetation not cleared since 31 December 1989) in 
‘priority’ Great Barrier Reef catchments (Macintosh 2012) (Table 2.3), after a temporary 
moratorium earlier in that year.  
In 2005, the New South Wales Native Vegetation Act (NVA) 2003 came into force, which 
prohibited of clearing native vegetation unless it could be demonstrated that it would 
“improve or maintain environmental outcomes” (Gibbons and Lindenmayer, 2007). An 
offset policy was formalized in 2008 with the introduction of the BioBanking scheme, which 
aimed to create a market for vegetation offsets in New South Wales (Gibbons et al., 2009). 
The NVA 2003 has been credited with the dramatic decline in approved clearing in NSW 
after 2005 (Taylor and Dickman, 2014). However, exempted and illegal clearing likely still 
occurred at a high rate (Bricknell, 2010; Gibbons, 2012) although these statistics are not 
publicly reported (Taylor and Dickman, 2014). A statutory review of the NVA 2003 in 2009 
concluded that the Act remained valid and that no fundamental changes were necessary, 
though some stakeholders expressed concerns about lack of flexibility in restrictions, policy 
overlap and complexity, and the level of Government enforcement (Bombell and Montoya, 
2014; Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water NSW, 2009). 
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Victoria revised its Statewide ‘no net loss’ goal in 2003 with the introduction of the Victorian 
Native Vegetation Management Framework, which aimed to achieve a Statewide net gain in 
vegetation extent and quality (Department of Natural Resources and Environment, 2002). 
However, the objective for ‘permitted clearing’ on private land was still to achieve a ‘no net 
loss’ (Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2012).  Subsequent evaluations have 
indicated that neither the Statewide or permitted clearing goals been met (Dart and Grossek, 
2007; Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2008). Amendments in 2006 to the 
Victoria Planning Provisions (VPP) aimed to simplify the permitting process for local 
councils and to provide consistency across the State (Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, 2010).  The BushTender and BushBroker programs were initiated in 2007 to 
provide landholders opportunities to sell and purchase vegetation credits, respectively 
(Nemes et al., 2008; O’Connor, 2009; Stoneham et al., 2003).   
Reforms also occurred in Western Australia, with the amendment of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1986 (WA) to provide stricter and more consistent controls for clearing native 
vegetation across the State (Squelch, 2007). The Western Australian government also 
formalized an environmental offset policy in 2006 after releasing several guidance and 
position statements in the preceding years (Hayes and Morrison-Saunders, 2007).  
The decade of reform saw the introduction of significant controls on deforestation in 
Queensland and New South Wales, and ambitious commitments in Victoria. Primary 
deforestation was substantially reduced across the country (Figure 2.2), and many heralded 
this time as the end of land clearing in Australia (McGrath, 2007; Squelch, 2007; The 
Wilderness Society, 2007). However, landholders have generally been opposed to top-down 
regulation (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000; Bartel and Barclay, 2011), and concerns 
about policy duplication, inconsistencies and inefficiencies became more prominent over 
time (Productivity Commission, 2004).  
Contemporary policy responses: 2010 to 2016 
While the previous decade was marked by increasingly tight restrictions on deforestation 
across Australia, policy responses from 2010 have followed a trend of relaxing these controls 
(Table 2.4). In 2011, the newly elected government of New South Wales announced a 
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statutory review into the Native Vegetation Regulation 2005 made under the Native 
Vegetation Act 2003 (Stoner and Parker, 2013) in an effort to “strike the right balance 
between sustainable agriculture and protecting the environment”. Following the release of 
the review’s independent report in 2013 (Lane, 2013), the NSW government introduced self-
assessable codes which permitted landholders to undertake “low impact clearing activities” 
such as clearing of paddock trees, removal of invasive native species and native vegetation 
thinning without requiring approval. Concerns about the relaxation of native vegetation 
policies were raised by the environmental sector (Taylor and Dickman, 2014), while the 
changes were reported as being generally welcomed by landholders (Condon and Bryant, 
2013). A comprehensive review of the NVA 2003 and related biodiversity policies was 
announced in mid-2014, and the final report released December 2014 (Byron et al., 2014). 
In their report, Byron and colleagues recommended the repeal of the NVA 2003, and 
combining native vegetation regulations with other biodiversity policies under a single 
Biodiversity Conservation Act. They also argued that the ‘improve or maintain’ test under 
the NVA 2003 is “unnecessary and burdensome at the site scale”, and that offsite, third-party 
biodiversity offsetting should be applied to all environmental impacts (rather than only to 
threatened species and communities), along with increased investment in conservation on 
private and public lands. At the time of writing (May 2016), it appears that the reforms 
recommended by Byron and colleagues have yet to be drafted into legislation (Druce and 
Foley, 2015).  
The Victorian government initiated a review of the Native Vegetation Management 
Framework in 2012, in an effort to improve regulatory performance through the reduction of 
“red tape” (Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2012). The reforms introduced in 
2013 provided a risk-based approach to the regulation of vegetation clearing, whereby only 
“moderate” or “high” risk clearing required on-site assessment, and offsetting of ecological 
impacts (Department of Environment and Primary Industries, 2013). The Statewide goal for 
native vegetation was again revised, this time to “No net loss in the contribution made by 
native vegetation to Victoria’s biodiversity”. 
Following a series of reviews from 2009 to 2011, Western Australia’s native vegetation 
regulations were amended in late 2013 (Department of Environment Regulation, 2014). 
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Landholders are now permitted to clear up to 5 hectares per year on individual properties, 
and maintain cleared areas for pasture for up to 20 years without requiring a permit.  The 
report from a recent senate inquiry into the gazetting of environmentally sensitive areas 
(ESAs) in Western Australia argues that the State’s native vegetation regulations are  
“confusing” and “complex”; and financially disadvantage landowners (Standing Committee 
on the Environment and Public Affairs, 2015).  
Perhaps the most environmentally significant policy change since 2010 has occurred in 
Queensland, where the latest data indicate that 266,191 hectares of forest was cleared in 
2013-146. This is the highest deforestation rate recorded in Queensland since the end of broad 
scale clearing permits in 2006 (Bulinski et al., 2016; Department of Science, Information 
Technology and Innovation, 2015). Amendments to the Vegetation Management Act 1999 in 
2013 permitted landholders to clear remnant native vegetation to establish for ‘high value 
agriculture’, removed restrictions on clearing ‘high value’ regrowth, and removed the 
requirement to obtain a permit under the Water Act 2000 to clear native vegetation in 
watercourses. Existing investigations into alleged non-compliance with the VMA were put 
on hold (Cripps, 2012). In response, prominent Queensland ecologists issued a public 
statement which argued against the removal of clearing restrictions (Maron, Catteral, et al., 
2013), and the World Wildlife Fund has warned that Australia may again become a global 
hotspot for deforestation (Taylor, 2013, 2015; WWF International, 2015). In 2015, the newly 
elected Queensland Government promised to reinstate the provisions of the Vegetation 
Management Act 1999 which were removed as part of the 2013 amendments by the previous 
government led by Premier Campbell Newman. At the time of writing (May 2016), the 
Vegetation Management (Reinstatement) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2016 (State 
of Queensland, 2016) has not yet been passed by the Queensland Parliament, but is due to be 
reintroduced later in the year. In an effort to prevent a surge in deforestation prior to the 
passage of the tightened regulation (so-called ‘panic clearing’), clearing restrictions would 
                                                 
6 Note that this estimate is provided by Queensland’s SLATS program (Department of Science, Information 
Technology and Innovation, 2015), which considers a broader definition of ‘forest’ and has historically 
reported higher estimates of deforestation than the NCAS (Bulinski et al., 2016; Macintosh, 2012) 
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be applied retrospectively to 17th March 2016 – when the Bill was first introduced to 
Parliament (Chambers, 2016).  
Policy trends  
From the preceding discussion of native vegetation policy reform over the last 40 years, some 
trends emerge. Up until the late 1980s, policies aimed to restrict deforestation were primarily 
framed around soil conservation and salinity prevention, rather than the protection of native 
vegetation itself (Table 1, Slee, 1998). However, increasing public concern for the 
environment in the 1990s and the realization of substantial gains in public land conservation 
saw a shift in focus to regulating native vegetation primarily to reduce environmental 
degradation and biodiversity loss (Table 2.1). From 2000, regulation in most States became 
increasingly ‘command and control’, and the use of satellite imagery for monitoring and 
compliance more widespread (Bartel, 2005, 2008). Offsetting arrangements, either as 
complementary policies or as conditions of approved clearance, were in place within most 
States and Territories by the mid 2010’s (Table 2.3, Maron et al. 2015).  
Over the decade of reform, there was a sense of optimism that Australia’s globally significant 
rates of deforestation had come to an end. However, within 10 years of what was celebrated 
as the end of broad-scale land clearing, major legislative changes have been made which 
relax clearing regulations. This new wave of policy reform is being mirrored in all of the 
high-deforestation States except South Australia, where only minor amendments have been 
made (Table 2.4). Although not clearly reflected in the NCAS data presented in this paper, 
the most recent data from the SLATS program in Queensland suggests there has been a sharp 
rise in deforestation since the government first signaled legislative changes (Department of 
Science, Information Technology and Innovation, 2015; Queensland Audit Office, 2015). In 
the absence of a robust quantitative evaluation, it is not yet clear whether deforestation rates 
have significantly changed following other recent policy changes in New South Wales, 
Victoria and Western Australia.  
The relaxation of State-level native vegetation policies from 2010 has marked a shift in 
emphasis from ‘command and control’, to voluntary compliance and self-regulation. This 
change has occurred in parallel with Federal level efforts to reduce “red tape” in 
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environmental approvals under the EPBC Act (Australian Government, 2014b; Standing 
Committee on the Environment, 2014), the “opening up” (and subsequent re-closing) of 
National Parks to cattle grazing (Beilharz and Taylor, 2015; Tlozek, 2015), as well as 
possible amendments to the EPBC Act to redress what is perceived by some as an imbalance 
between environmental protection and economic opportunity (Senate Legislation Committee 
Environment and Communications, 2015). The most recent announcement by the 
Queensland Government to revert back to ‘command and control’ regulation may suggest 
that the days of voluntary compliance and self-regulation are numbered (State of Queensland, 
2016). However, no other state governments have so far indicated any intention to reinstate 
strict regulatory controls on deforestation. In no other state has such a significant increase in 
deforestation occurred over 2012-2014 as it has in Queensland, which has resulted in the 
release of carbon emissions almost equivalent to the amount secured through the Australian 
Government’s Emissions Reduction Fund (Bulinski et al., 2016). The scale of deforestation 
and its contribution to climate change has provided the Queensland Government a policy 
platform to reinstate the Vegetation Management Act 1999 in its previous form, with the 
intent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and agricultural run-off into the Great Barrier Reef 
(State of Queensland, 2016). 
It is important to consider the broader macroeconomic environment when discussing trends 
in deforestation and policy responses over time (Figure 2.5). The drivers of deforestation are 
highly context specific, and cannot be easily generalized (Geist and Lambin, 2002). Many of 
the factors described by the international literature on deforestation, such as population 
growth, access to roads and shifting cultivation, are not relevant in Australia (Australian 
Greenhouse Office, 2000; Lindenmayer, 2005). Angelsen & Kaimowitz (1999) emphasises 
macroeconomic variables and policy instruments as key ultimate drivers of deforestation. 
Importantly, and rarely discussed in the literature, is the availability of suitable land which 
ultimately limits the amount of primary forest which can be cleared (Australian Greenhouse 
Office, 2000; Bartel, 2004).  
Rainfall, commodity prices and terms of trade are widely known to influence landholder 
clearing decisions (Australian Government, 2013; Macintosh, 2012; Rolfe, 2002). The 
effects of rainfall are complex however (Figure 2.5c), as deforestation may be driven by high 
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rainfall as well as drought conditions – the latter due to the increased production required to 
be profitable (Australian Greenhouse Office 2000).  The relationship between deforestation 
rates and farmer’s terms of trade has been used to estimate historical clearing from 1940 to 
1970 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), as well as to predict deforestation rates up to 2030 
(Australian Government 2013).The Australian economy has undergone a restructure over the 
last several decades, leading to an increased contribution of the mining sector to economic 
growth, and unfavourable economic conditions for the agricultural sector (Connolly and 
Lewis, 2010; Corden, 2012; Gregory, 1976).   
When considered in the context of these broader policy trends and the decline of the 
agricultural sector (Figure 2.5), the recent relaxation of native vegetation policies is not 
altogether surprising. ‘Command and control’ regulation is deeply unpopular amongst many 
rural landholders (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000; Bartel and Barclay, 2011), who had 
historically held the right to clear vegetation without restriction, and indeed had been 
encouraged by Government to do so.  Perceived and real impacts on farm productivity, 
inequitable impacts on landholders, and a large distance between the values and norms held 
by landholders and that of the Government and its policies mean that at least at the present 
time, strict regulations on deforestation are politically unpalatable (Bricknell, 2010; 
Chambers, 2016; Productivity Commission, 2004).  
Future prospects for native vegetation policy in Australia 
It is not yet apparent whether the current trend in deregulation will continue, or if it is simply 
a temporary pushback in the context of a long term trend of clearing decline, worsening 
economic conditions, and the increasing scarcity of primary forest available to clear (Figure 
2.5). As highlighted by the previous section, relying too heavily on regulation can be 
politically costly, and may ultimately lead to policy failure (Bartel and Barclay, 2011). 
Acceptance and compliance with native vegetation policies has proven to be extremely 
difficult to achieve in Australia (Bartel, 2003; Bricknell, 2010).  
A key recommendation made within recent reviews of State-level native vegetation policy is 
the need to consider incentive-based and educational policies in addition to regulatory 
enforcement, in order achieve positive environmental, social and economic outcomes (DSE 
Chapter Two: Deforestation in Australia 
 
 
54 
 
2012, Byron 2014). Arguments in favour of using a diversity of instruments to meet 
environmental policy goals are not new (Bartel, 2008; Bricknell, 2010; Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2009; Dovers and Hussey, 2013), but the strengths and weaknesses of all policy 
options must be clearly considered (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999). The recent increased 
emphasis on policies such as biodiversity offsetting, private conservation agreements and 
carbon farming is analysed below. 
Biodiversity offsetting 
Biodiversity offsetting has been increasingly emphasized as an approach which can deliver 
environmental outcomes in a more flexible and efficient manner (Chapters Five to Seven, 
Byron et al., 2014; Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), and policies are now in place at the 
Federal and State levels. While offsetting can provide efficiencies over regulatory 
approaches, generally it can only maintain existing trajectories of deforestation and 
biodiversity loss, rather than slow or reverse the decline (Maron et al. 2015). As highlighted 
by Maron and colleagues, all Australian offset policies aim to achieve a ‘no net loss’ of 
biodiversity relative to a business-as-usual scenario. In fact, most policies assume a 
background rate of loss that is far higher than the existing rate of deforestation, meaning that 
offset policies have the potential to exacerbate biodiversity loss. This issue is one of a range 
of perverse outcomes that can occur as a result of widespread adoption of biodiversity 
offsetting (Gordon et al., 2015), hence regulation will still be necessary if deforestation is to 
be reduced or reversed. Indeed, regulation effectively sets the ‘cap’ on permitted 
environmental impacts, and thus is required to create the demand for a functioning 
environmental market (Salzman and Ruhl, 2000). 
Private conservation agreements 
The importance of providing incentives to protect native vegetation, wildlife and associated 
ecosystem services on private land is also regularly highlighted by commentators (Byron et 
al., 2014; Commonwealth of Australia, 2009; Fitzsimons, 2015; Hardy et al., 2016). Private 
land stewardship is a critical component of Australia’s biodiversity conservation efforts, 
given that the majority (74%) of the continent is freehold, leasehold or under Indigenous 
management (Geoscience Australia, 1993). It should be made clear, however, that increasing 
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the area of land privately (or indeed, publicly) managed for conservation does little to reduce 
the overall deforestation rate if they do not prevent the loss of forest (Maron et al., 2013; 
McDonald-Madden et al., 2009). As was the case in the early South Australian Heritage 
Agreements, landholders who enter into voluntary conservation agreements are generally 
already sympathetic to nature conservation, and the incentives provided are not enough to 
change land use decisions at a large scale.  Landholders whose values do not align with 
conservation are not likely to change land practices unless it is economically profitable to do 
so – and even then, social and cultural norms can provide an additional barrier to participation 
(Bartel and Barclay 2011).  As with other incentive-based programs, private conservation 
agreements are usually small-scale, prone to adverse selection (Ferraro, 2008), and subject 
to short-term funding cycles (Senate Environment and Communications References 
Committee, 2015). The efficacy of private conservation areas can also be compromised 
where land use conflicts are not resolved (Adams and Moon, 2013).  
Carbon farming 
Carbon farming also offers potential benefits for native vegetation protection and restoration, 
assuming a there is a market price on carbon emissions (Chapter Four, Crossman et al., 2011; 
Evans et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2013) and perverse impacts on biodiversity are avoided 
(Lindenmayer et al., 2012). Similar to private conservation agreements, factors such as high 
transaction costs, policy complexity and cultural norms can act as barriers to landholder 
participation in carbon farming projects (Macintosh, 2013). A key difference is that carbon 
farming can be more profitable than existing agricultural land uses, particularly in marginal 
areas where significant economies of scale exist (Evans et al., 2015). While unlikely to be 
influenced by reforestation and afforestation projects, the rate of deforestation can be reduced 
where genuine avoided loss can be secured. As with other incentive-based schemes, carbon 
farming can only genuinely prevent or reverse forest loss if regulatory controls on 
deforestation exist.  At present, the Australian Government’s carbon farming policy 
(Australian Government, 2014a) provides incentives for landholders to undertake avoided 
deforestation and reforestation, while State-level native vegetation policies have all recently 
been relaxed. This inconsistency in policy approach means that the environmental benefits 
generated by the Federal policy have largely been negated by recent increased deforestation 
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(Bulinski et al., 2016; Department of Science, Information Technology and Innovation, 
2015) and creates significant policy uncertainty for landholders (Elks, 2016). 
The need for an effective policy mix 
Incentive-based policies such as those outlined above are attractive as they can afford 
flexibility and efficiencies that traditional regulation cannot provide. Although it is sensible 
to consider the potential benefits offered by a range of policy instruments, there can be a 
temptation to recommend them as alternatives, rather than complements to regulation, or 
without a clear assessment of their likely efficacy (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). A 
combination of ‘command and control’ regulation, self-regulation, incentive-based and 
educational instruments will generally perform better than any single instrument in meeting 
a policy objective (Dovers and Hussey, 2013; Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999). Based on the 
most recent deforestation trends and the history of native vegetation policy in Australia, it 
appears that a coordinated and mutually supportive policy mix has yet to be achieved with 
respect to effectiveness, equity and social and political feasibility.   
Very little is actually known of the effectiveness of the various policy responses to 
deforestation over the last 40 years. Few government-sponsored evaluations are available 
(but see: Dart and Grossek, 2007; Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2008), and 
available data are often inadequate to conduct a rigorous evaluation (Byron et al., 2014). 
Environmental policies are notoriously difficult to evaluate, as environmental problems are 
generally complex, involve considerable uncertainties, and require detailed measurements 
and specialist methods to attribute a policy intervention to an observed response (Ferraro, 
2009; Keene and Pullin, 2011; Mickwitz, 2003). The efficacy of policy responses to 
deforestation can only be reliably evaluated by considering observed deforestation rates 
(including regulated, exempted and illegal clearing), in addition to the other drivers of land 
management behaviour (Bartel 2004).  
While it is recognized that macroeconomic, environmental and institutional arrangements all 
have an effect on deforestation rates (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Geist and Lambin, 
2002), how these variables interact and ultimately drive deforestation in Australia is poorly 
understood.  Nonetheless, the reduction in deforestation since the 1990s has been attributed 
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to government intervention in several instances (Australian Government, 2013; Department 
of Environment and Resource Management, 2010; Garnaut, 2008). Macintosh (2012) argues 
that such suggestions are misleading, or at least incomplete, without explicitly considering 
the effects of commodity prices, terms of trade and rainfall on deforestation rates. A 
comprehensive evaluation of the impact of native vegetation policies on deforestation in 
Australia over time is needed, but this would require adequate data, appropriate methods and 
a willingness by relevant stakeholders to conduct such an analysis.  
The lack of clear evidence for the historical effectiveness of Australia’s native vegetation 
policies is extremely problematic, given the time and effort devoted to their design, 
implementation and review. Despite the introduction of a raft of policies aimed to reduce 
deforestation over the last 40 years, monitoring, evaluation and enforcement have been 
hampered by a lack of resources and information (Bartel, 2003; Bricknell, 2010; Nicol et al., 
2014). The advent of satellite imagery was at one stage heralded as a new beginning that 
would enable greater monitoring and evaluation, and encourage compliance with clearing 
regulations (Bartel, 2005; Purdy, 2009). We have, however, yet to see a revolution in our 
understanding of native vegetation policy effectiveness in Australia.  A key step required to 
deliver a more effective policy mix for addressing deforestation is therefore to invest a greater 
proportion of resources to monitoring, evaluation and compliance. 
Conclusions 
Native vegetation policy has been an extraordinarily active policy space in Australia over the 
last 40 years. Initially motivated by concerns around soil conservation and salinity, a growing 
interest around biodiversity conservation and ecologically sustainable development drove a 
wave of policy reforms over the 1990’s and 2000’s, which placed strict regulations on 
deforestation. An interest in providing landholders with flexibility and economic incentives 
to retain and restore vegetation saw the proliferation of offset policies from 2000 onwards. 
Since 2010, several Australian States have amended their native vegetation policies to place 
greater emphasis on self-regulation and voluntary compliance, in an effort to restore 
‘balance’ between meeting environmental, social and economic objectives.  The most recent 
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increase in deforestation in Queensland has triggered a potential shift back to ‘command and 
control’, but at present it does not appear that the other States will soon follow suit.  
Other than in Queensland, it is not yet clear whether this shift to self-regulation has preceded 
an increase in deforestation. Deforestation results as a combination of institutional, 
macroeconomic and environmental factors; hence a change in the rate of deforestation cannot 
be attributed to any particular event without a rigorous evaluation.  The long-term trend in 
Australia over 1972-2014 is of a gradual decline in the rate of deforestation relative to the 
amount of primary forest available to clear on suitable land. Faced with worsening economic 
conditions and the expansion of agriculture into increasingly marginal areas, deforestation 
for agricultural, urban and industrial development will likely cease being economically viable 
before all of the remaining primary forest is cleared. However, the raft of policies 
implemented over the last 40 years illustrates that there is a desire in the Australian 
community to limit deforestation for a range of environmental objectives.  To be effective, 
native vegetation policies therefore need to induce a ‘forest transition’ before deforestation 
meets its economic and environmental limits (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Lambin and 
Meyfroidt, 2011; Rudel et al., 2005). Ultimately, Australia has means to achieve this goal – 
it is a question of whether it is socially and politically feasible.  
Environmental policy is made in the context of broader socio-political and economic trends. 
The recent shift towards self-regulation, flexibility and economic instruments reflects these 
broader societal trends – but this shift in focus on policy instrument type does not necessarily 
mean there will be a change in policy effectiveness. All environmental policy instruments, 
regardless of whether they are ‘command and control’, self-regulation, economic or 
informational require monitoring, evaluation and enforcement if they are to be effective 
(Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999). Historically, these crucial steps in the policy process have 
been poorly executed with respect to Australia’s native vegetation and biodiversity (Bartel 
2003, Bricknell 2010). Ensuring that there is far greater capacity to monitor and evaluate the 
impacts of native vegetation policies will assist in delivering more effective, efficient and 
equitable outcomes. 
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Abstract 
Reducing and redressing the effects of deforestation is a complex public policy challenge, and 
evaluating the efficacy of such policy efforts is crucial for policy learning and adaptation. 
Deforestation in high-income nations can contribute substantially to global forest loss, despite the 
presence of strong institutions and high policy capacity. Here we employ a nonlinear mixed-effects 
statistical framework to evaluate what evidence may exist for the impact of recent successive 
regulatory policies aimed at reducing deforestation in Queensland, Australia. Over 5.5 million 
hectares of native vegetation has been cleared in Queensland since 1988, amounting to more than 
half of Australia’s historical deforestation. We combine satellite imagery of forest loss with 
macroeconomic, land tenure, biophysical and climatic variables within a single spatially explicit 
bent-cable regression, and collectively model deforestation for 50 local government areas (LGAs) 
across Queensland. We find that annual % growth in GDP was the only clear driver of LGA-
specific deforestation after adjusting for other covariate effects. Our model shows strong evidence 
of spatial contagion in deforestation, and this effect is influenced by the dominant land tenure type 
within each LGA. We find our model exhibits a “bend” mostly between 2000 and 2007, consistent 
with expectations, but the signal is not particularly strong due extreme variation in deforestation 
trends between and within LGAs. Our results demonstrate that the bent-cable model is a promising 
technique for detecting system changes in response to policy interventions, but future work should 
be conducted at a national scale to provide more data points, and incorporate more LGA-specific 
data to improve model goodness-of-fit. 
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Highlights 
• Deforestation can be globally significant in high-income nations with strong governance 
• Over 5.5 million hectares of forest has been cleared in Queensland, Australia, since 1988 
• A spatially explict bent-cable regression was used to model deforestation  
• Strong evidence for spatial contagion in deforestation influenced by LGA land tenure  
• Some evidence of state-wide policy effect due to extreme variation in LGA deforestation 
responses 
Key words: deforestation, regulation, environmental policy, bent-cable regression, Bayesian 
inference, hierarchical modeling, longitudinal data, spatial correlation   
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Introduction 
Effective control of deforestation is crucial to ensure sustainable provision of ecosystem services 
and the conservation of biodiversity (Kirby et al., 2006; Lambin et al., 2001; Vitousek et al., 1997).  
Public policies such as protected areas (Andam et al., 2008; Ferraro et al., 2013; Gaveau et al., 
2009; Joppa and Pfaff, 2011; Nolte et al., 2013), regulations and market intervention (Arima et al., 
2014; Busch et al., 2015; Gaveau et al., 2012; Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013; Nepstad et al., 2014; 
Soares-Filho et al., 2014) and payments for ecosystem services (Arriagada et al., 2012; Liu et al., 
2008; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007) can contribute to a reduction in forest loss. Not all policies 
have proved effective however, with some producing perverse outcomes (Brandt et al., 2016; 
Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2009) and many more policy interventions having not been evaluated for 
their efficacy (Ferraro, 2009; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014; Miteva et al., 2012). An understanding 
of the efficacy of policy measures taken to control deforestation, and the varied institutional, social 
and political conditions in which they are adopted, implemented and enforced (Ferraro et al., 2011; 
Nolte et al., 2017), is critical for policy learning and adaptation.  
Disentangling the effects of policy interventions from the varied drivers of deforestation is a 
complex evaluation challenge. Broader macroeconomic trends and policy drivers ultimately 
influence local market conditions and institutional settings, which in turn affect the deforestation 
behavior of agents (Angelsen, 2010; Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Geist and Lambin, 2002). 
The availability of arable land and forest resources also influences how much deforestation occurs 
locally, and how much is displaced elsewhere (Bartel, 2004; Evans, 2016; Meyfroidt and Lambin, 
2009). How these variables interact and influence deforestation in a particular context cannot 
easily be generalized (Geist and Lambin, 2002), hence there is a need to evaluate the efficacy of a 
broad range of instruments across multiple locations and policy settings (Miteva et al., 2012). 
Much of the published work on deforestation drivers and policy interventions has been in the 
tropics, perhaps due to the high rates of deforestation observed in this region (Hansen et al., 2013; 
Keenan et al., 2015), and the global significance of tropical forests for biodiversity, livelihoods, 
climate regulation and food production (Laurance, 1999; Laurance et al., 2012, 2014). Population 
growth (DeFries et al., 2010; Jha and Bawa, 2006), roads and access to markets (Kirby et al., 2006; 
Laurance, 2001), agricultural commodity prices and currency exchange rates (Barbier and 
Rauscher, 1994; Ewers et al., 2008; Richards et al., 2012), presence and strength of institutions 
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(Dolisca et al., 2007; Fearnside, 2001; Messina et al., 2006; Nolte et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 
2014) and degree of policy enforcement (Arima et al., 2014; le Polain de Waroux et al., 2016) have 
all been found to influence tropical deforestation. However, less attention has been paid to 
deforestation drivers and policy responses in high income nations (Busch and Ferretti-Gallon, 
2017), which have contributed substantially to global forest loss (Hansen et al., 2010, 2013) despite 
having comparatively strong governance (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004; Deacon, 1994). Australia 
is one such example, where recent deforestation rates have been globally significant (Evans, 2016; 
FAO, 2001; Keenan et al., 2015; Macintosh, 2012), yet thus far there have been no quantitative 
evaluation of the effectiveness of policies introduced to reduce forest loss. 
Here, we conduct such an evaluation to establish what, if any, effect the introduction of regulatory 
policies have had on the rate of deforestation in the state of Queensland, Australia. Forest loss in 
Australia at the turn of the century was the sixth highest in the world (FAO, 2001), and the vast 
majority (58%) of clearing over the last three decades has occurred in Queensland. Successive 
policies have been introduced in Queensland since 1995 in an attempt to control deforestation 
(Evans, 2016; Macintosh, 2012; Rolfe, 2000), with amendments in 2007 said to have signaled the 
“end of broad-scale land clearing” in Australia (Kehoe, 2009; McGrath, 2007). The national 
downturn in forest loss since the 1990’s has been attributed to state-level regulations on native 
vegetation clearing (Australian Government, 2013; Department of Environment and Resource 
Management, 2010; Garnaut, 2008), but with limited empirical basis (Macintosh, 2012). Here, we 
adapt the bent-cable regression model (Chiu et al., 2006; Chiu and Lockhart, 2010; Khan et al., 
2009) to determine the impact of regulatory policies on deforestation in Queensland relative to 
macroeconomic, institutional, biophysical and climatic drivers.  The bent-cable model generalizes 
the broken-stick (piecewise-linear) model by providing a more realistic and flexible representation 
of system changes (Chiu et al., 2006; Chiu and Lockhart, 2010; Toms and Lesperance, 2003), yet 
has so far been under-utilised for policy evaluation (but see Khan et al., 2009, 2012). In particular, 
suppose the policy introduced at time 𝑡 unequivocally results in a reduction in deforestation. Then, 
even after adjusting for driver effects, the temporal trend in deforestation must exhibit a higher 
rate of decline sometime after 𝑡 than the rate before time 𝑡. In reality, any observable impact of an 
environmental policy is rarely unequivocal. In such cases, the bend of an empirically fitted bent 
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cable would provide quantitative clues to the presence and nature of a change in deforestation rate 
before and after the introduction of policies. 
In the remainder of this paper, we first document recent deforestation rates in Queensland, and 
describe how historical and present-date drivers have contributed to forest loss over time.  Second, 
we briefly describe the key policy changes that have occurred in our study region in the past three 
decades, and highlight which interventions we expect to have influenced the rate of deforestation 
beyond the effects of macroeconomic, climatic, biophysical and institutional variables.  Third, we 
provide details on the data used to model deforestation over time, and justify our selection of 
covariates used in the statistical analysis. We then outline our bent-cable regression model 
specification, and report on the results of our analysis. Finally, we discuss the implications of our 
findings for the design and implementation of policies aiming to control deforestation in Australia 
and other forested nations which rely on agriculture and other commodity exports for economic 
development.  
Background 
Study region and policy context 
Queensland is Australia’s second-largest state, covering 170 million hectares (23% of the 
continent). Close to 10 million hectares of forest has been cleared since 1988, of which 31% was 
primary (remnant) forest (Figure 3.1) Agriculture is the primary land use, with extensive grazing 
making up 85% of the state by area, and cropping and other agricultural industries (excluding 
forestry) comprising just 2%. Beef is the state’s most important agricultural commodity, 
contributing AUD 3.3 billion in 2013–14 (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 
2014) which is close to half of Australia’s total production. The majority of land is leasehold 
(63%), with only 25% privately owned (freehold). Leasehold land in Queensland may be held in 
perpetuity or for a fixed term (1-100 years), with tenure issued for a specific purpose (e.g. 
agriculture).  Deforestation occurs disproportionally on freehold land in Queensland (Department 
of Science, Information Technology and Innovation, 2015) and in Australia as a whole (Evans, 
2016).  
Queensland holds the largest remaining area of forest Australia, and the availability of cheap land 
suitable for agriculture has been key historical driver of deforestation (Australian Greenhouse 
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Office, 2000; Evans, 2016). Native vegetation such as Brigalow (Acacia harpophylla) and Mulga 
(Acacia aneura) grow vigorously, and are generally re-cleared in 15 year cycles to maintain 
suitable pasture (Dwyer et al., 2009; Fensham and Guymer, 2009).  Government land development 
schemes, access to cheap finance and tax concessions facilitated early agricultural expansion, but 
most of these incentives were removed by the 1980’s (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000; 
Seabrook et al., 2006). Fluctuations in commodity prices, terms of trade, rainfall and regulatory 
controls on clearing are considered the key contemporary drivers of deforestation in Australia 
(Australian Government, 2013; Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000; Evans, 2016; Marcos-
Martinez et al., 2017).   
 
Figure 3.1.  Deforestation events (including primary and regrowth deforestation) attributed to human 
intervention from 1988 – 2014. Data is sourced from the National Carbon Accounting System (NCAS), 
Australian Department of the Environment (2015, 2016). 
Deforestation in Queensland has occurred at an average rate of 204,000 hectares per year since 
1988 (Figure 3.2). State-wide regulation of native vegetation clearing on leasehold land was first 
introduced under the Land Act 1994 (Figure 3.2 (a), Evans, 2016; Rolfe, 2000), whereas similar 
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controls on freehold properties were enacted five years later under the Vegetation Management 
Act (VMA) 1999 (Figure 3.2 (b), Evans, 2016). The upturn in deforestation in 2000 has been 
attributed to “panic clearing” (McGrath, 2007), where landholders cleared substantial amounts of 
vegetation prior to the VMA coming into effect in an effort to avoid regulation. In 2004, a ballot 
was held for clearing permits totaling 500,000 ha which were all used or expired by 31 December 
2006. This policy change is considered to have effectively reduced deforestation in Queensland to 
its lowest level in the last three decades. The relaxation of the VMA’s regulatory controls in 2013, 
and the subsequent rapid increase in clearing rates (Reside et al., 2017) has added further weight 
to this claim. 
 
Figure 3.2. Annual rate of deforestation in Queensland from 1988-2014, and the introduction of key 
legislations which regulate the clearing of native vegetation. The central piece of legislation is the 
Vegetation Management Act 1999 (b), which came into force in 2000 to regulate vegetation clearing on 
freehold land. Amendments to the VMA in 2004 (d) were said to led to the end of broad-scale land clearing 
by on 31st December 2006 (e). Other legislative changes corresponding to (a), (c) and (f) to (h) are described 
in the Supplementary Material (Appendix 2.1, Table A2.1). Data is sourced from the National Carbon 
Accounting System (NCAS), Australian Department of the Environment (2015, 2016). 
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Materials and Methods 
Deforestation data 
We used national-scale spatial datasets on forest extent and human induced forest change 
(Australian Department of the Environment, 2015, 2016) developed by the Australian Government 
as part of the National Carbon Accounting System (Evans, 2016; NCAS, Furby, 2002; Lehmann 
et al., 2013). The NCAS uses over 7,000 Landsat MSS, TM and ETM+ images to map forest extent 
and change from 1972 to 2014 at a 25 metre resolution across the Australian continent. Note that 
the NCAS classifies imagery according to a definition of ‘forest’ as vegetation with a minimum 
of 20% canopy cover, at least 2 metres high, and with a minimum area of 0.2 hectares.  
Annual forest extent and deforestation data are not available within the NCAS until 2005. Prior to 
then, data are instead captured within multi-year epochs (instances in time), with some epochs (e.g 
1972) containing data for five consecutive years (Australian Department of the Environment, 
2015, 2016; Evans, 2016). We converted deforestation events contained within multi-year epochs 
into annual values by dividing the deforestation that occurred within that epoch by the number of 
years within the epoch (Australian Department of the Environment, 2015; Reddy, S, pers. comm.). 
For example, the 1972 epoch contains deforestation events for 1972 to 1977, hence the annual 
amount of deforestation in those years is the deforestation occurring in the 1972 epoch divided by 
five. To derive annual forest extent values, we simply assumed that the forest extent value in a 
multi-year epoch was equivalent to the corresponding annual values. For example, the area of 
forest extent in the 1988 epoch was assigned as the annual forest extent value for 1988 and 1989.   
Preliminary modelling results suggested that an unreasonable amount of uncertainty in the model 
estimates was a consequence of (a) the lack of real observed data (as opposed to artificially imputed 
data) prior to 1988 and (b) the ambiguity in the definition of primary (remnant) forest extent. 
Therefore, for our final models, we discarded sparse data early in the time series by considering 
all deforestation events and forest extent (Australian Department of the Environment, 2015, 2016) 
from 1988 to 2014 only. By “all deforestation events and forest extent” we did not differentiate 
between primary and regrowth forest as per Evans (2016). 
Using a national land use dataset (ABARES, 2010), we excluded protected areas and areas of 
commercial forestry from the analysis, and so considered deforestation only where the land use 
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was for residential and urban development, agriculture, grazing and mining. local government 
Areas (LGAs) were selected as spatial units of analysis due to their relatively small size and 
alignment with catchment boundaries, which have previously been used spatially differentiate 
native vegetation regulations in Queensland (Evans, 2016). State-level native vegetation 
legislation does not prevent a local planning restrictions on deforestation in an LGA, however the 
State law prevails in the event of inconsistencies (State of Queensland, 1999). We used the ‘raster’ 
package (Hijmans and van Etten, 2012) in R Statistical software (R Development Core Team, 
2017) to summarise forest extent and deforestation data at the LGA level.  
Macroeconomic data 
We extracted key national level indicators (Table 3.1) including the annual percentage growth in 
gross domestic product (GDP, USD in real terms), the value added by agriculture to GDP, and 
terms of trade (The World Bank, 2015). Oil supply constraints are associated with changes in the 
rate of deforestation (Eisner et al., 2016), hence we considered the annual imported crude oil price 
(USD/barrel, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015). We used national scale agricultural 
commodity statistics (ABARES, 2015) as local surveys are not conducted annually. 
Climate data 
Rainfall is a key driver of rural land use decisions (Macintosh, 2012; Rolfe, 2002), and is expected 
to affect deforestation rates independently of broader macroeconomic variables (Australian 
Government, 2013). Queensland regularly experiences periods of drought, and these regional 
climatic extremes can influence observed deforestation rates due to changes in the availability and 
quality of fodder (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000). Spatiotemporal variation in temperature 
and rainfall is also linked to the relative suitability of land for grazing and cropping (Marcos-
Martinez et al., 2017). We obtained spatial data for key climatic variables (Table 3.1) from the 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology (Jones et al., 2009). Rainfall, vapour pressure (‘humidity’) and 
temperature were sourced as monthly averages (Bureau of Meteorology, 2017a, 2017c, 2017b). 
Quantities were calculated within each LGA polygon for each year from 1988 to 2014 using the 
Python Rasterstats package (Perry, 2015).  
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Biophysical data 
We derived slope and elevation data from a 1 second Digital Surface Model (Geoscience Australia, 
2017) to account for the influence of topography on agricultural productivity and deforestation  
(Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Marcos-Martinez et al., 2017; Pressey et al., 1996). Spatial 
variation in vegetation productivity was accounted for using the normalized difference vegetation 
index (Tucker et al., 2014). The mean, median and standard deviation was calculated for each 
LGA using the Rasterstats package (Perry, 2015).  
Land tenure  
We used the most recent national land tenure dataset (Geoscience Australia, 1993) to determine 
the proportion of each LGA held in leasehold, freehold or public tenure.  We derived a spatial 
covariate 𝐿𝑖  (Figure 3.3) to represent the extent to which an LGA 𝑖 is held in leasehold or freehold 
tenure, according to: 
𝐿𝑖 = log
(% 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑+0.01)
(% 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑+0.01)
      
 
Figure 3.3. Land tenure in Queensland (left, Geoscience Australia, 2013) and corresponding tenure 
covariate 𝐿𝑖 calculated for each local government areas (LGAs, n = 74 (total), n = 50 (included in regression 
analysis)) 
. 
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Table 3.1 Key variables considered in our regression analysis during covariate selection, and the covariates selected for inclusion in our final model. 
Details of the covariate selection process is provided in the Appendix 2.2. 
Name Type Description 
Spatial resolution and units Temporal resolution Contained in 
final model? 
Data source 
Original Final Original Final 
Response variable 
Area of 
deforestation 
Environmental 
Extent of total forest loss 
attributed to human 
intervention  0.0002 
degrees; 
25m 
Hectares, 
calculated for 
each LGA 
Available for epochs: 
1972, 1977, 1980, 
1985, 1989, 1991, 
1992, 1995, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, 
annually from 2005 to 
2014 
1988 to 2014 
(annual) 
- 
Australian Department of 
the Environment (2015) 
Area of forest 
extent 
Extent of vegetation classified 
as 'forest' (excluding protected 
areas and commercial 
forestry) 
- 
Australian Department of 
the Environment (2016) 
Proportion of 
deforestation 
(𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
Area of deforestation relative 
to the area of forest available 
to clear in LGA I and year t 
LGA; % Yes Derived 
Explanatory variables 
Rainfall 
Climatic 
Total annual rainfall 
0.05 
degrees; 
5km 
mm, calculated 
for each LGA 
1900 to current 
1988 to 2014 
(annual) 
- 
Bureau of Meteorology 
(2017a) 
Minimum of mean monthly 
minimum observations  
Maximum of mean monthly 
minimum observations  
Vapour pressure 
('humidity') 
Mean of mean monthly 9am 
estimates 
hPa, calculated 
for each LGA 
1989 to 2014 
(annual) 
Yes 
Bureau of Meteorology 
(2017c) 
Temperature 
Mean of mean monthly 
minimum observations 
degrees celsius, 
calculated for 
each LGA 
1990 to 2014 
(annual) 
- 
Bureau of Meteorology 
(2017b) 
Minimum of mean monthly 
minimum observations 
Mean of mean monthly 
maximum observations 
- 
Maximum of mean monthly 
maximum observations 
- 
Land tenure Institutional 
Extent of land tenures across 
Australia 
Polygon 25m raster - - 
Geoscience Australia 
(1993) 
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Tenure covariate 
(𝐿𝑖) 
Log ratio of % freehold to % 
leasehold in each LGA 
Index from -2 to 2.  
Calculated for each LGA 
Spatial 
adjacency 
only 
Derived 
Name Type Description 
Spatial resolution and units Temporal resolution Contained in 
final model? 
Data source 
Original Final Original Final 
Explanatory variables 
Slope 
Biophysical 
Mean, median, minimum, 
maximum 
1 second 
(approx 
30m) 
m, calculated for 
each LGA 
- 
- 
Geoscience Australia 
(2017) 
Elevation Yes (mean) 
NDVI 
Mean of long term mean 
(estimate of productivity) 
10km 
Calculated for 
each LGA 
1981 to 2011 - - Tucker et al. (2014) 
Standard deviation of long 
term mean (estimate of land 
cover variability ) 
Mean of long term standard 
deviation (estimate of 
production variability over 
time) 
 % GDP growth 
(annual) 
Macroeconomic 
% growth in the value of all 
goods and services produced 
in a given year 
National,  % 
1972 to 2014 
1988 to 2014 
(annual) 
Yes 
The World Bank (2015) 
% value added to 
GDP by 
agriculture 
Net output of agriculture after 
adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate 
inputs 
National,  % of GDP 
- 
Inflation 
Rate of price change in the 
economy as a whole 
National, % 
Oil price 
Annual average imported 
crude oil price 
International, USD/barrel 1968 to 2015 Yes 
U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2015) 
Terms of trade 
(ToT) 
Ratio of total export prices to 
import prices 
National 
1972 to 2015 - ABARES (2015) 
Farmer's terms of 
trade (FToT) 
Ratio of prices received by 
farmers to prices paid by 
farmers 
National 
Gross value of 
agricultural 
exports 
Gross value of farm 
production, value of cereal 
exports, meat exports, wool 
exports, total exports 
National, AUD 
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Model specification 
We developed a holistic model of deforestation trends in Queensland to model LGAs (n = 
74) as the spatial units of analysis. Forest data were not available in 6 LGAs in the western 
part of the state, and we discarded a further 18 LGAs due to insufficient data (Appendix 2.3, 
Table A3.1), leaving 50 LGAs remaining to be analysed. 
Our response variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is calculated as the relative proportion of deforestation in LGA i at 
time step t, then log-transformed twice to reduce skewness: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = log {− log 
(Area of deforestation)𝑖𝑡
(Area of forest extent)𝑖𝑡
}     
The total forest extent in LGA i may decrease, increase or remain unchanged between 
sequential years, since the NCAS captures forest as it is cleared, regrown and re-cleared. This 
means that 𝑦𝑖𝑡 similarly may decrease, increase or remain unchanged between time steps. 
Our specification of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 controls for the area of forest available to clear (Australian 
Greenhouse Office, 2000; Evans, 2016), such that if no forest is present in time t, no 
deforestation may occur.  
Our hierarchical (multilevel) regression framework collectively models deforestation across 
Queensland (i.e the population level) by drawing on LGA-specific bent-cable model 
estimates. The bent-cable function comprises two linear segments (the incoming and 
outgoing phase), connected by a quadratic bend (Figure 3.4). The linear segments are 
parametrized by an intercept 𝛼0𝑖, incoming slope 𝛼1𝑖, and outgoing slope 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑖.  
 
Figure 3.4 General depiction of the bent-cable function, adapted from Khan et al. (2009) 
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Our modeling framework below accounts for spatial correlation among LGAs, and the 
longitudinal nature of the data (i.e. each LGA has its own time series data): 
𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛LGA(= 50)
𝑡 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑇(= 27)
𝑏0, 𝒃1, 𝒃2, 𝑏15, 𝑏23: population-level driver slope parameters (fixed effects)
𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝒯, ℓ𝛾: population-level bent-cable parameters (fixed effects)
𝑣, 𝜎𝜏, 𝜎𝛾, 𝜎1, 𝜎2, 𝜎10, 𝜎20: population-level dispersion parameters (fixed effects)
𝑬𝑡 = (macroeconomic data vector)𝑡
𝑪𝑖𝑡 = (climate data vector)𝑖𝑡
 
Level 1 :
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (𝑏0 + 𝛽10𝑖) + 𝑏15𝐿𝑖 + 𝑏23(elevation)𝑖          (i.e., spatial-only covariates) +
𝛽20𝑡 + 𝒃1
′𝑬𝑡         (i.e., temporal-only covariates) +
𝜇𝑖𝑡         (i.e., spatio-temporal term) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡
𝜖𝑖𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝑣
2)
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝒃2
′ 𝑪𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑖
(𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖)
2
4𝛾𝑖
1{|𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖| ≤ 𝛾𝑖} + 𝛼2𝑖(𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖)1{𝑡 > 𝜏𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖}
(i.e., spatiotemporal covariates and LGA-specific bent cable )
 
Level 2:
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛼1𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(𝑎1, 𝜎1
2)
𝛼2𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(𝑎2, 𝜎2
2)
𝜏𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(𝒯, 𝜎𝜏
2)
log 𝛾𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(ℓ𝛾, 𝜎𝛾
2)
𝛽10𝑖 ∼ CAR(𝜎10
2 ) (i.e., random LGA-specific deviation 
from population intercept 𝑏0)
𝛽20𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎20
2 ) (i.e., random year-specific deviation f
rom population intercept 𝑏0)
 
where “CAR” stands for the “conditional autoregressive” spatial correlation structure that we 
assume among LGAs. CAR is the spatial analogy of the lag-one autoregressive (AR(1)) 
temporal structure. It stipulates that given any LGAs 𝑖 and 𝑗, their response values 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑦𝑗𝑡 mutually influence each other only if 𝑖 and 𝑗 share borders (Earnest et al., 2007; Khan et 
al., 2012). Note that Khan and colleagues (2012) also employ the CAR structure under a 
spatial-longitudinal bent-cable framework to evaluate the impact of the Montréal Protocol on 
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the reduction of atmospheric chlorofluorocarbons. However, they only consider 8 spatial 
units under an ambiguous definition of spatial adjacency.  
Statistical inference is made under the Bayesian paradigm. The posterior distribution from 
which Bayesian estimates are derived requires prior distributions to be specified for all 
population-level parameters (see Appendix 2.4 for details). Models are implemented in R 
using the R2WinBUGS package (Sturtz et al., 2005). WinBUGS numerically approximates 
the posterior distribution (Gelman et al., 2013; Kery, 2010; Lunn et al., 2000). 
To explore relevance of land tenure on spatial adjacency, we draw on the approach taken by 
Earnest and colleagues (2007) and define spatial weighting according to: 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 =
𝟏{𝑖, 𝑗 share border}
∣ 𝐿𝑖 − 𝐿𝑗 ∣ +0.00001
 
Such weighting stipulates that neighbouring LGAs 𝑖 and 𝑗 would influence each other more 
than neighbouring LGAs 𝑖′ and 𝑗′ if 𝐿𝑖 and 𝐿𝑗 were more similar than 𝐿𝑖′  and 𝐿𝑗′ . 
We consider two key variations to our model framework described above, to explore: 
(a) Whether the “bend” occurs around the year 2000 at the introduction of the original 
VMA, or around 2007 after the VMA amendments came into effect; and  
(b) If weighting spatial adjacency by land tenure similarity makes a difference to model 
fit, as compared to unweighted spatial adjacency 
Other minor model variations were considered to address model goodness-of-fit (Appendix 
2.4) 
Results 
Having tested the influence of over 20 covariates on deforestation behavior, our model 
selection procedure revealed that annual % growth in GDP and year were the only clear 
predictor variables of LGA-specific deforestation in a combined regression model. In other 
words, GDP can be regarded as a clear driver of deforestation at the LGA level even in the 
presence of other predictor variables, while other macroeconomic and climate predictors are 
confounded with year. Land tenure and elevation were also not statistically important drivers. 
Appendix 2.5 provides justification for discarding these model covariates. 
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Our model shows strong evidence of spatial contagion in deforestation (Figure 3.5), and that 
this effect is strengthened by spatial weighting which accounts for land tenure similarity 
between each LGA (median deviance ~ -1500 with weighting, ~ -930 without weighting; a 
smaller deviance indicates better goodness-of-fit; Appendix 2.6, see also Figure A2.2)  
 
Figure 3.5 Estimates of 𝛽10𝑖 (‘o’) and corresponding Bayesian confidence intervals (CIs) at the 80% 
level (black) and 95% level (red). Strong evidence of spatial contagion is suggested by the large 
number of CIs which exclude 0. 
Our results also suggest that deforestation in Queensland exhibits a population-level (state-
wide) “bend” mostly between 2000 and 2007, consistent with expectations (Figure 3.6). 
However, extreme variation is inherent in the deforestation time series (detrended by 
removing LGA-level driver effects from 𝑦𝑖𝑡) between and within LGAs, so that the signal for 
a state-wide bend is not particularly strong. Nevertheless, our results highlight there are 
broader macroeconomic and temporal explanations for deforestation at the state level, as 
supported by previous analyses (Chapter Two).  
We found that LGA-level bent-cable estimates (Figure 3.7) can differ substantially. For some 
LGAs, deforestation increased over time to around 2000 then decreased (e.g Goondiwindi, 
Figure 3.7), as predicted by the timing of policy changes (Figure 3.2). Other LGAs followed 
the completely opposite trend (e.g Redland) and displayed an upturn in deforestation around 
2007 which lasted until the end of the time series. Deforestation in some LGAs remained 
consistently high relative to the population-level trend (e.g Hope Vale) from 1988 to 2014, 
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or followed a general declining trend (e.g Central Highlands). In yet more LGAs, 
deforestation peaked around 2007 and subsequently declined (e.g. Quilpie). 
 
Figure 3.6. LGA-level time series 𝑦𝑖𝑡 (n = 50) after detrending (black) and fitted population-level 
bent cable (green). “Detrending” refers to removing LGA-level driver effects from the 𝑦𝑖𝑡  data. 
Vertical lines delimit the estimated bend (start, middle, and end of transition phase) 
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Figure 3.7. Examples of LGA-level time series 𝑦𝑖𝑡 (n = 50) after detrending (black), with LGA-level 
bent-cable estimate (red) and fitted population-level bent cable (green). See also Appendix 2.8, Figure 
A2.3 
Discussion 
We found that the spatially explicit bent-cable model is a promising technique for detecting 
a policy effect simultaneously at the local government area (LGA) level and state level while 
controlling for driver variables; and there is some evidence of policy-induced shifts in the 
deforestation rate as expected in 2000 with the introduction of the original VMA, and with 
the subsequent amendments in 2007. However, due to an inadequate number of data points 
(LGAs) under extreme spatial variation in trends in, and responses to, deforestation within 
and between local government areas, the overall level of statistical confidence may not be 
overwhelmingly high. Nevertheless, our analysis quantitatively supports that while 
deforestation in some LGAs increased in 2000 and decreased in 2007 as predicted by the 
policy changes, other LGAs followed the completely opposite trend, while deforestation 
remained either consistently high or low throughout the time series (1988 to 2014). 
A core challenge with any statistical analysis is for there to be sufficient data points which 
may permit detection of the effect of policy introduction amidst substantial variation inherent 
in the data. This is understandably difficult to achieve at the national/state scale, especially 
with limited temporal continuity in data points. Expanding our analysis to the national scale 
could improve the capacity to detect any effect of policy interventions on deforestation, but 
at the expense of additional complexities given the considerable variation in timing and scope 
of regulatory policies across different Australian states (Evans, 2016).  
It should be noted that little improvement in our capacity to estimate a “bend” would be 
expected by considering the data at a finer spatial resolution than LGA (for example in an 
equal-area grid), as the total amount of information per region in a grid would be offset by 
the substantially higher spatial correlation across gridded regions.  
Using LGAs as a spatial unit of analysis provides the benefit of being able to investigate 
plausible explanations for regional deforestation trends using data captured within our tested 
variables (Table 3.1), or additional contextual information we have far been unable to 
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quantify. For example, the Goondiwindi LGA is held entirely in freehold tenure (Table A2.2, 
excluding publicly managed protected areas). The LGA-specific “bend” around 2000 is 
consistent with the “panic clearing” phenomenon documented in 2000 (Evans, 2016; 
McGrath, 2007), where deforestation spiked prior to the introduction of the original VMA 
which imposed restrictions on deforestation on freehold tenure for the first time. Hope Value 
is an Aboriginal Shire Council with a population of only 1,125 people (ABS, 2016), and 
several exemptions exist under the VMA to enable economic development on Indigenous 
land (State of Queensland, 2015). The upturn in deforestation around 2007 in the Redland 
LGA (Figure 3.7) can be explained by a spike in urban and residential development7. 
Exemptions under the VMA allow for native vegetation clearing to proceed for urban 
development (e.g. residential, industrial, sporting, recreational or commercial) in a regional 
ecosystem (Nelder et al., 2017) that is listed as ‘least concern’ (State of Queensland, 2015)8. 
Land tenure in the Quilpie LGA is equally split between freehold and leasehold (Table A2.2), 
and is dominated by Mulga (Acacia aneura) which is regularly “pushed” to maintain pasture, 
and to provide emergency feed for cattle during periods of drought (Dwyer et al., 2009; 
Fensham and Guymer, 2009; Gunders, 2017).  
Our present analysis sought to quantitatively establish evidence for the impact of regulatory 
policies aimed at reducing deforestation in Queensland, which are widely regarded to have 
led to a state-wide and national decline in deforestation around 2007 (Australian 
Government, 2013; Evans, 2016; McGrath, 2007; Reside et al., 2017). Previous work has 
emphasized the overarching influence of macroeconomic variables (Angelsen, 2010; 
Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Geist and Lambin, 2002), agricultural commodity prices 
and terms of trade (Australian Government, 2013; Barbier and Rauscher, 1994; Ewers et al., 
2008; Richards et al., 2012), rainfall and temperature (Australian Government, 2013; 
Marcos-Martinez et al., 2017), biophysical variables (Marcos-Martinez et al., 2017; Pressey 
et al., 1996) and institutions (Dolisca et al., 2007; Fearnside, 2001; Messina et al., 2006; 
                                                 
7 The koala is a charismatic species2 which was once abundant throughout the Redland region, but has suffered 
an estimated 80.3% decline in population densities between 1996 and 2014, primarily due to urban development 
(Rhodes et al., 2006, 2015). 
8 Note that the Queensland, New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory populations of the koala 
(Phascolarctos cinereus) were listed as Vulnerable under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) in 2012, and so would not have substantially influenced the observed 
deforestation trend in Redland.  
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Nolte et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2014) in driving deforestation. We tested representative 
variables from each of these groups (Table 3.1), and our modelling framework (which 
combined driver variables with year as covariates within a single regression) revealed that 
most of these variables were highly correlated or provided no extra information in addition 
to year (Appendix 2.2), or did not improve model goodness-of-fit (Appendix 2.5).  
The Australian Government uses a linear regression model (with farmers’ terms of trade as 
a single covariate) to predict future deforestation up to 2035. This model informs national 
land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) emissions projections for reporting under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Australian Government, 
2013, 2015). Although this simple model may be adequate for making a national-level 
prediction of future deforestation trends, our spatially explicit analysis suggests that the 
assertion of a “drop in land clearing activity from 2007 onwards” (Australian Government, 
2015: 20) based on a single-variable regression is premature. In future work, our quantitative 
evaluation approach could be strengthened by including spatially explicit information not 
usually considered in deforestation modelling, such as broad vegetation groups (Nelder et 
al., 2017), primary land use (ABARES, 2010), and social data which may reveal landholder 
compliance behaviours (Bartel and Barclay, 2011).  
Our analysis used the 2014 version of human induced forest change data as developed by the 
Australian Government for the NCAS (Australian Department of the Environment, 2015, 
2016). The Queensland Government also runs a system for detecting and analyzing land use 
change under the Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS) (Department of Science, 
Information Technology and Innovation, 2015). Recent work has identified substantial 
differences in the amount of deforestation estimated by the NCAS and SLATS systems 
(Bulinski et al., 2016), largely due to an inconsistent definition of ‘forest’9 (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2016b). To determine whether regulatory policies introduced in Queensland 
have affected local deforestation, the SLATS data would be more fit for purpose. However, 
                                                 
9 The NCAS adopts a Kyoto definition of ‘forest’ where canopy cover must be at least 20%. However, much 
of the historical and recent native vegetation clearing in Queensland is ‘sparse woody vegetation’ (e.g Mulga 
and Brigalow ecosystems) which does not always meet the 20% canopy cover threshold. The NCAS is 
designed to monitor forest loss for the purpose of reporting Australia’s emissions under the UNFCCC, 
whereas the SLATS program is used specifically to monitor for compliance under the Queensland VMA.  
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collectively modelling deforestation at the national scale would still require use of the NCAS 
system given the substantial differences in deforestation accounting methods used in each 
Australian state (Bulinski et al., 2016).  
Policy evaluation in the conservation literature is currently dominated by the use of impact 
evaluation methods (Baylis et al., 2016; Ferraro, 2009; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Miteva 
et al., 2012), which aim to infer causal relationships through quasi-experimental techniques 
such as matching (Andam et al., 2008; Arima et al., 2014; Brandt et al., 2016; Ferraro et al., 
2013; Joppa and Pfaff, 2011) and synthetic control (Abadie et al., 2010; Sills et al., 2015). 
Such methods rely on the ability to isolate a counterfactual from the available data, which 
must be of sufficient temporal and spatial resolution relative to the type and frequency of 
policy interventions to be evaluated. Impact evaluation methods are regarded by some 
scholars as ‘best practice’ for policy evaluation (Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014; Miteva et al., 
2012), and have been used extensively to evaluate the impact of protected areas on 
deforestation in tropical nations (Andam et al., 2008; Ferraro et al., 2013; Gaveau et al., 2009; 
Joppa and Pfaff, 2011; Nolte et al., 2013). However, quasi-experimental techniques are not 
applicable to our Queensland case study, as a counterfactual could not be readily isolated 
since (i) the VMA and its amendments regulate the state-wide clearing of native vegetation, 
and any differences in compliance effort or legislative exceptions applied do not follow a 
clear or consistent pattern; and (ii) regulatory policies for reducing deforestation exist in each 
Australian state and territory, hence a synthetic control cannot be established. Arima et al. 
(2014) evaluated the impact of the second phase of Brazil’s Action Plan for Prevention and 
Control of the Legal Amazon Deforestation (PPCDAm ii), which led to a reduction in 
deforestation from 2008 despite an increase in the price of beef cattle and agricultural GDP 
(Arima et al., 2014; Richards et al., 2017). However, matching techniques were possible in 
this situation due to the differing levels of enforcement of PPCDAm ii across Brazilian 
municipalities.  
Conclusions 
Deforestation in Australia occurs at a rate and scale which is on par with well-known global 
deforestation hotspots (Hansen et al., 2013; Keenan et al., 2015), despite the presence of 
strong governance (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004; Deacon, 1994) and the introduction of a 
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series of policies aimed to control the clearing of native vegetation over the past four decades 
(Evans, 2016). Given the substantial and widespread impacts of deforestation on biodiversity, 
ecosystem service provision, and climate regulation, a greater understanding of the efficacy 
of policy interventions in regions where deforestation may be assumed to be effectively 
“controlled” therefore warrants further attention. Although our population-level findings 
should be considered preliminary given the substantial “unexplained” variation in LGA-
specific deforestation trends, our results nonetheless suggest a degree of caution should be 
taken before proclaiming the effectiveness of regulatory policies prior to conducting an ex-
post evaluation.  Data limitations and methodological challenges can impede the evaluation 
of policy impact in the presence of confounding variables, time-lags and misalignment of 
spatial and temporal data. Such challenges in evaluation must be overcome to ensure that 
policies effectively deliver environmental outcomes as anticipated.  
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Abstract 
Carbon farming in agricultural landscapes may provide a cost-effective mechanism for 
offsetting carbon emissions while delivering co-benefits for biodiversity through ecosystem 
restoration. Reforestation of landscapes using native tree and shrub species, termed 
environmental plantings, has been recognized as a carbon offset methodology which can 
contribute to biodiversity conservation as well as climate mitigation. However, far less 
attention has been paid to the potential for assisted natural regeneration in areas of low to 
intermediate levels of degradation, where regenerative capacity still remains and little 
intervention would be required to restore native vegetation. In this study, we considered the 
economics of carbon farming in the state of Queensland, Australia, where 30.6 million 
hectares of relatively recently deforested agricultural landscapes may be suitable for carbon 
farming. Using spatially explicit estimates of the rate of carbon sequestration and the 
opportunity cost of agricultural production, we used a discounted cash flow analysis to 
examine the economic viability of assisted natural regeneration relative to environmental 
plantings. We found that the average minimum carbon price required to make assisted natural 
regeneration viable was 60% lower than that required to make environmental plantings viable 
($65.8 t CO2e
-1compared to $108.8 t CO2e
-1). Assisted natural regeneration could sequester 
1.6 to 2.2 times the amount of carbon possible compared to environmental plantings alone 
over a range of hypothetical carbon prices and assuming a moderate 5% discount rate. Using 
a combination of methodologies, carbon farming was a viable land use in over 2.3% of our 
study extent with a low $5 t CO2e
-1 carbon price, and up to 10.5 million hectares (34%) with 
a carbon price of $50 t CO2e
-1.  Carbon sequestration supply and economic returns generated 
by assisted natural regeneration were relatively robust to variation in establishment costs and 
discount rates due to the utilization of low-cost techniques to reestablish native vegetation. 
Our study highlights the potential utility of assisted natural regeneration as a reforestation 
approach which can cost-effectively deliver both carbon and biodiversity benefits.
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Introduction 
The carbon market has the potential to deliver significant outcomes for ecosystem restoration 
alongside the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions (Bradshaw et al., 2013). The demand 
for terrestrial carbon sinks is creating opportunities for avoided deforestation in tropical 
forests (Phelps et al., 2012a; Venter and Koh, 2011), as well as landscape-scale restoration 
through afforestation and reforestation reforestation (Galatowitsch, 2009; Peters-Stanley et 
al., 2013; Silver et al., 2000). There is particular interest as to whether the carbon market can 
deliver positive outcomes not only for the climate and local economies, but also for 
biodiversity (Bekessy and Wintle, 2008; Smith and Scherr, 2003). A too narrow focus on 
maximizing sequestration of carbon (such as the planting of monocultures) can lead to a 
range of negative ecological impacts (Lindenmayer et al., 2012; Pittock et al., 2013), and will 
miss opportunities for co-benefits derived through restoration of natural ecosystems (Bullock 
et al., 2011; Dwyer et al., 2009; Gilroy et al., 2014; Rey Benayas et al., 2009). 
Carbon farming is a term that is used to describe land-based practices which either avoid or 
reduce the release of greenhouse gas emissions, or actively sequester carbon in vegetation 
and soils, primarily in agricultural landscapes. Several studies have examined the economics 
of carbon farming through establishment of monocultures or environmental plantings (Bryan 
et al., 2014; Bryan and Crossman, 2013; Crossman et al., 2011; Paterson and Bryan, 2012; 
Paul et al., 2013; Polglase et al., 2013). Environmental plantings are a mixture of locally 
indigenous tree and shrub species which are planted or seeded on cleared land, and are not 
normally harvested (Paul et al., 2013). The potential for environmental plantings to deliver 
biodiversity co-benefits alongside carbon abatement has been a focus of recent work (Bryan 
et al., 2014; Carwardine et al., 2015; Goldstein et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 
2008; Pichancourt et al., 2014; Renwick et al., 2014). Yet given the high up-front costs of 
direct planting (Chazdon, 2008; Schirmer and Field, 2000), it is surprising that there has been 
limited assessment of the economic viability of carbon sequestration through assisted natural 
regeneration of vegetation, despite the large potential biodiversity and economic benefits of 
this approach (Birch et al., 2010; Bradshaw et al., 2013; Butler, 2009; Dwyer et al., 2009; 
Funk et al., 2014; Smith and Scherr, 2003; Trotter et al., 2005). 
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Assisted natural regeneration (ANR, also known as managed regrowth) is recognized as a 
cost-effective forest restoration method that can restore biodiversity and ecosystem services 
in areas of intermediate levels of degradation, while also providing income for rural 
livelihoods (Chazdon, 2008; Ma et al., 2014). ANR relies on residual seeds and plants at the 
site, or dispersed from vegetation nearby.  ANR utilizes low-cost techniques to assist in the 
natural re-establishment of vegetation, such as: restriction of livestock grazing through 
fencing and direct stocking rate management; cessation of tree control practices like burning 
and disturbance with machinery; the use of vegetation thinning to reduce competition and 
promote growth, and; in some circumstances, supplementary planting of seedlings (Smith 
and Scherr, 2003). Although most frequently applied in tropical forests (Rey Benayas, 2007; 
Shono et al., 2007), ANR is gaining momentum as an important mechanism for restoring 
forests across a range of ecosystems (Chazdon, 2008; Gilroy et al., 2014; Shono et al., 2007).  
Vegetation that is allowed to naturally regenerate has several advantages for biodiversity 
conservation over plantings, even when plantings are comprised of native species. First, 
under ANR, the vegetation is more likely to be comprised of native species adapted to local 
conditions, resulting in vegetation that is more resilient to local climate variation and 
disturbance. Second, natural regeneration can result in high species diversity including trees, 
shrubs, forbs and grasses, whereas under environmental planting, generally only tree species 
are planted. Third, ANR often provides superior habitat for local fauna as a result of the 
increased plant and structural diversity (Bloomfield and Pearson, 2000; Bowen et al., 2009; 
Bruton et al., 2013; R.J. Fensham and Guymer, 2009). Finally, under the right conditions, the 
cost of establishing vegetation through ANR is much lower than active planting (Sampaio et 
al., 2007; Schirmer and Field, 2000; Smith, 2002). 
Despite the potential advantages of ANR, a lack of awareness of its benefits and 
demonstrative results means it remains underutilized (Shono et al., 2007). ANR falls under 
the definition of afforestation/reforestation (A/R) under the Kyoto Protocol and Clean 
Development Mechanism  (Smith, 2002; Smith and Scherr, 2003), but has attracted little 
attention as a carbon sequestration methodology compared to mechanisms such as active 
planting or avoided deforestation (Niles et al., 2002). ANR has most potential in locations 
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that have not been intensively used (cropped or irrigated) or with a relatively short history of 
intensive land use.  Across much of sub-tropical Australia most grassy eucalypt woodlands 
used for grazing land fall into this category (McIntyre and Martin, 2002). A window of 
opportunity therefore exists to achieve significant carbon and biodiversity outcomes through 
assisted natural regeneration across much of northern Australia (R.J. Fensham and Guymer, 
2009; Martin et al., 2012), the Texas drylands (Asner et al., 2003), central Brazilian pastoral 
lands (Sampaio et al., 2007), the Gran Chaco in Argentina  (Zak et al., 2004), degraded 
pastoral landscapes in Albania (Deichmann and Zhang, 2013) and in the mountainous Humbo 
region of Ethiopia (Biryahwaho et al., 2012). 
The aim of this study was to evaluate the potential for carbon farming in the extensive 
agricultural landscapes of the state of Queensland, in north-eastern Australia, by examining 
the economic viability of ANR relative to environmental plantings. Commercial livestock 
grazing on pastures with dominant native species is the main land use across Queensland. 
The extensive, as opposed to intensive (McIntyre and Martin, 2002), nature of grazing in 
much of Queensland provides ideal conditions for carbon sequestration via ANR.  
Profitability (profitability at full equity) of grazing throughout Queensland is generally low 
with many farms losing money in recent years (ABARES, 2013). To determine whether 
carbon farming could be a viable land use in Queensland, we conducted a spatially explicit 
analysis of the minimum (‘break-even’) carbon price required for carbon farming to become 
profitable via environmental plantings and ANR. We also considered a range of hypothetical 
carbon prices and discount rates to estimate the carbon sequestration supply and profitability 
of carbon farming over a long (100 years) and medium (25 years) project duration. Finally, 
we tested the sensitivity of our results to variation in the establishment costs of each 
methodology. 
Study region and policy context 
Our case study region is in the state of Queensland, in north-eastern Australia (Figure 4.1). 
Agricultural development over the past 150 years has led to extensive landscape modification 
(Dwyer et al., 2009; McAlpine et al., 2002) with the most rapid development occurring in 
the vast Brigalow Belt bioregion within the latter half the 20th century (Seabrook et al., 2006). 
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As a result, around 34 million hectares of vegetation in Queensland (20% of the state’s total 
vegetated area) is now considered non-remnant: heavily modified, secondary vegetation. 
Commercial grazing of livestock is the predominant land use across much of northern 
Australia, where it occurs in extensively managed grassy eucalypt and acacia woodlands and 
shrublands (Martin and McIntyre, 2007). Unlike southern parts of the continent, these 
northern landscapes have not been subject to broad scale intensification via sowing of exotic 
pastures, fertilization and irrigation. Despite broad scale clearing of trees and shrubs in some 
regions (Martin et al., 2012), much of the cleared land retains regenerative capacity via small 
trees and soil seed bank, e.g. Brigalow Acacia harpophylla) (Dwyer et al., 2009; Fensham 
and Guymer, 2009). 
At present, clearing regrowth to maintain high quality forage for livestock represents a 
substantial management cost to graziers throughout Queensland (Gowen et al., 2012; 
McIntyre and Martin, 2002). Landholders not clearing regrowth would forgo some pasture, 
but could attract credits for carbon sequestrated if the vegetation was left to regenerate 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2013b, 2013a). Extensive restoration of vegetation in these 
agricultural landscapes is a high priority to avoid potential long term ecological impacts and 
future native species extinctions (Martin, 2010; McAlpine et al., 2002).   
Australia’s Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI, Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) and climate 
policies are currently under review (at time of writing, February 2015); however, there is 
broad political support for landholders to generate additional income through the provision 
of land-based carbon offsets in agricultural landscapes. We examine a range of carbon prices, 
project durations and establishment costs in order to gain an understanding of the economic 
viability of two key reforestation methodologies in our study region to help guide the carbon 
farming policy debate. 
Methods 
Land use data 
We restricted the extent of our analysis to sub-bioregions in Queensland where at least 5% 
of the sub-bioregion is comprised of agricultural production landscapes (resulting in 73 of 
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130 sub-bioregions being considered). Our study extent encompasses 30.6 million hectares 
of agricultural landscapes potentially suitable for ANR or environmental plantings.  To refine 
this extent to areas where ANR or environmental plantings are feasible, we used a state-wide 
vegetation coverage layer (Department of Environment and Resource Management, 2009) to 
delineate the extent of cleared land in Queensland (Neldner et al., 2005). 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The study extent encompasses 73 sub-bioregions in Queensland, of which agricultural 
landscapes make up 30.6 million hectares. Areas of remnant vegetation (in black) are excluded from 
the analysis. The Brigalow Belt bioregion (hatched) covers an extensive part of the study extent.  
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We excluded areas of intensive land use (mines, urban areas), irrigated cropping, protected 
areas and water bodies from the analysis using a national land use dataset. Land uses included 
in our analysis were native pasture (88.7% study extent), non-irrigated cropping (hereafter, 
‘cropping’, 3.5%), and modified pastures (6.1%).  The native pasture category includes land 
where there has been limited or no deliberate attempt at pasture modification, and vegetation 
contains greater than 50 per cent dominant native species (ABARES, 2010). For ease of 
interpretation, we incorporated modified pastures within the ‘cropping’ land use category. 
Approximately 1.7% of the study extent is formerly rainforest where cropping is now the 
dominant land use, which is important to delineate given the higher costs of environmental 
plantings in these areas (Catterall and Harrison, 2006). 
Environmental plantings were considered to be feasible across each of our three land use 
categories (native pasture, cropping and former rainforest). However, ANR is generally not 
a suitable carbon farming method on sites which have been cultivated, irrigated and sown to 
exotic pastures, due to lack of local regenerative capacity in native vegetation (Fischer et al., 
2009; McIntyre and Martin, 2002). We therefore restricted our analysis of ANR to areas of 
native pasture.  
Estimating the rate of carbon sequestration 
The rate of carbon accumulation through forest growth varies temporally, and so 
understanding the cost-effectiveness of alternative carbon farming methodologies requires 
this dynamic variation in flows to be explicitly accounted for (Richards and Stokes, 2004). 
To capture this temporal variation, we emulated the core of the FullCAM forest growth model 
(Richards and Brack, 2004). We used a dataset known as the Maximum Potential Biomass 
layer (MaxBio, Department of Climate Change & Energy Efficiency, 2004) to derive 
estimates of the rate of carbon sequestration under the ANR and environmental plantings 
methodologies. 
MaxBio and FullCAM are components of the National Carbon Accounting System (NCAS), 
which estimates Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions from land based activities in 
accordance with the international guidelines adopted by the United Nations Framework 
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Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). MaxBio is estimated from a forest productivity 
index (FPI, Kesteven and Landsberg, 2004) generated with a plant physiology model using 
bioclimatic parameters, and empirically related to above ground biomass in native forests 
(Richards and Brack, 2004).   
The predicted above-ground tree biomass (t ha-1) at time t is a function of MaxBio, M, and 
an estimated constant k that determines the rate of approach towards the maximum biomass 
(Richards and Brack, 2004) is:  
tkMetM /)(  .              (1) 
Biomass generally accumulates more rapidly in tree species commonly used in 
environmental plantings compared to regrowth of native vegetation, hence we consider k = 
20 for environmental plantings and k = 24 for ANR in this study, which reflects values used 
for Australia’s National greenhouse gas accounts (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012a, 
2014). We accounted for biomass allocation to coarse roots (root:shoot ratio) using the 
recommended fraction of 0.25 for acacia forest and woodland (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2012a; Snowdon et al., 2000), hence the ratio of total biomass to above ground biomass is 
5:4, or 1.25 times. 
The long-term average annual increment in biomass accumulation (cumulative above- and 
below-ground biomass)
 
between t and t + 1 years (It), using equation (1): 
     
)(25.1 )1/(/   tktkt eeMI .                                    (2) 
The carbon content of tree biomass can range between 45-50% carbon, but this varies by 
species (Thomas and Martin, 2012) and tree component (Gifford, 2000). We adopted a 
conversion factor of 50% to be consistent with the Australian National Carbon Accounting 
System (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012a; Gifford, 2000). 
The annual sequestration rate of carbon by vegetation (ct, t CO2e ha
-1), is therefore: 
)(67.35.0 1 ttt IIc ,              (3) 
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where 3.67 is the ratio of the atomic masses of CO2 and C.  
For simplicity, we assumed that the carbon stock at project commencement (t=0) is zero. 
Current methodologies to credit carbon sequestration through ANR in Australia require that 
project areas have evidence of regeneration but little standing carbon stock at 
commencement. Our model is consistent with estimates from the CFI Reforestation 
Modelling Tool (RMT, Domestic Offsets Integrity Committee, 2011). FullCAM and the 
RMT model forest growth for user supplied point locations but our approach allowed us to 
generate estimates of carbon yield from ANR and environmental plantings over a large 
spatial extent rather than on a single project basis (see Supplementary Material in Appendix 
Three for further details).  
Costs of carbon farming 
Opportunity costs of agriculture were derived from the most current map of agricultural profit 
for Australia, which was based on data for the year 2005/2006 (Marinoni et al., 2012). The 
map is a grid of profitability at full equity (PFE, $ ha-1) at a 1km2 resolution across the 
Australian content, using data on production, revenues and costs for 23 irrigated and rain-fed 
agricultural commodities, combined with data on land use (2005/2006) and yield estimates.  
PFE is a measure of profit which is calculated as the difference between revenue from the 
sale of agricultural commodities and all fixed and variable costs (Bryan et al., 2009; Marinoni 
et al., 2012). The system developed by Marinoni and colleagues will enable the production 
of a more current map of agricultural profitability once the latest land use data set for 
Australia (2010/2011) is finalized. As this dataset is not yet available, we adjusted PFE to 
present day values based on a 2.7% annual rate of inflation between 2006 and 2013 (Reserve 
Bank of Australia, 2014). 
We considered a mid-range once-off (incurred at t=0) on-ground establishment cost of 
$2,000 ha-1 for environmental plantings (tube stock, fencing, weed management, labour), but 
also conducted sensitivity analyses using high and low cost estimates ($3,000 ha-1 and $1,000 
ha-1) adopted in previous studies (Crossman et al., 2011; Polglase et al., 2013; Schirmer and 
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Field, 2000).  Environmental plantings in areas of former rainforest incurred an establishment 
cost of $8,000 ha-1 (Catterall & Harrison 2006). 
Ceasing the routine re-clearing of regrowth vegetation is likely to be sufficient to allow 
regeneration in many parts of our Queensland study region. The balance between re-clearing 
costs and production income are part of PFE, hence we considered an establishment cost of 
$0 ha-1 for ANR in our analysis. However, in areas with a longer history of intensive land 
use, it may be necessary to restrict livestock access to the carbon farming project site to 
facilitate regeneration of vegetation (Comerford et al., 2011; Prober et al., 2011; Vesk and 
Westoby, 2001; Witt et al., 2011). We therefore conducted a sensitivity analysis by 
considering an establishment cost for ANR to cover the cost of erecting fences (including 
materials, labour, and transport). We derived an estimate for the establishment cost for an 
ANR project using estimates from Schirmer and Field (2000). This estimate was adjusted to 
present day values based on a 2.9% annual rate of inflation between 2000 and 2013 (Reserve 
Bank of Australia, 2014), to reach a final estimate of  $460 ha-1 (Figure A3.1).
 
 
Finally, for both environmental plantings and ANR, we derived annual on-ground 
management costs from comparable studies  (Comerford et al., 2011; Polglase et al., 2008; 
Schirmer and Field, 2000) and adjusted to 2013 prices (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2014) to 
reach an estimate of $45 ha-1 year-1. Market participation costs included an initial project 
establishment cost ($100 ha-1), as well as annual monitoring and auditing costs of $10  ha-1 
year-1, and transaction costs of $10  ha-1 year-1 (Bryan et al., 2014; Comerford et al., 2011; 
Paul et al., 2013).  
Economic viability of carbon farming 
To determine the economic viability of carbon farming, we used a discounted cash flow 
analysis to calculate the minimum price on carbon required to generate an economic return 
via environmental plantings or ANR.  We generated a 1km2 vector grid covering the extent 
of the study area, resulting in 707,530 planning units i. The average annual sequestration rate 
of carbon by ANR and environmental plantings and opportunity cost of carbon farming was 
calculated for each planning unit. 
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The net present value (NPV) of carbon sequestration in each site i is: 
  
iii PVCPVBNPV  ,
            (4)
 
where 𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑖is the present value of the benefits at site i, calculated according to a carbon price 
p ($ t CO2e
-1), discount rate r, and accounting for cti the rate of carbon sequestration at time 
t in site i:
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For Australian Government cost-benefit analyses, it has been proposed that discount rates 
over a range of 3 to 10 per cent should be tested (Harrison, 2010). Previous studies have 
evaluated the economic potential of carbon farming using discount rates ranging from 0% to 
12% (Bryan et al., 2014; Funk et al., 2014; Paul et al., 2013; Polglase et al., 2013; Renwick 
et al., 2014). Unless otherwise indicated, we present our results where a moderate 5% 
discount rate has been applied throughout the manuscript. We also test the sensitivity of our 
findings to rates of 1.5% and 10%  to enable comparison to the results of relevant key studies. 
We accounted for a risk of reversal buffer (dR) of 5%, which is deducted as a percentage of 
generated carbon credits in order to insure the CFI scheme against residual risks 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2012c). Carbon farming policy in Australia currently requires 
carbon sequestration projects to remain in place for 100 years to meet permanence obligations 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2012c; Macintosh and Waugh, 2012). An option for 
landholders to adopt a 25-year contract for a carbon farming project is currently under 
consideration (Australian Government, 2014a), but under this permanence option 20% of 
carbon credits would be deducted to reflect the potential cost to government of replacing 
carbon stores if 25-year projects are discontinued. Hence, we considered two project 
durations T of 100 and 25 years, and applied a 20% discount (dT=25) to the credits earned if 
T=25.  
The present value PVCi j of the costs of carbon sequestration at site i is: 
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where EC is the sum of the initial establishment and costs ($ ha-1), MC is the annual on-
ground management cost ($ ha-1 year-1), TC is the sum of transaction and monitoring costs 
($ ha-1 year-1) and PFEi is the profitability at full equity ($ ha
-1) of the current agricultural 
land use in site i (Marinoni et al., 2012).  
Finally, we converted the NPV in each site to the equal annual equivalent:  
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Spatial analyses were conducted using ArcMap version 10 (ESRI, 2011), the discounted cash 
flow analysis was implemented using MATLAB version 7.10.0.499 (2010), and results were 
analysed using the R statistical package version 2.15.0 (R Development Core Team, 2012). 
Results 
Break-even carbon prices 
We calculated the minimum price required for carbon farming to become profitable to gain 
an understanding of the size of payment necessary ($ t CO2e
-1) to encourage landholder 
adoption of ANR or environmental plantings in our study region. The ‘break-even’ carbon 
price p occurs when the NPV (Equation 4) is equal to 0. A positive break-even price indicates 
that an annual payment is required to stimulate conversion from agriculture to carbon 
farming, whereas a negative break-even price signifies that the current agricultural land use 
is producing negative economic returns and a conversion to carbon farming could occur at 
no cost.  
Overall, the average site-level break-even carbon price (T=100) was considerably lower for 
ANR ($65.8  t CO2e
-1) as compared to environmental plantings ($108.8  t CO2e
-1, Figure 4.2). 
The break-even price varied according to land use (Figure A3.2), whereby environmental 
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plantings were generally more economically viable on sites where cropping was the dominant 
land use ($99.9 t CO2e
-1) compared to sites on native pasture ($109.5 t CO2e
-1). 
Environmental plantings on former rainforest sites broke even for $153.0 t CO2e
-1 on average. 
These averaged estimates mask much of the spatial heterogeneity in the break-even carbon 
price across the study extent (Figure 4.2). Low break-even prices were more frequent in the 
relatively productive east of the study region, and several areas in the central eastern coast 
have similar break-even prices under either methodology. Over the 25 year project duration, 
average break-even estimates for ANR increased to $76.1 t CO2e
-1, and to $141.5 for 
environmental plantings.  
 
Figure 4.2. Break-even carbon prices (100 year project duration and 5% discount rate) for a) assisted 
natural regeneration (ANR) and b) environmental plantings.  Areas where carbon farming is not 
available are shaded in grey.  
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Carbon sequestration 
Using the break-even prices estimated previously for all sites in our study extent, we 
generated supply curves for carbon sequestration using ANR and environmental plantings 
under the two project durations (Figure 4.3). We also present a third ‘least cost’ curve which 
is derived by selecting the methodology with the lowest break-even price in each site. This 
portfolio comprises of sites where environmental planting is the only available carbon 
farming methodology (where the land use is either cropping or former rainforest), in addition 
to sites where ANR is the more cost-effective of the two possible carbon methodologies.  
 
Figure 4.3. Carbon sequestration supply curves for ANR, environmental plantings and ‘least cost’ 
methodology (where the methodology with the lowest break-even price at each site is assumed to be 
adopted) for a) 100 year and b) 25 year project durations. The y-axis is restricted to $200 per t CO2e-
1or less for ease of interpretation. 
Chapter Four: Carbon farming in agricultural landscapes 
 
 
 
98 
 
With a low carbon price of $5 t CO2e
-1(similar to the currently trading price in the European 
market), only 63 Mt CO2e
-1could be sequestered over 100 years by considering 
environmental plantings alone (Figure 4.3a). ANR could supply 110 Mt CO2e
-1 at this price, 
and a total of 123 Mt CO2e
-1 could be sequestered if the ‘least cost’ methodology was adopted 
in each site (Table 4.1).   
Table 4.1. Key results for the ‘least cost methodology’ scenario, assuming the most plausible 
establishment costs ($2000/ha for environmental plantings, $0/ha for ANR), 100 year project duration 
and three hypothetical carbon prices. Note that it is assumed the methodology (ANR or environmental 
plantings) with the lowest break-even price is adopted in each site. 
Carbon price 
Discount rate 
1.5% 5% 10% 
$5 per t CO2e-1       
  Area of carbon farming (ha)                762,700                 696,700                 622,700  
  Area (% study extent) 2.5% 2.3% 2.0% 
  Total carbon sequestered (Mt CO2e-1)                       136                        123                        110  
  Net present value ($M)                    4,230                     1,513                        691  
  Equal annual equivalent ($M/year)                         82                          76                          69  
  % NPV from ANR 84% 89% 94% 
$20 per t CO2e-1       
  Area of carbon farming (ha)             1,135,300              1,212,200                 984,400  
  Area (% study extent) 3.7% 4.0% 3.2% 
  Total carbon sequestered (Mt CO2e-1)                       223                        244                        194  
  Net present value ($M)                    5,805                     2,252                        983  
  Equal annual equivalent ($M/year)                       112                        113                          98  
  % NPV from ANR 83% 89% 94% 
$50 per t CO2e-1       
  Area of carbon farming (ha)             8,038,400            10,508,600              8,106,100  
  Area (% study extent) 26.3% 34.3% 26.5% 
  Total carbon sequestered (Mt CO2e-1)                    1,532                     1,825                     1,489  
  Net present value ($M)                  19,720                   10,956                     4,089  
  Equal annual equivalent ($M/year)                       382                        552                        409  
  % NPV from ANR 85% 91% 96% 
 
*Study extent is 30.6 million hectares 
At a moderate carbon price of $20 t CO2e
-1, it is feasible for around 243 Mt CO2e
-1 to be 
sequestered by a mixture of ANR and environmental plantings over 100 years.  Carbon 
farming becomes more viable under a high carbon price of $50 t CO2e
-1 (comparable to the 
estimated price required to induce significant cuts in emissions, Pezzey and Jotzo, 2013), 
with around 1,825 Mt CO2e
-1 that could be supplied using a combination of ANR and 
environmental plantings. ANR however could viably sequester 1,664 Mt CO2e
-1 at this price, 
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whereas carbon farming via environmental plantings alone could supply 770 Mt CO2e
-1 over 
100 years.  Carbon sequestration supply over the 25 year project duration was less than half 
of what could be achieved over 100 years for each of our hypothetical carbon prices. A total 
of 710 Mt CO2e could be sequestered with a of $50 t CO2e
-1 carbon price with a combination 
of ANR and environmental plantings (Figure 4.3b). Supply of carbon sequestration via ANR 
was relatively insensitive to discounting due to negligible establishment costs, whereas a high 
discount rate (10%) increased the disparity evident in the economic viability of 
environmental plantings relative to ANR (Figure A3.3).  
Economic returns under hypothetical carbon price scenarios 
Carbon farming was competitive with agriculture over a fairly limited spatial extent under 
low and moderate carbon prices (Figure 4.4). Environmental plantings were viable over 
372,500 ha (1.2% study extent), while ANR viable was over approximately twice that area 
(626,400 ha) with $5 t CO2e
-1. Increasing to a moderate $20 t CO2e
-1, the area viable for 
carbon farming increased marginally to 568,700 ha and 1,088,200 ha for environmental 
plantings and ANR respectively.  
With a $50 t CO2e
-1 carbon price, carbon farming via ANR alone was competitive with 
agriculture over 9.8 million hectares, or 32.3% of the study extent, and could generate $503 
M per year over 100 years. Environmental plantings alone were viable across 3.1 million ha 
(10.2% study extent) and generated less than half of the economic returns possible under 
ANR ($212 M per year). When we considered the ‘least cost’ methodology in each site, ANR 
generated the vast majority of economic returns, holding the market share of between 83 and 
96% of total net present value over 100 years, under each of our carbon price scenarios and 
discount rates (Table 4.1). Assuming the ‘least cost’ methodology was adopted in each site, 
the total area viable for carbon farming and carbon sequestered at this price was actually 
comparable under both 1.5% and 10% discount rates with a carbon price of $20 t CO2e
-1 or 
more. 
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Figure 4.4. The impact of alternative establishment costs on the economic viability of carbon farming. 
(a) A high establishment cost for ANR ($460/ha) results in a shift up for both the ANR and ‘least 
cost’ methodology supply curves. (b) Low ($1000/ha) and high ($3000/ha) establishment costs for 
environmental plantings have a large impact on the carbon supply curve for environmental plantings 
alone, but (c) makes minimal change to the shape of the ‘least cost’ methodology curve. 
Environmental plantings were more attractive with a lower discount rate, and subsequently 
made up a greater proportion of the market (Table 4.1).  However, a high discount rate 
resulted in the ‘least cost’ supply curve shifting upwards, reducing the overall viability of 
carbon farming (Figure A3.3).  
Annual economic returns over the 25 year project duration ranged between 69% and 94% of 
what could be achieved over 100 years for carbon prices of $50 and $5 t CO2e
-1 respectively. 
The proportion of economic returns via ANR was slightly higher over the shorter project 
duration (Table 4.1). However, the total area viable for carbon farming was largely 
unaffected by project duration (Figure A3.4).  
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Impact of variation in establishment costs  
When we considered a high establishment cost for ANR, the average break-even price for 
this methodology increased from $65.8 to $80.0 t CO2e-1. However, this was still less than 
the average break-even price for environmental plantings with both low ($83.1 t CO2e-1) and 
high establishment costs ($134.4 t CO2e-1). 
If a high establishment of $460ha-1 was incurred for ANR across all eligible sites, the supply 
of carbon via this methodology would decrease from 1,664 to 1,251 Mt CO2e (25%) over 
100 years, assuming a $50 t CO2e-1 carbon price (Figure 4.5a). The environmental plantings 
supply curve was highly sensitive to variation in establishment costs (Figure 4.5b), with an 
increase from $2,000ha-1 to $3,000ha-1 leading to a reduction in carbon supply from 770 to 
342 Mt CO2e-1 (56%) over 100 years.  
However, when the ‘least cost’ methodology was considered in each site (Figure 4.4c), 
variation in the establishment cost for environmental plantings had a minimal impact on the 
overall supply of carbon, since ANR was the most viable methodology in the majority of 
sites in our study region. At a $50 t CO2e-1 carbon price, a high establishment cost for 
environmental plantings reduced overall carbon supply from 1,824 to 1,752 Mt CO2e-1 (4%). 
ANR retained the market share when we considered an optimistic low establishment cost for 
environmental plantings (83-84% for all carbon price scenarios), and also under a high ANR 
establishment cost (87% for all carbon price scenarios). 
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Figure 4.5. Equivalent annual returns ($ per ha per year) for (a) ANR and (b) environmental plantings, 
under hypothetical carbon prices ($5, $20 and $50) and 5% discount rate. 
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Discussion 
Carbon farming in agricultural landscapes presents an important opportunity to deliver 
biodiversity, financial and social co-benefits alongside terrestrial carbon abatement (Lin et 
al., 2013). Identifying low-cost options for carbon abatement which can contribute to 
biodiversity conservation and other co-benefits is a high priority (Bryan et al., 2014; Gilroy 
et al., 2014; Nelson et al., 2008; Phelps et al., 2012a). Our study has highlighted the potential 
for carbon farming to establish as a viable land use in agricultural landscapes in north-eastern 
Australia. In particular, our research illustrates the ability of ANR to provide a cost-effective 
alternative to environmental plantings for sequestering carbon and providing biodiversity co-
benefits in areas of intermediate levels of degradation.  
In our Queensland study region, we found that carbon farming was a viable alternative to 
agricultural production across a fairly limited spatial extent under low and moderate carbon 
prices. Nonetheless, this is still a significant result as it highlights the marginal economic 
nature of the dominant grazing land use in some parts of the landscape. The level of payments 
delivered either by an appropriate incentive scheme or a market price on carbon would only 
need to be minimal to stimulate adoption of carbon farming in such areas, but would provide 
an alternative viable land use as well as deliver environmental and biodiversity co-benefits. 
Under a scenario where carbon is priced at a level needed to stimulate significant cuts in 
global greenhouse gas emissions ($50 t CO2e-1, Pezzey and Jotzo; 2013), carbon farming 
could become a viable land use across up to 10.5 million hectares of agricultural landscapes 
(34% of our study extent), and sequester 1825 Mt CO2e over 100 years.  These findings 
demonstrate the importance of gaining an understanding of future land use change across a 
range of possible scenarios, in order to inform the development of policies which will have 
implications for climate mitigation, agriculture and biodiversity conservation.   
Our study is the first to quantify the economic and carbon sequestration opportunities derived 
from assisted natural regeneration of vegetation in Australian agricultural landscapes, and 
one of few internationally (Birch et al., 2010; Funk et al., 2014; Gilroy et al., 2014).  We 
found that where it is possible, ANR was almost always a more cost-effective methodology 
for sequestering carbon than the direct planting of trees. Environmental plantings were 
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competitive with ANR on areas of native pasture only when the discount rate was very low, 
or in the situation where the cost of establishing environmental plantings is very low ($1000 
ha-1), and a high establishment cost ($460 ha-1) is assumed for ANR. It is unlikely that the 
establishment cost of an ANR project would be as high as $460 ha-1, particularly in our study 
region where regeneration can be facilitated simply by ceasing to re-clear regrowth 
vegetation (Dwyer et al., 2009; Fensham and Guymer, 2009). 
Previous studies which have examined the economics of carbon farming via environmental 
plantings have found that the viability of this methodology is highly sensitive to variation in 
establishment cost (Polglase et al., 2013). Under one particular scenario evaluated by 
Polglase and colleagues ($20 t CO2e-1, 5% discount rate), the area profitable for 
environmental plantings across Australia declined from 32 M ha to only 1M ha when the 
establishment cost was increased from $1000 ha-1 to $3000 ha-1. Our results were also 
sensitive to changes in the establishment cost, but the overall viability of carbon farming was 
affected minimally when accounting for the option of ANR. In our study region, we found 
that the area viable for carbon farming using environmental plantings alone halved under the 
same circumstances (868,600 ha to 387,700 ha). However, when we considered 
environmental plantings in combination with ANR, the reduction in total viable area was just 
under 10% (1.3 M ha to 1.2 M ha), as ANR was the more viable methodology in the vast 
majority of sites and contributed the greatest proportion of economic returns. Since ANR 
establishment costs are largely negligible, carbon sequestration supply and economic returns 
generated using this methodology are likely to be more robust to variable economic 
conditions.   
The amount of carbon which could profitably be sequestered using ANR was roughly twice 
the amount possible if only environmental plantings were considered. A $50 t CO2e-1 carbon 
price could incentivize the sequestration of 1,664 Mt CO2e using ANR, whereas 
environmental plantings alone could only supply 770 Mt CO2e over 100 years.  
Environmental plantings are still an important methodological option for carbon farming, 
particularly in areas where natural regenerative capacity has been diminished to the point 
where ANR is not viable. However, our findings do indicate that ANR holds considerable 
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potential for restoring vegetation in agricultural landscapes, particularly when the costs 
associated with establishing environmental plantings are high or uncertain. Our study 
contributes to a growing body of work which demonstrates the potential for ANR as a low-
cost reforestation methodology which can benefit biodiversity conservation alongside carbon 
sequestration (Birch et al., 2010; Funk et al., 2014; Gilroy et al., 2014), in a literature which 
has so far been dominated by studies focused predominantly on environmental plantings and 
fast-growing monocultures  (Bryan et al., 2014; Bryan and Crossman, 2013; Carwardine et 
al., 2015; Paul et al., 2013; Polglase et al., 2013; Renwick et al., 2014). While the biodiversity 
value of regrowth or secondary forests may generally not be as high as in unmodified forest 
(Álvarez-Yépiz et al., 2008; Gibson et al., 2011; Sampaio et al., 2007), ANR has a key role 
to play as a pragmatic forest restoration method which can cost-effectively sequester carbon 
and restore biodiversity in landscapes of intermediate levels of degradation (Gilroy et al., 
2014; Shono et al., 2007). Restoration of deforested landscapes can provide crucial habitat 
for highly threatened species (Bowen et al., 2009; Butler, 2009; Munro et al., 2007), by 
supplementing important refugia (Shoo et al., 2011) and enhancing structural complexity 
(Munro et al., 2009; Woinarski et al., 2009). The outcomes of restoration are highly 
dependent on geographic and historical context (Suding, 2011), and it should be noted that 
ANR is most suitable for restoring areas where some level of natural succession is in progress 
(Chazdon, 2008; Shono et al., 2007). In our study region, it has been shown that management 
history can affect density of regrowth and rates of recovery in Brigalow forest (Dwyer et al., 
2010a). Management of fire and grazing will play an important role in forest regeneration. 
In some instances fire may be useful for thinning which has been demonstrated to enhance 
growth rates in some forest types in Australian rangelands (Dwyer, et al., 2010b). Likewise, 
the management of grazing pressure will be important to allow early establishment of trees. 
In regions which also contain high fuel load exotic grasses, grazing may also be necessary to 
manage fire risk. 
It is important to consider some caveats to our approach. We have assumed that monitoring 
costs are incurred annually, whereas carbon farming projects often have a defined crediting 
period (15 years for reforestation projects under the CFI) (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2012c). Monitoring costs could be reduced by undertaking measurements of carbon stocks 
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at longer intervals (Cacho et al., 2012). Carbon farming offers considerable economies of 
scale (Cacho et al., 2013; Charnley et al., 2010) which we have not accounted for here. While 
some establishment and management costs are proportional to project size (tube stock, pest 
management), many components of market participation and transaction costs are fixed. It is 
therefore likely that carbon farming projects will be more profitable over large areas, for 
example where several landholders could collaborate, thereby reducing management and 
transaction costs (Polglase et al., 2013). Such economies of scale may be particularly 
significant for the ANR methodology, given there is no need for intensive restoration of 
vegetation and where fencing is needed, the cost will scale in proportion to project area 
(Schirmer and Field, 2000).  
We have also assumed the full opportunity cost of agricultural production is incurred to 
establish carbon farming on a property, but this is likely an overestimate. Grazing by 
livestock is permitted on sites with environmental plantings 3 years after project 
establishment (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012b), and on ANR sites once forest cover has 
been re-established (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013a) or earlier if evidence can be 
provided that grazing has not prevented the regrowth of native forest (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2013b). Future analyses should factor in a model of diminishing returns from 
grazing as a function of vegetation growth rate (Scanlan, 1991), so as to better understand 
the costs and benefits of ANR versus environment plantings. We have also not accounted for 
the cost savings associated with ceasing re-clearing of regrowth vegetation in this study, 
which could make ANR an even more attractive option in landscapes with high natural 
regenerative capacity (Dwyer et al., 2009; Gowen et al., 2012). Such an analysis will need to 
take into consideration the variation in regrowth clearing costs, which are dependent on the 
local dominant vegetation.  
A potential source of uncertainty in our results is the error contained within the agricultural 
profitability layer (Marinoni et al., 2012), which we used as a proxy for the opportunity cost 
of carbon farming. Two main sources of uncertainty are inherent in spatial estimates of 
agricultural profitability: mapping uncertainty, and estimation uncertainty (Bryan et al., 
2009). Mapping uncertainty emerges due to inaccuracies in the underlying land use data 
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layer, as well as the use of NDVI mapping as a proxy for agricultural yield. Estimation 
uncertainty is mainly due to the temporal and spatial variability of individual parameters of 
the agricultural commodity profit function, particularly costs, which cannot be fully captured 
over large geographical areas and for multiple commodities (Bryan et al., 2011). It should 
also be noted that Marinoni et al. (2012) derived estimates of agricultural profitability for the 
year 2005/2006, which was a time of drought in our Queensland case study region. The 
viability of the beef industry in particular was affected during this time (ABARE, 2009), 
resulting in some negative estimates of profitability mainly in the south-west of our study 
extent (Marinoni et al., 2012). Our central finding of the economic viability of ANR relative 
to environmental plantings should be robust to this source of uncertainty, given that 89% of 
our study extent is devoted to livestock grazing on native pastures, and any price volatility 
due to drought would affect this landscape fairly evenly. We therefore expect that the overall 
impacts of uncertainties in agricultural profitability estimates are low, and do not change the 
general conclusions of our study.  
We considered the influence of project duration on the viability of carbon farming, as it is 
clear that in addition to policy risk and market uncertainty, long-term contracts can present a 
significant barrier to private landholder participation  (Ando and Chen, 2011; Charnley et al., 
2010; Mitchell et al., 2012).  In our analysis, we found that the total area viable for carbon 
farming and the annual economic returns over a 25 year project duration did not differ 
substantially to what was expected over 100 years. Although this result was of course 
influenced by discounting, this effect was diminished by the predominance of the low-cost 
ANR methodology.  Our findings suggest that the 25 year contract option would offer a 
similar degree of financial benefit compared to a long term contract, despite the proposed 
20% discount on credits earned over a 25 year project duration (Australian Government, 
2014a). However, a key consequence of this shorter contract option is that approximately 
half as much carbon would be sequestered relative to a 100 year carbon farming project. 
Reducing barriers to landholder participation in carbon farming schemes does not necessarily 
mean that only short contracts should be offered, as establishing a carbon farming project 
requires long term investment, and the carbon sequestration and biodiversity benefits from 
restoring vegetation increase over time. Alternatives to strict long-term permanence 
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obligations such as insurance policies and premiums (van Oosterzee et al., 2012) and 
arrangements where the contract duration is selected based on a sliding scale with the 
estimated risk of project reversal (Macintosh, 2013) deserve further investigation. 
In our analysis, we have demonstrated the economic viability of ANR relative to 
environmental plantings in Australian agricultural landscapes for the first time. An important 
future extension to this work would be to explicitly consider the expected biodiversity 
benefits derived from ANR to understand how the supply of carbon sequestration and 
contribution to biodiversity conservation can be jointly maximized. Targeted payments to 
areas of high conservation value could augment economic returns from carbon farming to 
facilitate ‘win-win’ carbon and biodiversity outcomes (Bryan et al., 2014; Carwardine et al., 
2015; Crossman et al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2008; Phelps et al., 2012b). However, trade-offs 
exist between biodiversity and carbon sequestration potential over both space and time. 
While above-ground carbon storage generally increases in a monotonic fashion as stands age 
and mature (Law et al., 2001; Stephenson et al., 2014), it can take substantially more time 
for regrowth vegetation to provide habitat values similar to mature remnant vegetation 
(Hatanaka et al., 2011; Woinarski et al., 2009). Carbon sequestration potential, biodiversity 
values and opportunity costs are unevenly distributed throughout landscapes (Crossman et 
al., 2011; Nelson et al., 2008). An important area of future research would be to determine 
how biodiversity co-benefits can be delivered alongside the economic and carbon 
sequestration benefits generated by the carbon market, while taking into account these 
potential trade-offs. In particular, future work should specifically focus on how the cost 
efficiencies of ANR could deliver improved outcomes for biodiversity relative to what is 
possible with environmental plantings, as examined by previous studies (Bryan et al., 2014; 
Carwardine et al., 2015; Crossman et al., 2011).   
Despite the requirement for carbon sinks to remain in place over a very long timeframe, 
consideration of future global change and associated risks to carbon farming projects are 
noticeably absent in current Australian carbon farming policy. We have calculated the 
economic viability of carbon farming using a discounted cash flow analysis, but such a 
deterministic methodology is unable to account for the uncertainties inherent over long time 
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frames in the face of climate change (Dobes, 2008; Stafford Smith et al., 2011).  Future 
carbon prices are subject to high uncertainty and fluctuations, as evidenced by the 2012 crash 
of the carbon price in the European market and recent climate policy changes in Australia. 
The costs and benefits of offsets are rarely considered within a climate adaptation framework, 
and in particular, the projected climate impacts on offset projects which aim to mitigate the 
effects of climate change are often unaccounted for. Unless analyzed appropriately, 
mitigation responses to climate change could ultimately prove to be maladaptive in the future. 
A key research gap therefore exists on how to analyze the costs and benefits of offset projects 
in the face of uncertainty. 
Conclusions 
Carbon farming in agricultural landscapes presents an important opportunity to deliver 
biodiversity, financial and social co-benefits alongside carbon abatement. Although carbon 
farming is only one of many policy options available to stimulate abatement of greenhouse 
gas emissions, it is an active policy space in Australia (Australian Government, 2014; 
Bradshaw et al., 2013; Bryan et al., 2014), New Zealand (Funk et al., 2014; Trotter et al., 
2005), Canada (Anderson et al., 2014; van Kooten, 2000) and internationally (Benítez et al., 
2007; Gilroy et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2014). 
We have presented the first spatially explicit assessment of potential carbon supply via 
assisted natural regeneration relative to environmental plantings, in a region which is 
significant for its biodiversity values as well as its rural history (Dwyer et al., 2009; McAlpine 
et al., 2002; Seabrook et al., 2006). Our findings show that carbon farming is a viable 
alternative to agricultural production in the marginal areas within our study region even with 
low and moderate carbon prices, whereas a $50 t CO2e-1 carbon price could make over 10 
million hectares of land attractive for carbon sequestration projects.   
Crucially, the vast majority of carbon sequestration and economic potential of carbon farming 
in our study region is derived from assisted natural regeneration. In addition to providing a 
low-cost option for terrestrial carbon sequestration, there is considerable potential for ANR 
to make an important contribution to biodiversity conservation within modified agricultural 
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landscapes (Bowen et al., 2009; Butler, 2009; Martin and McIntyre, 2007; McAlpine et al., 
2002).   
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PREAMBLE  
Biodiversity offset policy and governance 
...I want to ask you today what the generations to follow will say of us 40 years from 
now. It could be they’ll report the loss of many million acres more, the extinction of 
species, the disappearance of wilderness and wildlife; or they could report something 
else. They could report that sometime around 1989 things began to change and that 
we began to hold on to our parks and refuges and that we protected our species and 
that in that year the seeds of a new policy about our valuable wetlands were sown, a 
policy summed up in three simple words: “No net loss.” 
— President George HW Bush, June 8, 1989 
 
This thesis has so far covered native vegetation regulations (Chapters Two and Three) 
and carbon farming (Chapter Four). Here I introduce the third and final policy 
instrument examined in this thesis: biodiversity offsetting. Biodiversity offsetting is a 
highly contested and controversial policy instrument, which is nonetheless increasing in 
popularity worldwide.  Like carbon farming, biodiversity offsetting is often framed in a 
very optimistic sense, as an “opportunity” that will provide “win-wins” for biodiversity 
and the economy. It also shares similarities with carbon farming as a market-based policy 
instrument, which aims to change behaviour by encouraging “correct” behavior 
(environmental protection and conservation of biodiversity) rather than discouraging or 
punishing poor behavior (c.f native vegetation regulations). Both instruments rely heavily 
on the selection of a baseline from which to measure benefits, and are subject to agency 
problems that can result in lower environmental outcomes than what may have been 
anticipated.  
I began my research on biodiversity offsetting while working at the University of 
Queensland in early 2012, prior to beginning my PhD. I worked as part of the Australian 
National Environmental Research Program (NERP) Environmental Decisions Hub with 
Phil Gibbons, Martine Maron and Hugh Possingham to provide advice on the 
development of the Australian Environmental Offsets Policy under the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act 1999. The final policy was 
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published by the Australian Government’s Department of Sustainability, Environment, 
Water, Population and Communities (DSEWPaC) in October 2012.  
Upon commencing my PhD in March 2013, I began a part-time internship within 
DSEWPaC and worked alongside Katherine Miller, James Trezise and Stefan Kraus for 
9 months. During this time, I co-authored a paper (Miller et al., 2015) which describes 
the history behind, policy rationale and development of the current Australian EPBC Act 
Environmental Offsets Policy. I also contributed to the design and testing of the offset 
metric used to implement the policy, as outlined in Chapter Five. My time at the 
Department (now Department of the Environment and Energy) gave me an invaluable 
insight into the realities of policy design, implementation and evaluation from the 
perspective of policy makers and administrators. My PhD research on biodiversity 
offsetting was inspired and facilitated by this time spent within the Department. 
This preamble briefly describes the history of biodiversity offset policy, and two of the 
broad contested issues encountered in its design, implementation and evaluation. I then 
introduce my case study of the biodiversity offsetting in Australia, which provides context 
for the remainder of this thesis.  
Introduction to biodiversity offsetting 
Human activities contribute to the loss of biodiversity through activities such as urban 
and residential expansion, built infrastructure, mining and agriculture. Concerns about 
the impacts of continued development on threatened species and ecosystems have 
prompted a range of policy responses in an effort to avert biodiversity loss (Chapters One 
to Four of this thesis). One such policy is biodiversity offsetting – also known as 
environmental offsetting  
Biodiversity offsetting is an increasingly widespread policy mechanism which is aims to 
compensate for the ecological impacts of human development (Gardner et al., 2013; 
McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; ten Kate et al., 2004). In 1989, the United States adopted 
a goal of ‘no net loss’ of wetlands, which was popularized by George H.W. Bush during 
his 1988 presidential campaign (Boisvert, 2015; Robertson, 2000; Salzman and Ruhl, 
2010). This shift in policy framing and approach for wetland management (Burgin, 2010; 
Kentula, 2000; Zedler, 1996) alongside the rise of market-based instruments for 
biodiversity conservation, were central to the emergence of biodiversity offsetting 
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(Boisvert, 2015; Burgin, 2008b, 2008a). Now, at least 69 countries have biodiversity 
offset policy in place or in development (Maron et al., 2016), and the majority of schemes 
have emerged within the last 10 years (Ives and Bekessy, 2015).   
Despite its popularity, biodiversity offsetting is highly controversial and faces several 
technical, governance, social and ethical dilemmas (Maron et al., 2016). There is also 
little evidence available which can demonstrate what outcomes are being delivered in any 
jurisdiction (but see Lindenmayer et al., 2017; May et al., 2016; Pickett et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, biodiversity offsetting remains a policy instrument of choice for 
governments worldwide seeking to balance competing economic and environmental 
demands, and is becoming firmly entrenched within regulatory and voluntary systems. 
There is therefore a need to resolve these issues wherever possible in order to deliver 
better outcomes for biodiversity (Maron et al., 2016). 
In this thesis, I consider only two of these broad challenges described by Maron et al. 
(2016). Technical issues in biodiversity offsetting primarily concern the selection and use 
of metrics to represent ‘biodiversity’, how to appropriately account for biodiversity losses 
and gains, how to capture uncertainty and time lags, and questions around baselines and 
counterfactual assumptions. Governance issues include agency problems which may 
emerge as a result of counterfactual assumptions, varying motivations of policy actors, 
and limited capacity or incentive for monitoring, evaluation and auditing. Australia is an 
enthusiastic adopter of biodiversity offsetting, and so provides fertile ground for research 
into these challenges.   
Biodiversity offsetting in Australia 
In Australia, biodiversity offsetting has been used both formally and informally (i.e, in 
absence of a documented policy) for the last 20 years, and formal policies are now in 
place at the federal level and in most states and territories (Maron et al. 2015; Table P.1, 
Figure P.1). The 2009 Hawke review of the EPBC Act recommended that Australia 
“develop a national biodiversity banking (biobanking) system and standards” and that the 
EPBC Act should be amended to “facilitate and promote the use of biobanking as part of 
project approvals; and facilitate the operation of a national biobanking scheme.” 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). 
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Table P.1. Key details of offset policies in Australia. Adapted from Maron et al. (2015) 
  Jurisdiction 
  
Commonwealth 
of Australia 
Victoria Queensland Western Australia South Australia New South Wales 
Australian 
Capital Territory 
Southern 
Tasmania 
Policy name 
EPBC Act 
Environmental 
Offsets Policy 
Native 
Vegetation 
Permitted 
Clearing 
Regulations 
Queensland 
Government 
Environmental 
Offsets Policy 
Western Australia 
Environmental 
Offsets Policy 
Significant 
Environmental 
Benefit 
BioBanking 
Assessment 
Methodology 
Biodiversity 
Offsets Policy 
for Major 
Projects 
ACT 
Environmental 
Offsets Policy 
Southern 
Tasmanian 
Councils 
Authority 
Guidelines for 
the use of 
Biodiversity 
Offsets  
Current policy 
year 
2012 2013 2014 
2011 - policy; 2014 - 
guidelines 
2015 2014 2014 2015 2013 
First policy year 2007 (draft) 2007 2008 2006 2002 2008 - - - 
Policy scope 
Significant 
impacts on 
MNES* 
Most 
vegetation 
clearing 
permits 
Significant 
impacts on 
threatened 
species or 
ecological 
communities 
Significant residual 
impacts 
Most native 
vegetation 
clearance 
Threatened 
species and 
ecological 
communities 
Threatened 
species and 
ecological 
communities 
Significant 
residual adverse 
impacts on MNES 
or ACT protected 
matters 
Residual 
impacts, on 
protected 
biodiversity 
value/s 
Intended net 
biodiversity 
outcome** 
“Offsets must… 
deliver an 
overall 
conservation 
outcome that 
improves or 
maintains the 
viability of the 
protected matter 
as compared to 
what is likely to 
have occurred 
under the status 
quo, that is if 
neither the 
action nor the 
offset had taken 
place.” 
‘‘No net loss in 
the 
contribution 
made by native 
vegetation to 
Victoria’s 
biodiversity’’ 
“Offsets must 
achieve an 
equivalent or 
better 
environmental 
outcome” 
Offsets “provide 
environmental 
benefits which 
counterbalance the 
significant residual 
environmental 
impacts or risks of a 
project or activity.” 
“The Significant 
Environmental 
Benefit must 
outweigh the 
value of 
retaining the 
vegetation” 
“Offsets should 
aim to result in 
a net 
improvement in 
biodiversity 
over time. 
Enhancement of 
biodiversity in 
offset areas 
should be equal 
to or greater 
than the loss in 
biodiversity 
from the impact 
site.” 
Not specified 
‘‘...an overall 
conservation 
outcome that 
improves or 
maintains the 
viability of the 
aspect of the 
environment that 
is within the scope 
of the Policy and 
is impacted by the 
proposed action.’’ 
“When taken as 
a whole, the 
benefit of the 
offset actions 
must be greater 
than the scope of 
the adverse 
impacts on 
biodiversity 
value” 
 
* Matters of National Environmental Significance 
** As per Maron et al. 2015, but updated for South Australia's 2015 Significant Environmental Benefit policy 
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Figure P.1. The jurisdictions across Australia in which each of the eight offset policies and guidelines 
examined apply. Map appears in Maron et al. (2015) and was developed by M. Evans. 
Although the EPBC Act has not yet been amended to explicitly require biodiversity offsetting 
as part of project approvals, a formal offset policy and guide was developed over 2011-2012 
to support Commonwealth regulation of impacts to Matters of National Environmental 
Significance (Australian Government, 2012; Miller et al., 2015).  
The EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy (2012) was designed in response to stakeholder 
dissatisfaction with the Australian Government’s ad-hoc approach to offsetting in use since 
2001 (Miller et al., 2015). The policy was designed to adhere to the Business and Biodiversity 
Offsets Programme’s principles of biodiversity offsets (2012), and requires that offsets 
deliver an overall conservation outcome that improves or maintains the viability for a 
protected matter as compared to what is likely to have occurred under the status quo (Maron 
et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2015).  
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A recent Australian Senate inquiry into the effectiveness of biodiversity offsetting in 2014 
attracted 97 submissions from individuals and organisations, with divergent views expressed 
from different stakeholders on what is needed to for an effective offset policy (Martin et al., 
2016). A conclusion of the Senate committee overseeing the inquiry was that there is a 
“…lack of evidence that offsets are effective and actually achieving their intended outcomes” 
(The Senate Environment and Communications References Committee, 2014). A key 
principle of the Australian environmental offset policy (2012) is that of transparency in 
decision making, and this was central in the policy design process. However, it is not yet 
clear whether transparency in the “front end” of policy implementation has translated to 
transparency in outcomes or policy evaluation. 
The following three Chapters describes work I have undertaken which attempt to resolve or 
clarify key technical and governance challenges in biodiversity offsetting. In Chapter Five, 
I highlight the key contributions I made to its design (and in particular, the technical aspects 
of metric design, as discussed within Miller, Gibbons and colleagues (2015)). I describe the 
rationale behind the selection of an appropriate discount rate when determining ecological 
equivalence between biodiversity losses and gains, that explicitly accounts for a species risk 
of extinction.  
Chapter Six then examines the governance of biodiversity offsetting. I first draw on co-
authored work (Martin et al. 2016) which analysed the perceptions of stakeholders who made 
submissions to a Senate Inquiry into the effectiveness of biodiversity offsetting in Australia. 
I then introduce agency theory as a lens which may be used to explain stakeholder perceptions 
and behaviours, and outline how perverse outcomes are predicted to emerge for biodiversity 
under offset policy arrangements. I present evidence which suggests adverse selection is 
undermining the anticipated environmental outcomes from biodiversity offsetting in 
Australia (Maron et al. 2015), and consider whether moral hazard also has the potential to 
occur.  
In Chapter Seven, I examine stakeholder perspectives of the efficacy of biodiversity 
offsetting in Australia, with a particular focus on how the policy is interpreted and 
implemented in practice. I draw on data collected through semi-structured interviews with 
Preamble to Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
 
 
 
117 
 
policymakers, practitioners and industry proponents who have had direct experience with the 
Australian Environmental Offsets Policy (2012), to examine how policy actors interact with 
the offset policy process. I identify a series of factors within the process through which 
biodiversity offsets are designed, assessed, implemented and evaluated under the EPBC Act 
which may enable or inhibit good environmental outcomes. I conclude by discussing what 
prospects exist for improved policy outcomes under current institutional and political 
arrangements.  
 
  
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  
Discounting extinction: ecological time 
preference and biodiversity offsets 
A version of this Chapter was originally drafted as: 
Evans, M.C., Maron, M., Gibbons, P. & Possingham, H.P. (2013). A bird in the hand is 
worth two in the bush: ecological time preference and biodiversity offsets. Paper 
prepared for the 15th Annual BIOECON Conference, Kings College, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom, 18 – 20th September 2013. 
It also draws upon and expands on contributions made by the Candidate to the following 
publications, provided in Appendix Five of this thesis.  
Gibbons, P., Evans, M.C., Maron, M., Gordon, A., Le Roux, D., von Hase, A., 
Lindenmayer, D.B. & Possingham, H.P. (2016). A Loss-Gain Calculator for 
Biodiversity Offsets and the Circumstances in Which No Net Loss Is Feasible. 
Conservation Letters, 9, 252–259. 
Miller, K.L., Trezise, J.A., Kraus, S., Dripps, K., Evans, M.C., Gibbons, P., Possingham, 
H.P. & Maron, M. (2015). The development of the Australian environmental offsets 
policy: from theory to practice. Environmental Conservation, 42, 306–314.
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Abstract 
Biodiversity offsetting is an increasingly popular yet contentious policy instrument used to 
compensate for the ecological impacts of development. Much of the research focus on 
biodiversity offsetting has been on developing metrics for quantifying the amount of offset 
required to achieve a ‘no net loss’ or ‘net gain’ of biodiversity.  Although the majority of 
metrics in use take into account the spatial dimension of impact, few consider the time 
required for an offset to fulfil its compensation requirements to a particular species or 
ecosystem. Given that the future prospects of biodiversity are inextricably linked with time, 
surprisingly little work has been undertaken to quantify the offset requirements for threatened 
species and ecosystems which face varied degrees of threat to their persistence.  In this study, 
we introduce a novel approach to comprehensively estimate the offset requirements for 
biodiversity impacts over time and space, by incorporating the species’ annual probability of 
extinction as a discounting factor within our loss-gain metric. We find that accounting for 
‘ecological time preference’ within our loss-gain metric results in greater offset requirements 
for threatened species and ecosystems, but offset burden can be reduced if compensation can 
be delivered more rapidly.  Our approach can utilise readily available estimates of the 
probability of extinction related to the IUCN threat status of Red Listed species and 
ecosystems, but could benefit from refined estimates of annual extinction probabilities for 
specific biodiversity elements. 
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Introduction 
The overall goal of biodiversity offsetting is to achieve a ‘no net loss’ or ‘net gain’ in 
biodiversity after accounting for development impacts (Bull et al., 2013; Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 2012d). This goal is usually operationalized 
through the use of metrics, which facilitate the quantification of biodiversity losses in the 
development area as well as estimating the offset requirements commensurate with the 
impacts.  
Adequately accounting for biodiversity in offset calculations requires consideration of equity 
in type, time and space in order to meet the ‘no net loss’ policy objective (Salzman and Ruhl, 
2000). Although the inherent uncertainties associated with measuring biodiversity (Regan et 
al., 2002) inevitably mean that surrogates (such as the area of habitat impacted) are often 
used to quantify the biodiversity losses and gains associated with offsetting, much work has 
been done to provide guidance on how these estimates can be strengthened (Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 2012b). Generally, it is recommended that loss-
gain calculations for biodiversity offsetting should consider:  
(i) the type of biodiversity being impacted, such that ‘like-for-like’ or similar 
components of biodiversity are provided in compensation (Dunford et al., 2004; 
Quétier and Lavorel, 2011),  
(ii) the difference between status quo and the impact and offset scenario, such that 
offset outcomes are additional to what would have occurred anyway (Gibbons 
and Lindenmayer, 2007; Maron, et al., 2013), 
(iii) the likelihood of the proposed offset meeting its stated requirements (McKenney 
and Kiesecker, 2010; Moilanen et al., 2009),  
(iv) the threat status or vulnerability of the impacted biodiversity components 
(Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 2012b), and  
(v) the time delay between the ecological impact and delivery of the offset  (Bekessy 
et al., 2010; Salzman and Ruhl, 2000).   
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Although there is general consensus on the importance of these factors, no ‘standard’ 
approach exists to quantify the ecological impacts from development, and the offset required 
to compensate for these impacts (Gibbons et al., 2016; McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010). The 
majority of existing methods used to quantify biodiversity offset requirements account in 
some way for exchanges in type and across space (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP), 2012c; McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010), but the remaining (ii) – (v) 
factors are considerably less developed.  
Typically, offset requirements will be adjusted according to a ‘multiplier’, to reflect those 
factors not explicitly accounted for in the loss-gain calculation (McKenney and Kiesecker, 
2010). Multipliers are commonly used to increase offset requirements in an effort to better 
account for risk, species or ecosystem threat status, and time delays (Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 2012a). However, the danger in the use of offset 
multipliers is that their selection is arbitrary, and may lead to over- or under-estimation of 
offset requirements (Moilanen et al., 2009).  
Several authors have introduced approaches for explicitly considering time delays and the 
associated uncertainty in delivering offset outcomes. A time discounting factor can be 
incorporated into the offset calculation to ensure that a delayed offset results in no net loss 
from the perspective of the present time (Denne and Bond-Smith, 2012). The discount rate 
can also reflect (either individually or as a composite) a range of factors including pure time 
preference, the balance of supply and demand, risk and change in the marginal value of 
investment returns (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 2012c; Moilanen 
et al., 2009; Overton et al., 2013).  
Moilanen et al. (2009) introduced the concept of applying a discount rate within offset 
calculations, to account for the loss to biodiversity during the time-lag between development 
impact and the offset being delivered. Overton et al. (2013) suggested that discounting should 
be incorporated into calculation of the ‘net present biodiversity value’ to address the risk of 
an offset not being delivered.  Yet despite the general agreement on the concept of 
discounting for biodiversity offsets, no clear guidance exists for the selection of an 
appropriate discount rate. This is crucial, given the large impact discounting can have on 
Chapter Five: Discounting extinction 
 
 
 
122 
 
calculated offset requirements (Gibbons et al., 2016; Moilanen et al., 2009). 
Time discounting has been applied in a number of biodiversity offset policies. A 3.5% 
discount rate is currently being applied in calculations within the UK biodiversity offsetting 
pilot scheme (DEFRA, 2012) to reflect societal time preference. Denne and Bond-Smith 
(2012) recommend a 1% discount rate for the New Zealand biodiversity offsets program. 
Further, they contend that that pure time preference is the only appropriate reason to apply 
discounting to biodiversity offsets, as “the assessment of what is an adequate offset is 
concerned only with the biodiversity outcome, not with the financial costs of retaining or 
replacing it”.  
It could be argued then, that the appropriate discount rate should not necessarily just reflect 
just human preference for the timing of offset delivery, but rather the adequacy of a time-
delayed offset for biodiversity which is (in most cases) declining over time. A critically 
endangered species is unlikely to utilise an offset in a future time point beyond which it is 
expected to remain extant. It is surprising then that the discussion around time-discounting 
and biodiversity offsets has not extended to how the threat status of species and ecosystems 
should be explicitly considered in offset calculations, to avoid the use of arbitrary multipliers. 
In this study, we propose that the use of discounting in biodiversity offset calculations should 
be informed by species or ecosystem threat status, which can be quantified as an annual 
probability of extinction. We define ‘ecological time-preference’ as the use of time-
discounting to reflect the heightened offset requirements of species or ecosystems which are 
highly vulnerable to future extinction.  
We demonstrate our approach using a loss-gain metric developed by Gibbons and colleagues 
(2016), which has been adopted as the basis for the Australian Government’s Environmental 
Offsets Policy (Australian Government, 2012). Our approach can utilise readily available 
estimates of the probability of extinction related to the IUCN threat status of Red Listed 
species and ecosystems, but could benefit from refined estimates of annual extinction 
probabilities for specific biodiversity elements. 
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Methodology 
Loss-gain metric 
We present our approach for calculating offset requirements based on the loss-gain metric 
detailed in Gibbons et al. (2016). The loss-gain metric is similar to the discrete-time 
cumulative ‘net present biodiversity value’ presented by Overton et al. (2013), but is 
simplified to consider only the instantaneous losses and gains, rather than the cumulative sum 
of marginal losses and gains over time.   
We assume that prior to calculating offset requirements, we have: 
1) followed the mitigation hierarchy (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme 
(BBOP), 2012d) and considered any thresholds of impact beyond which offsets 
should not be considered (Gibbons et al., 2009; Pilgrim et al., 2013), and  
2) have identified a ‘credit profile’ of the ecological characteristics of the impact site 
which must be matched on the offset site, to ensure a ‘like-for-like’ trade (Department 
of Environment and Climate Change (DECC), 2008; Gibbons et al., 2009). 
For simplicity, we assume that the likelihood of success of the offset meeting its requirements 
is 100%.  
We first present the discrete-time cumulative value of an offset detailed by Overton et al. 
(2013). We assume the impact occurs at 0t , and the full value of the offset is delivered at
Tt  . No net loss is achieved when the net present value (NPV) of the difference between 
the discounted sum of marginal values of the offset ( OMV ) and the discounted sum of 
marginal values of the impact ( iMV ) is equal to zero: 




00
)()()()(
t
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T
t
O tDtMVtDtMVNPV ,  
where 0NPV  represents ‘no net loss’.  
The discounting function )(tD  applies a discounting factor d  to the value of impacts or 
Chapter Five: Discounting extinction 
 
 
 
124 
 
offsets that occur at time t into the future: 
tdtD )1()(  . 
We consider an exponential discounting function in this case, but other forms such as the 
hyperbolic (Gowdy, 2008; Henderson and Sutherland, 1996) and gamma (Weitzman, 2001) 
functions are possible.  
The loss-gain metric developed by Gibbons and colleagues (2016) and adapted for the 
Australian Government’s Environmental Offset Policy (2012) does not consider the 
discounted cumulative value of the impact and offset over time; but rather their respective 
values at the end-point T .  This simplification means that the impacts are potentially over-
valued, and offset under-valued over the time period 0t  to T . However, for the purposes 
of the policy principles10, it was necessary to assume that biodiversity impacts are 
instantaneous, and that the value of the offset is not considered until T.  
We calculate the value of an offset ( OV ) by taking the difference between two counterfactual 
scenarios (Maron et al., 2013):  the future value of the offset site under baseline or status quo 
conditions ( bV ), and the future value of the offset site under the impact-and-offset scenario 
( aV ): 
 baO VVV   .  
As in the discrete-time cumulative version (Overton et al., 2013) the impact occurs at t = 0 
and the offset is delivered at the end-time point T. The discounting factor d is applied to OV  
at t = T. We only consider discounting on the offset side of the equation, but impacts could 
also be discounted based on human preference for biodiversity conservation (Gowdy et al., 
                                                 
10 In particular, Policy Principle 7 requires the calculation of offsets to be “efficient, effective, timely, 
transparent, 
scientifically robust and reasonable”. Calculating the NPV cumulatively over the full time period was 
considered too complex for inclusion in the offset assessment guide spreadsheet:  
http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/publications/environmental-offsets-policy.html 
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2010; Overton et al., 2013).  No net loss is achieved when the discounted value of an offset 
( )(tDVO  ) is equivalent to the magnitude of the original impact ( iV ). 
Discounting function 
We account for ‘ecological time preference’ by applying a discounting factor 𝑑 which is 
informed by the impacted species’ threat status11. Extant threatened species and ecological 
communities listed as protected under the Australian Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBC) Act (1999) are categorised as Vulnerable, 
Endangered and Critically Endangered.  
Similar to the United States Endangered Species Act 1973, there are no guidelines under the 
EPBC Act which quantify the probability of extinction for species listed under different threat 
categories (Regan et al., 2013). We therefore adopted the IUCN (2001) criteria for each 
threatened species category (Table 5.1), and converted the probability of extinction in the 
wild into our annual discounting factor d by taking the geometric mean: 
y
Pd 1 , 
where P = the minimum probability of extinction in y years.  
The geometric mean is commonly used to model species population growth curves 
(Bascompte et al., 2002), and so provides a better approximation of the annual probability of 
extinction than the arithmetic mean. 
                                                 
11 The Australian Government’s EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy requires offsets to be “in proportion 
to the level of statutory protection that applies to the protected matter” (Policy Principle 3) 
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Table 5.1. IUCN (2001) criteria translated into the minimum annual probability of extinction for each 
major threatened species category, used as the discounting factor d for calculation of biodiversity 
offsets 
Threat Status 
IUCN Criteria for Probability 
of Extinction in the Wild 
Annual Probability of Extinction 
(Geometric mean) 
Critically Endangered At least 50% in 10 years 6.7% 
Endangered At least 20% in 20 years 1.1% 
Vulnerable At least 10% in 100 years 0.1% 
Case study 
To illustrate our approach, we present a hypothetical case study for a threatened species 
native to Australia: the red-tailed black cockatoo (Calyptorhynchus banksii graptogyne), 
which listed as Endangered under the EPBC Act. The key concern for this species is habitat 
loss and fragmentation driven by agricultural expansion in south-eastern Australia, which has 
impacted on the availability of its preferred food resources (Maron et al., 2010; Maron and 
Fitzsimons, 2007).  
Consider an impact where 20 hectares of feeding habitat for C. banksii graptogyne is 
removed as part of a development. The impact occurs on a site which encompasses 100 
hectares of suitable habitat in total. Ongoing pressures on the red-tailed black cockatoo’s 
habitat mean that it is expected to decline at a rate of 5% per year, based on estimates of land 
conversion in the surrounding landscape. The impact is to occur at t = 0 and it is proposed 
that an offset is initiated at this time by planting suitable vegetation at an adjoining site. We 
assume that the value of the offset site increases according to a power function,
)()( TAtAtA x
z
xx   such that it reaches its maximum value at t = T, and the 
growth parameter z = 0.10 (Figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1. Representation of the cumulative impact and offset value for our hypothetical case-study 
of the red-tailed black cockatoo (Calyptorhynchus banksii graptogyne, see inset). Under the 
baseline/status quo scenario, feeding habitat is lost at a rate of 5% per year due to external pressures. 
The time of impact is t=0, where 20 hectares of feeding habitat is removed due to development. Note 
that we do not apply a discounting factor to the impact trajectory, although this is possible. The figure 
illustrates the cumulative value of the offset after it is first planted at t = 0, and the trajectories as 
discounted according to whether the species is endangered (EN, d = 1.1%) or critically endangered 
(CE, d = 6.7%). 
We consider two scenarios: first, where the value of the proposed offset for C. banksii 
graptogyne is discounted according to its current threat status (Endangered, d = 1.1%). 
Secondly, the offset value is calculated according to the Critically Endangered threat status 
(d = 6.7%) to illustrate the impact on our findings. We calculate the offset requirements based 
on (1) our loss-gain metric (Gibbons et al. 2016) (2) the discrete-time cumulative function 
(Overton et al., 2013), and (3) a standard ‘multiplier’ approach. 
Results 
Using our loss-gain metric, we found that the 20 ha impact on endangered C. banksii 
graptogyne habitat could be offset to a no-net loss standard after 100 years by planting 60 ha 
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of land with new vegetation (Table 5.2). When the cumulative value of the impact and offset 
were taken into account (Overton et al., 2013), we found that a slightly larger offset area of 
80 ha was recommended. When we considered the case where C. banksii graptogyne was 
actually categorised as Critically Endangered, our results based on the alternative approaches 
differed substantially. The offset required to achieve no-net loss as calculated by our loss-
gain metric exceeded 10,000 ha in this case, which would likely be considered infeasible. 
Based on the discrete-time cumulative calculation, the offset requirement was 170 ha. The 
offset areas recommended by the standard ‘multiplier’ approach were lower than the 
estimated requirements based on the loss-gain metric as well as the discrete-time cumulative 
calculation (Table 5.2). 
Discussion 
We have presented a theoretical framework for explicitly accounting for the threat status of 
species and ecosystems in the calculation of biodiversity offset requirements. Offset policies 
will often adjust offset requirements for threatened biodiversity according to an arbitrary 
multiplier  (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010), which may seem intuitive but ultimately has 
little scientific or economic basis. Time discounting has been incorporated into some 
biodiversity offset policies (DEFRA, 2012; Denne and Bond-Smith, 2012), but is generally 
used to reflect pure-time preference or the risk of offset failure without differentiating 
whether the biodiversity components in question are threatened, and to what degree.  
Considering a discount rate for biodiversity offsetting which is informed by species’ annual 
probability of extinction offers a several advantages over the other approaches seen in 
policies so far.  Our approach explicitly considers ‘ecological time preference’ for offset 
delivery: specifically, the risk that a species will go extinct prior to an offset becoming 
available for use. Arguably, human time preference for offset delivery should be accounted 
for separately to the species’ time preference for the offset, given that the first consideration 
in biodiversity offset calculations should be as to whether an offset adequately satisfies a ‘no 
net loss’ criterion (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 2012d; Denne 
and Bond-Smith, 2012).  
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Table 5.2. Results from our hypothetical case study of the red-tailed black cockatoo (Calyptorhynchus banksii graptogyne), as calculated using 
the loss-gain metric, discrete-time cumulative function and basic multiplier approach. Offset requirements are calculated over 100 years, under 
scenarios where the species is either endangered (EN) or critically endangered (CE). Cells in grey indicate that the variable (row) is not 
considered in the corresponding offset calculation (column). 
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Pure time preference for biodiversity offsets could still be considered, but it first must be 
understood whether the biodiversity in question will be adequately compensated in order to 
remain extant over the time in which ecological impacts are incurred. Differentiating the 
discounting factor based on threat status could also reflect human time preference; given the 
higher value which society places upon species and ecosystems at risk. Applying a generic 
discount rate consistently across all biodiversity impacts suggest that humans place no greater 
preference over a critically endangered species compared to a common species. Of course, 
public preferences for biodiversity are influenced by a range of factors (Gowdy et al., 2010), 
but arguably these considerations should be accounted for after offset requirements are 
quantified.  
Higher discount rates for a threatened species could further incentivise efforts to avoid, 
mitigate and restore impacts prior to choosing to offset12. Alternatively, the threatened 
species’ ‘preference’ for timely compensation will require the development to provide an 
offset (which is scaled to the degree of species threat) which would ceteris paribus be larger 
than for a non-threatened species. In particular, a high discount rate could incentivise a more 
rapid delivery of an offset. While reducing the time taken to deliver an offset in itself only 
increases the offset requirement, if the rate of restorative works or securing an averted loss 
offset happens more rapidly during this reduced timeframe, this could result in considerable 
cost savings for the proponent, and provide compensation for the threatened species sooner.  
Gibbons et al. (2016) found that a low discount rate was a key factor in contributing to 
whether a development is likely to achieve no net loss. Based on our approach, this translates 
to offsets being more viable for species with a lower level of endangerment. 
We have adopted the IUCN criteria on species probability of extinction to inform the 
discounting factor calculation of offset requirements, given this is the international 
benchmark for threatened species categorisation (IUCN, 2001). However, locally specific 
estimates of species extinction probability, or estimates informed by population viability 
                                                 
12 Anecdotal evidence from the implementation of the Australian Government’s Environmental Offsets Policy 
suggest that a greater emphasis is being placed on threatened species listings, to ensure species are placed in 
the most appropriate threat category; given the considerable influence the discount rate (particularly for 
Critically Endangered species) has on biodiversity offset requirements 
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analysis (Boyce, 1992; McCarthy et al., 2003), or expert opinion (Carwardine et al., 2012; 
Regan et al., 2013) could easily be incorporated if they were readily available. In contrast to 
a basic ‘multiplier’ approach, offset requirements discounted according to species probability 
of extinction can readily updated as improved information on species risks emerge. This may 
be difficult to achieve if specific multipliers were set in policy according to categorical 
criteria only.  
Our case study illustrated the magnitude of difference in offset requirements for biodiversity 
where discounting is informed by species’ probability of extinction. The multiplier approach 
recommended offsets much smaller in size than what was calculated under the loss-gain and 
discrete-time cumulative approaches, and importantly, there was no way to determine 
whether these quantities would result in a no-net-loss outcome. The net present value of the 
offset could be estimated using the loss-gain and discrete-time cumulative approaches, but 
each differed in their treatment of impact and offset values. The offset recommended by each 
approach was similar in magnitude when the discounting factor was relatively small (d = 
1.1%, endangered status), but the loss-gain metric was particularly sensitive to the critically 
endangered discounting factor (d = 6.7%). We considered offsetting over a 100 year time 
period in this case, but limiting consideration of offsets to a shorter timeframe could represent 
a more realistic scenario, and reduce sensitivities in the loss-gain metric13.  
However, certain offsetting scenarios may actually be more accurately represented by the 
instantaneous loss-gain metric, whereby the value of an offset is close to zero until a future 
time point. For example, the red-tailed black cockatoo may not be able to utilise feeding trees 
until they reach maturity around 100 years after they are planted (Maron et al., 2010), so the 
cumulative benefit function may not be appropriate in this case. More work is needed to fully 
explore a range of impact and offset value functions (Arponen et al., 2005), and the 
implications for ‘offsetability’ (Pilgrim et al., 2013) under different circumstances.  
Biodiversity offsetting is a policy which has come under fire due to the poor reported 
performance to date (Brown et al., 2013; Quigley and Harper, 2006), the lack of transparency 
                                                 
13 The maximum period of time over which offsets can be considered under the the Australian Government’s 
Environmental Offsets Policy is 20 years. 
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and evaluation of outcomes (Edgar et al., 2005; Madsen et al., 2010) and the widespread use 
of metrics that are not fit for purpose (Maron et al., 2013). Many of the challenges presented 
by biodiversity offsetting will not be solved by improved metric design (Walker et al., 2009), 
yet the metric used to calculate offset requirements has such a fundamental role in 
determining whether the ‘no net loss’ objective can be achieved. Accounting for an 
ecologically relevant discounting factor in the calculation of offset requirements would 
address the need to explicitly consider the interaction between time and species 
endangerment, which has so far eluded biodiversity offset policy. 
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Introduction 
 
“The process of initiating multiactor governance is not politically neutral, nor does it 
exist in a vacuum. It rather reflects competing interpretations of the performance of 
the polity: its effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and attempts by political actors  
to influence the direction of political change” 
Peter Newell, Philipp Pattberg, and Heike Schroeder (2012). Multiactor Governance  
and the Environment, Annual Review of Environment and Resources 37, 365–387 
 
Environmental governance refers to the institutions and organisations that guide the 
implementation of environmental policies, as well as the actors that influence and are 
influenced by these institutions and organisations (Adger and Jordan, 2009; Agrawal and 
Lemos, 2007; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Lockwood et al., 2010; Newell, 2008). 
Effective biodiversity conservation requires analysis of the incentives and actions of 
multiple actors, and an understanding of how these arrangements play out across multiple 
scales and contexts (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2006). Thus far, discussion of biodiversity 
offsetting in the literature has primarily focused on policy principles and metric design, 
with far less attention on political and social dimensions (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 
2017; Benabou, 2014; Maron et al., 2016; Penca, 2013, 2015). The governance of 
biodiversity offsetting ultimately determines how, and to what extent, policy objectives 
are met (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Newell, 2008), and so is a crucial area for research.  
As discussed in Chapter One, ‘new’ environmental policy instruments such as 
biodiversity offsetting operate through the participation of multiple actors, each with their 
own objectives and interests (Agrawal and Lemos, 2007; Jordan et al., 2005; Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006; Liverman, 2004; Newell et al., 2012). How successful and efficient these 
governance arrangements are in a particular jurisdiction will be highly dependent on local 
context – in terms of who is involved, and how power and authority are distributed 
between different actors. In developing nations such as Madagascar, Mongolia and 
Uzbekistan, businesses and non-government organisations have driven offset policy 
design, and market participation is on a voluntary basis (Benabou, 2014; Bidaud et al., 
2015, 2017; Bull et al., 2014; Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 
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2012d). In contrast, biodiversity offsetting in Australia and other developed nations 
operates within an existing regulatory environment, where businesses are required by 
government to deliver offsets as conditions of approval for development activities (Fox 
and Nino-Murcia, 2005; Miller et al., 2015).  
Although market-based instruments (MBI’s) such as biodiversity offsetting are often 
promoted as more efficient or ‘easier’ than traditional ‘command and control’ regulation, 
in reality they may require as much, if not more, regulatory settings than regulation on its 
own. Moreover, the number of actors involved in MBI’s can increase the transaction costs 
vis-à-vis the direct ‘regulator-regulated’ relationship. Far from a simple trade in 
ecological values from one place to another, biodiversity offsetting operates within highly 
complex governance arrangements (Boisvert, 2015; Coggan et al., 2013a; Whitten et al., 
2012), and should be analysed accordingly. Direct observation of how actors interact 
within a particular institutional and political context is difficult, hence I draw on a 
combination of stakeholder perceptions (Martin et al. 2016), quantitative estimates of 
policy scenarios (Maron et al. 2015) and a widely used theoretical framework (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Laffont and Martimort, 2009; Shapiro, 2005) to deliver a preliminary description 
of biodiversity offset governance.  
In this Chapter, I first introduce some of the policy actors involved in biodiversity 
offsetting, by drawing on work co-authored with Martin et al. (2016) which analysed 
stakeholder perceptions captured in submissions to an Australian Senate Inquiry in 2014. 
I then use agency theory as a framework for understanding the perceptions and behaviours 
of policy actors who are engaged with biodiversity offset policy. I outline how perverse 
outcomes can emerge for biodiversity under conditions predicted by agency theory, 
including adverse selection and moral hazard. I then present evidence first documented 
in Maron et al. (2015) which suggests adverse selection is undermining the potential 
environmental outcomes from biodiversity offsetting in Australia, by comparing the 
baseline assumptions of offset policies in eight Australian jurisdictions with estimated 
rates of deforestation. I conclude by considering how moral hazard may occur under 
common biodiversity offset policy arrangements: specifically, where there is asymmetric 
information and insufficient monitoring and public scrutiny.  
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Stakeholder perceptions of biodiversity offset policy 
There is evidently a need to better understand the governance of biodiversity offsetting 
from a holistic perspective (Boisvert, 2015), by investigating the motivations, incentives, 
and challenges faced by diverse policy actors. However, the academic literature on 
biodiversity offsetting has so far paid little attention to the stakeholders involved in 
designing, implementing and evaluating offset policies (Bidaud et al., 2017; Coggan et 
al., 2013a; Kaplowitz et al., 2008). Exceptions to this include work by Hayes and 
Morrison-Saunders (2007), who surveyed government agencies, regulators, consultants 
and industry proponents involved with biodiversity offsetting in Western Australia. 
Respondents in this study generally supported the use of offsets in-principle, but 
expressed doubts over the likelihood of achieving a ‘no net loss’ or ‘net gain’ outcome in 
practice. Brown et al. (2014) found similar results in New Zealand where ecological 
practitioners expressed strong support for the use of offsetting, but raised several 
organizational and informational barriers to effective implementation. Respondents also 
expressed concern about the lack of regulatory follow-up and long-term security of offsets 
(Brown et al., 2014).  
Given the complexity of biodiversity offset governance, it is useful to analyse these 
arrangements in a structured way which recognizes the varying degrees of interest and 
participation that diverse actors have in different stages of the offset policy process. In 
our published paper (Martin et al., 2016), we made use of a recent Australian Senate 
inquiry into the effectiveness of environmental offsets to investigate the views of 
stakeholders who had made written submissions. The Senate inquiry specifically focused 
on “the history, appropriateness and effectiveness of the use of environmental offsets in 
federal environmental approvals in Australia”, incorporating: 1) policy principles, 2) the 
development of offset proposals, 3) processes used to assess and approve offsets, 4) the 
adequacy of monitoring and evaluation, and 5) outcomes and results delivered by 
approved offsets (The Senate Environment and Communications References Committee, 
2014). A total of 97 submissions were made by individuals and organizations, including 
47 non-government organisations (NGOs; conservation, education, environment legal 
services, indigenous bodies), 9 industry peak bodies (business, mining, farming and 
aquaculture), 7 government organisations (political party, city council, regional 
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development agencies, indigenous land and advisory, environment), and 5 business firms 
(consultants, developers), with 29 individuals providing written submissions.  
We used a structured content analysis (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Miles et al., 2013) to 
examine the arguments made in stakeholders' submissions, and coded to five broad 
themes reflecting broad stages in the offset policy process (Table 6.1). Within each theme, 
statements were then coded to subthemes which reflected support for key offset principles 
drawn from the literature (e.g. additionality, no net loss; see Figure 1, Martin et al. (2016) 
Appendix 5), considerations which stakeholders considered should or should not be 
included within offset policy processes (e.g include high quality scientific information, 
exclude existing protected areas as possible offsets), and any comments relating to known 
offset success or failure. Despite the constrained nature of the public inquiry and the 
unbalanced response rate from different stakeholder groups (e.g 47 NGO responses 
versus 14 from industry peak bodies and business firms), some useful insights emerged. 
First, there was a perception by NGO and individual (often scientists) respondents that 
the mitigation hierarchy was not being stringently considered in development decisions, 
with offsets being favoured over avoidance, minimization and rehabilitation measures 
(Clare et al., 2011; Clare and Krogman, 2013). In their final report, the Senate committee 
expressed concern over evidence presented by submissions that the mitigation hierarchy 
“is not being rigorously applied and that there is insufficient emphasis on avoidance and 
mitigation measures” (The Senate Environment and Communications References 
Committee, 2014). Many environmental stakeholders submitted that an assessment 
should be conducted as part of offsets pre-testing to assure that all environmental impact 
avoidance, minimization and restoration options have been rigorously canvassed prior to 
offsets planning. 
Second, the need for greater consistency between local, state and federal environmental 
offset policies was emphasized, in particular by regulated industries. The National 
Farmers' Federation described that better policy alignment “will avoid the current 
confusion of separate offset requirements by the different jurisdictions.” (Submission 15, 
NFF, 3rd April 2014, pg. 2). The Chamber of Minerals and Energy Western Australia 
stated that “any offsets requirements imposed under both State and Commonwealth  
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Table 6.1. Summary of stakeholder statements relating to offsets. From Martin et al. (2016) 
Theme 
Number of statements by stakeholder group (n = 742) 
Businesses 
Business peak 
bodies 
Government NGO Individuals 
Theme total 
(no.) 
Theme total 
(%) 
1. Principles and Policy 8 24 29b 162a b   41 264c 36% 
2. Proposal Development and 
Submission 
 
11b 25b 13 147a 45b 241 32% 
3. Proposal Assessment and Approval 1 5 7 48a 19 80 11% 
4. Monitoring and Evaluation 4 7 6 90a 19 126 17% 
5. Outcomes and Results 1 2 4 18a 6 31 4% 
Stakeholder Total (No.) 25 63 59 465 130 742   
Normalized Total (No.) 5.00 7.00 8.43 9.89 4.48 7.65 
 
Stakeholder Total (%) 3% 8% 8% 63% 18%   100% 
 
Notes: 
a Indicates lead stakeholder in theme. 
b Indicates stakeholder primary area of interest. 
c Indicates leading theme. 
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legislation should be complementary and should not impose additional costs on industry” 
(Submission 33, CME, April 2014, pg. 6).   
There were however concerns expressed about the Australian Government’s proposed ‘one 
stop shop’ for environmental approvals, which was intended to reduce policy duplication and 
reduce regulatory burden for industry (Australian Government, 2014b; Standing Committee 
on the Environment, 2014). A number of stakeholders criticized the government’s plan to 
accredit state and territory planning processes under the EPBC Act, since these are of a lower 
standard than the federal policy.  
Third, submissions from peak bodies, NGOs and individuals argued for a more ‘strategic’ 
approach to offsetting, which can account for cumulative impacts from developments over 
larger spatial and temporal scales than are currently considered under the standard piecemeal, 
‘project by project’ approach. Achieving this holistic view of offsetting would require some 
harmonization of offset policies across jurisdictions (as per above), and the integration of 
offsetting within the broader context of strategic landscape planning. There is a role for 
government to provide guidance and information to facilitate this strategic approach, which 
the The Environment Institute of Australia and New Zealand argued would assist with “the 
identification and delivery of offsets that provides proponents with greater certainty of their 
required contributions” (Submission 88, EIANZ, April 2014, pg. 8).  
Finally, all stakeholder groups expressed concern over the current lack of transparency and 
availability of information relating to offset assessments, approvals and delivery of 
environmental outcomes. NGOs such as Friends of the Earth argued that the current approval 
process prevents rigorous public scrutiny, since “…[offsets] are imposed as post-approval 
conditions and are therefore not subject to review and public input” (Submission 58, Friends 
of the Earth Australia, April 2014, pg. 6). Once offsets are approved and presumably 
established, there is similarly limited information the environmental performance of offsets, 
due to the absence of a public register of offsets and “systemic failures in monitoring and 
performance” (Submission 72, Environmental Defenders Office (Victoria), 10th April 2014, 
pg. 6). The Outcomes and Results theme in our analysis attracted the lowest number of 
stakeholder statements (4%), which is due in part to it being “too early” to tell whether offsets 
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approved since the introduction of the 2012 policy had generated environment outcomes 
(Submission 88, EIANZ, April 2014, pg. 9). However, since environmental offsetting has 
been in operation informally since the introduction of the EPBC Act in 2000 (Miller et al., 
2015), the chronic lack of information available to conduct a meaningful evaluation was 
criticized by several stakeholders.  An independent audit concluded in 2014 that: 
“…compliance monitoring undertaken by the department has, generally, been 
insufficient to provide an appropriate level of assurance of proponents' ongoing 
compliance with their conditions of approval” (Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO), 2014).  
Environmental NGOs and industry peak bodies alike supported the development of a publicly 
available offsets register, which suggests that greater transparency and information could 
provide benefits for multiple interests. As noted by the Senate committee (2014), the 
Australian Environmental Offsets Policy (2012) states that all offsets (including their 
locations and details of protected matters and management activities) will be registered and 
information made publicly available, which will “allow strategic planning, and streamline 
processes with state and territory requirements and schemes”. However, such a system has 
not yet become publicly available.  
Understanding the behavior of policy actors in biodiversity offset 
governance  
A limitation with the use of data that captures ‘perceptions’, particularly in the context of a 
public inquiry, is that the statements made by stakeholders do not necessarily match their 
true intent or behavior (Bennett, 2016). It is notable that businesses (3%, Table 6.1) and 
business peak bodies (8%) made up only a small subset of the total number of submissions, 
hence it is likely the views of a number of businesses subject to biodiversity offset policy 
were not explicitly captured in the public inquiry. More in-depth research would be necessary 
to capture this data (such as through semi-structured interviews, e.g Brown et al. 2014), but 
a theoretical framework can also assist in predicting and explaining the likely behavior of 
policy actors.  
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MBI’s such as biodiversity offsetting aim to align the incentives of policy actors to encourage 
policy compliance (Jordan et al., 2003a; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006), in contrast to ‘command 
and control’ regulation where compliance is in theory more fervently enforced by 
government. Principal-agent theory (Laffont and Martimort, 2009), otherwise known as 
agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005), provides a useful lens through which to 
examine the efficacy of policy implementation in the context of multi-actor  governance 
(Howlett et al., 2009) and has been widely used to analyse the behavior of actors within a 
contractual relationship.  
A biodiversity offset involves a full or partial transfer of rights and responsibilities from one 
party (the developer, or offset buyer) to another (the offset seller). This transfer is codified in 
a legal contract, and compliance is enforced by government (the regulator).  In this simplified 
situation, the developer is the principal of contract between it and the offset seller (the agent). 
The regulator is the principal of the relationship between it and the developer, hence the 
developer is simultaneously a principal and an agent (Figure 6.1). Economists have typically 
drawn on principal-agent theory to analyse contractual arrangements between a small number 
of actors (Laffont and Martimort, 2009), whereas agency theory broadens this perspective to 
incorporate a wider range of relationships involving non-monetary incentives (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Shapiro, 2005). 
Kiser (1999) defines agency theory as “a general model of social relations involving the 
delegation of authority, and generally resulting in problems of control, which has been 
applied to a broad range of substantive contexts”. Agency problems can arise in any 
contractual arrangement between one or more actors, due to asymmetric access to 
information, uneven sharing of risks between these parties, and the diverging interests 
between the principal(s) and agent(s). Biodiversity offsetting is thus exposed to agency 
problems, including adverse selection and moral hazard (Maron et al., 2016).  
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Figure 6.1. Simple representation of a principal-agent relationship and its key assumptions.  
Market based instruments aim to select the units where the greatest benefit per unit cost can 
be delivered – that is, where the benefits delivered by the market are in addition or additional 
to what would have happened in absence of the policy. Determining what is additional 
requires an estimate of the counterfactual scenario, which is by definition not observable 
(Ferraro, 2009), and therefore has the potential to be gamed (Maron et al., 2016; Salzman 
and Ruhl, 2010). Adverse selection has been documented in carbon offset markets (Burke, 
2016; Bushnell, 2010), payments for ecosystem services schemes (Ferraro, 2008) and species 
banking in the United States (though additionality is not a stated policy goal in this case, Fox 
and Nino-Murcia, 2005; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 2003). In the case of biodiversity 
offsetting, there’s an incentive for the agent to inflate the counterfactual scenario, such that 
it appears that they are delivering a higher environmental outcome offset than in reality. 
Where the counterfactual scenario, or ‘crediting baseline’, assumes a future trajectory of 
biodiversity decline, the intended net outcome of a biodiversity offset is maintenance of that 
declining trajectory. If the rate of decline of the crediting baseline is implausibly steep, 
biodiversity offsetting can exacerbate biodiversity decline (Figure 6.2).  
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Figure 6.2. Example of an offset trade in which the use of an implausibly steep crediting baseline 
(fine dotted line) results in inflation of offset credit (a) which is then exchanged for an equivalent loss 
(b). For simplicity, we assume the plausible crediting baseline and debiting baselines are identical. 
The total credit allocated in (a) comprises both the genuine gain compared to the plausible 
counterfactual (dark grey) and the overallocated credit (light grey), resulting in a residual net loss 
equivalent to the amount of credit that was overallocated (light grey shading in (b)). From Maron et 
al. (2015). 
Evidence of adverse selection occurring under Australian biodiversity 
offset policies   
In our published paper (Maron et al., 2015), we examine the often-implicit assumptions used 
to inform counterfactual scenarios in Australian offset policies. Specifically, we (1) explore 
the extent to which a baseline from which to measure offset gains is clearly articulated for 
nine offset policies in eight Australian jurisdictions; and (2) for cases where a baseline is not 
explicitly stated, we explore whether a declining baseline is implied based on the rules 
specified for calculating offset credit under that policy and/or actual offset trades that have 
occurred, and if so, estimate the implied rate of decline; and (3) compare the baseline rates 
of decline to recent rates of vegetation loss for each of the jurisdictions to identify the degree 
to which the decline assumptions inherent in the policy correspond to available evidence of 
vegetation loss. 
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To evaluate the plausibility of assumed crediting baselines in offset policies, we compared 
the rates of future change implied by the crediting baselines built into each credit calculation 
approach with recent rates of change in woody vegetation extent in each jurisdiction (as per 
methods in Chapter Two). A comparison of implied crediting baselines with rates of change 
in extent allows an examination of whether there is any relationship between the two, as 
might be expected if crediting baselines were drawn from the assumption that the future 
would reflect recent trends.  
We found that the crediting baselines used in policy implementation varied among and within 
the jurisdictions from 0.36% and 4.2% decline per annum. In comparison, recent rates of 
woody vegetation loss were generally much lower and varied between 0% and 0.5% loss per 
annum (Figure 6.3). On average, crediting baselines were over five times the mean observed 
rate of forest loss, ranging from between 1.6 (Queensland) and 16 (South Australia) times 
higher than the observed rates of change (excluding ACT, with zero observed woody 
vegetation loss). There was no correlation between a jurisdiction’s observed rate of forest 
loss and its crediting baseline (Pearson’s r = 0.39); therefore, for crediting baselines to relate 
predictably to recent rates of change, prevailing processes of condition decline would have 
to vary considerably among jurisdictions. 
Our results show that vegetation decline scenarios used as crediting baselines in Australian 
biodiversity offset policies are much higher than recent rates of vegetation loss. Thus, not 
only are biodiversity declines entrenched as the net outcome across impact-offset trades, but 
those trades also risk exacerbating background rates of decline by overestimating averted 
loss offset credit which can be exchanged for equivalent losses. This assumption of ongoing 
biodiversity decline is at odds with federal and state government commitments to reduce or 
reverse the decline in native vegetation extent and quality (COAG Standing Council on 
Environment and Water, 2012; Evans, 2016). 
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Figure 6.3. Counterfactual annual rates of native vegetation decline (area per se, or condition × area) 
used for calculating offset credit in (L-R) the Australian Capital Territory, two New South Wales 
policies, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria (open bars), and observed 
mean annual rates of loss for each jurisdiction for the period 2002-2012 (grey bars). Error bars depict 
range of values. From Maron et al. (2015). 
Our findings provide evidence of adverse selection occurring under Australian biodiversity 
offset policies.  Further work is needed to ascertain how it manifests in practice, but is likely 
a result of: unstated or ambiguous counterfactual assumptions; inadequate or inaccurate data 
on background rates of biodiversity loss; and an incentive to overestimate the conservation 
benefits from a potential offset site by those who incur the cost of offsetting.  
Is there a risk of “hidden action” in biodiversity offsetting? 
Integration of monitoring, evaluation and reporting within the long term management plan 
of an offset is considered a core ‘best practice’ component of biodiversity offsetting 
(Australian Government, 2012; Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 
2012d). Unfortunately, there are widespread reports of inadequate monitoring and evaluation 
of offsets worldwide, as well as a lack of enforcement by regulators (Bernhardt et al., 2005; 
Brown et al., 2013; May et al., 2016; Nature Conservation Council of NSW, 2016; Treweek 
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and ten Kate, 2014; U. S. Government Accountability Office, 2005). In the absence of 
monitoring and evaluation, it of course cannot be known what outcomes are being delivered 
by offsetting or any other on-ground conservation management action, nor can deficiencies 
be identified or rectified. Inadequate monitoring may also incentivise developers or third 
party offset providers to underdeliver offset requirements (Whitten et al., 2012).  
Similarly, moral hazard, otherwise known as ‘hidden action’ (Arrow, 1984; Ferraro, 2008) 
describes a situation where an agent may judge it is cost-effective to shirk its contract with 
the principal, since the risk of detection is low (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005).  For 
example, a developer may choose to not meet its offset obligations if it is known the regulator 
has limited capacity to monitor their activities for compliance (Whitten et al., 2012; 
Xepapadeas, 1991). Moral hazard can also arise with the involvement of third-party offset 
providers, particularly in cases where the liability of offset failure still rests with the 
developer. Lack of resources or institutional capacity to monitor and evaluate environmental 
policies is an ongoing challenge faced by regulating agencies (Brown et al., 2013; Whitten 
et al., 2012). There may also be a more overt interest in minimizing scrutiny of individual 
offsets due to the high costs involved (Salzman and Ruhl, 2000; Whitten et al., 2012), and 
the knowledge that the benefits of biodiversity conservation are dispersed and not universally 
understood by the public (as the final principal).  
Public scrutiny can prove to be financially or politically costly for governments (Dovers and 
Hussey, 2013; Keene and Pullin, 2011; Salzman and Ruhl, 2000), hence monitoring and 
evaluation may not necessarily be a high priority. Although claims of agency (or regulatory) 
capture are typically associated with more flagrant forms of corruption or bias, a regulator’s 
incremental actions may over time tend to favor regulated parties without an explicit intention 
to do so. This “bureaucratic slippage” (Freudenburg and Gramling, 1994) has been observed 
in the wetland compensation program in Alberta, Canada, where it was found that the 
mitigation hierarchy was routinely skipped over in favour of compensation, and 
compensation ratios approved by the regulator were frequently less than those required by 
stated policy guidelines (Clare and Krogman, 2013). Direct or indirect political influence, 
pressure to make rapid decisions with limited information, conflicting organisational goals 
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and the use of bureaucratic discretion can all influence individual decisions made by policy 
administrators, which over time cumulatively lead to policy outcomes which fail to meet the 
originally-stated policy goals (Clare and Krogman, 2013; Macintosh and Waugh, 2014).   
Conclusions 
This Chapter has provided a preliminary examination of the governance of biodiversity 
offsetting. Our structured analysis of stakeholder submissions (Martin et al., 2016) 
provided useful data which describes how different policy actors perceive the efficacy of 
biodiversity offsetting, and opportunities for policy improvement. Greater policy 
consistency, transparency, and a need to implement offsets ‘strategically’ over larger spatial 
and temporal scales were identified by stakeholders as key issues requiring attention to 
improve policy effectiveness. Drawing on agency theory, literature review and new 
empirical findings (Maron et al., 2015), I argue that adverse selection and moral hazard 
may be reducing the environmental outcomes from biodiversity offsetting below what 
would be required to achieve a ‘no net loss’ policy outcome. Further research is needed to 
establish what institutional, organisational, and informational incentives drive the behavior 
of state and non-state actors within biodiversity offset governance, how these interactions 
play out at different stages of the offset policy process, and what the implications are for 
biodiversity conservation.  
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER SEVEN:  
Opportunities and risks in the implementation of 
biodiversity offset policy in Australia  
This Chapter draws upon contributions made by in the following report:  
Evans M.C. (2017). An evaluation of the efficacy of the Australian Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBC Act) 1999 Environmental 
Offsets Policy. Report prepared for the Department of the Environment and Energy.  
A version of this Chapter is in preparation for publication and may be cited as: 
Evans M.C. (In preparation). Opportunities and risks in the implementation of biodiversity 
offset policy in Australia. Environmental Policy & Governance. 
 
Chapter Seven: Opportunities and risks for biodiversity offset policy in Australia 
 
 
149 
 
Abstract 
Biodiversity offset policies have been embraced worldwide as a mechanism for 
reconciling economic development and environmental protection. Much of the research 
into biodiversity offsetting to date has been focused on developing and refining offset 
metrics, and evaluating the environmental outcomes of offsets at the site scale.  However, 
there has been limited analysis of the biodiversity offset policy process as a whole, and 
how the interpretation and implementation of the policy in practice may ultimately 
impede or enable environmental outcomes. In this paper, I present the perspectives of 
policymakers, practitioners and industry proponents on how improved outcomes for 
biodiversity could be delivered under the Australian Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) Environmental Offsets Policy (2012). 
Australia is an early adopter of biodiversity offsetting, with policies in place in most state, 
territory and federal jurisdictions. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with key 
informants, I found three major results.  First, the ‘durability’ of offsets over time – either 
because of limited regulatory oversight or because of insecure land tenure arrangements 
– was considered to be a major policy limitation. Second, the potential for offsetting to 
be effective and efficient is severely constrained by the fragmentation that exists within 
government departments at the federal level, as well as between state and territory 
governments. Third, stakeholders expressed concern at the “piecemeal” outcomes 
resulting from current policy arrangements, and argued that offsets should be designed 
and implemented at the landscape scale to ensure both long-term environmental outcomes 
and economic efficiency. The paper concludes with prospects for how these challenges 
may be addressed within the current institutional and political environment.  
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Introduction 
 
“…they say that offsets are 90% other stuff and 10% ecology” 
Industry respondent 3 
“I think there’s a very large focus on the technical aspects of an offset…the metrics 
and whether the habitat meets all that, which is great, it has to be. I don’t think 
there’s much attention given to the legal, financial and governance side of offsets at 
all”  
Broker respondent 1 
 
The continued erosion of biodiversity and associated ecosystem services is a key public 
policy issue globally. Governments are increasingly turning towards biodiversity 
offsetting as a mechanism to counterbalance the impacts from economic development, 
with the goal being an environmental outcome that is “no net loss” or “net gain” (Boisvert 
et al., 2013; Boisvert, 2015; Bull et al., 2013; Gardner et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2016; ten 
Kate et al., 2004). The number of offset schemes worldwide has increased dramatically 
over the last two decades (Ives and Bekessy, 2015), and there are now at least 69 countries 
with national policies in place, in addition to international policies under the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN, 2016) and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC, 2012).  
Considerable scholarship exists on the principles underpinning biodiversity offsetting 
(Bull et al., 2013; Gardner et al., 2013; McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010), the design of 
metrics used to quantify biodiversity losses and gains through offset trades (Bull et al., 
2014; Gibbons et al., 2016; Gonçalves et al., 2015; Quétier and Lavorel, 2011), and the 
ethical and social justice issues raised by the “commodification of nature” as required by 
such policies (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017; Bidaud et al., 2017; Ives and Bekessy, 
2015; Moreno-Mateos et al., 2015; Spash, 2015; Spash and Aslaksen, 2015; Sullivan and 
Hannis, 2015; Taherzadeh and Howley, 2017). Up until recently, very few studies have 
examined how offset policy is administered, implemented and evaluated following the 
initial design phases (Brown et al., 2013, 2014; Clare and Krogman, 2013; Lukey et al., 
In press).  
There is now a growing recognition within the conservation literature that the institutional 
and political drivers which influence the behavior of policy actors ultimately determine 
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the biodiversity outcomes from offsetting (Damiens et al., 2017; Gordon et al., 2015; 
Maron et al., 2016; Salzman and Ruhl, 2000, 2010). Such an insight is crucial, given that 
a central concern of scientists, scholars and members of civil society is the current lack 
of evidence that offsetting is delivering its promised outcomes for biodiversity (Curran et 
al., 2013; Gibbons and Lindenmayer, 2007; Lindenmayer et al., 2017; Maron et al., 2012, 
2016; May et al., 2016). For example, the United States Species Banking program has 
been in operation since 1995, yet it is still not known to what extent impacts to endangered 
species have been compensated by bank sites (Bunn et al., 2014; Fox and Nino-Murcia, 
2005). Similarly in Australia, an early adopter of biodiversity offsetting (Miller et al., 
2015), there is a “…lack of evidence that offsets are effective and actually achieving their 
intended outcomes” (The Senate Environment and Communications References 
Committee, 2014). 
In this paper, I examine stakeholder perspectives of the efficacy of biodiversity offsetting 
in Australia, with a particular focus on how the policy is interpreted and implemented in 
practice. Biodiversity offsetting has been used both formally and informally in Australia 
for the last 20 years, and formal policies are now in place at the federal level and in most 
states and territories (Maron et al. 2015). Here, I focus specifically on the federal 
Environmental Offsets Policy (2012), which was designed in response to stakeholder 
dissatisfaction with the Australian Government’s ad-hoc approach to offsetting in use 
since 2001 (Miller et al., 2015). The Environmental Offsets Policy (2012) applies 
specifically to ‘matters of national environmental significance’ (MNES) which are under 
the jurisdiction of the federal Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (EPBC Act). Offsets under the EPBC Act are required to deliver an overall 
conservation outcome that improves or maintains the viability for a protected matter as 
compared to what is likely to have occurred under the status quo (Maron, et al., 2013; 
Miller et al., 2015). The policy is underpinned by a loss-gain calculator which is used by 
proponents, consultants and the regulator to estimate offset requirements14 (Chapter Five, 
Gibbons et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2015).  
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) in Australia frequently crosses regulatory 
processes at federal, state and local levels (Macintosh, 2010b, 2010a), hence a federal 
approval under the EPBC Act will often still require interactions with state and local 
                                                 
14 Available at: http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/publications/epbc-act-environmental-offsets-policy 
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regulatory bodies. Contractual arrangements required to deliver biodiversity offsets 
within this regulatory environment are therefore highly complex, and specialist 
intermediaries such as offset brokers have emerged in response (Coggan et al., 2013a). A 
range of other third parties may also participate in offset governance (Martin et al., 2016), 
such as environmental consultants and offset providers (e.g landholders and non-
government organisations). An understanding of the efficacy of biodiversity offsetting 
therefore requires the perspectives of a number of stakeholder groups to be considered, 
along with an appreciation of how each group experiences policy implementation.  
Specifically, this research aimed to understand: 
• The roles and experiences of policy actors involved in the process through 
which biodiversity offsets are designed, assessed, implemented and evaluated 
under the EPBC Act; 
• Factors which may enable or inhibit good policy outcomes as part of this 
process; 
• How improved policy outcomes could be delivered.  
Methodology 
This research uses qualitative data from semi-structured interviews with 30 policymakers, 
practitioners and industry proponents who have had direct experience with the 
implementation of biodiversity offset policy in Australia, and specifically the EPBC Act 
Environmental Offsets Policy (2012). It also draws upon a review of relevant academic 
and grey literature, policy documentation and legislation.  
I recruited participants using a snowball sampling approach (Biernacki and Waldorf, 
1981; Blaikie, 2009) through informal networks and via their workplaces. Sampling 
began with known professional contacts, and further participants were identified by 
asking interviewees to nominate other potential respondents who could provide additional 
insights into the biodiversity offset policy process in Australia. The interviewing process 
continued until no additional themes or insights emerged during individual interviews.  
A key aim of this research was to understand the diversity of individuals and organisations 
involved in the assessment, implementation, and evaluation of biodiversity offsets in 
Australia, hence I selected interview respondents from a number of stakeholder groups: 
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(1) government staff; (2) industry proponents; (3) offset brokers, (4) other specialist 
knowledge intermediaries (legal and financial advice); (5) environmental consultants; (6) 
non-government environmental organisations (NGOs) (Table 7.1). Stakeholder groups 
were identified iteratively through the snowball sampling procedure and the literature 
review. Interviews with non-government participants (groups 2 to 6) were conducted 
between December 2015 and March 2016, and interviews with staff from the Australian 
Government’s Department of the Environment and Energy  (hereafter “the Department” 
or “the regulator”) were during April and May 2016.  Government staff within the 
Department’s Environmental Standards Division are responsible for the assessment, 
approval, monitoring and compliance of biodiversity offsets under the EPBC Act. 
Executive-level staff within this Division responded to interview requests and identified 
up to four staff from their Branch15 to participate in the study. A sample interview 
schedule (Appendix 4.1) and participant information sheet (Appendix 4.2) was provided 
to all respondents prior to the interview.  
Table 7.1 Stakeholder groups, descriptions and abbreviations used to refer to specific interview 
data in the main body of the Chapter 
Stakeholder group Description n Abbreviation 
Government Australian Federal Government staff working in offset 
assessments, approvals, compliance and enforcement.  
13 G [1,2,3] 
Industry Representatives from companies who have experience in 
delivering offsets as part of federal environmental approvals for 
developments (mining, gas, urban) 
4 I [1,2,3] 
Brokers Intermediary contracted by the industry proponent (offset 
buyer) or the offset provider to mediate an offset transaction (as 
per Coggan et al. 2013a) 
3 B [1,2,3] 
Legal & financial advice Intermediary contracted by the industry proponent or the offset 
provider to provide independent legal or financial advice. Work 
with brokers but do not mediate the transaction 
4 LF [1,2,3] 
Consultants Ecological specialists with experience in conducting 
Environmental Impact Assessments for developments, 
contracted by the industry proponent (for impact assessment) or 
the offset provider (for assessment of offset suitability) 
3 C [1,2,3] 
NGO Environmental non-government organisation, either directly 
involved in offset transactions as an offset provider, and/or 
through policy advocacy 
3 N [1,2,3] 
 
The interview schedule was used to structure questioning, but was flexibly altered or 
reordered to preserve the flow of the interview and to facilitate in-depth exploration of 
                                                 
15 The current organisational structure of the Australian Department of the Environment and Energy is 
available in its latest annual report (2016) or may be accessed at:  http://www.environment.gov.au/about-
us/departmental-structure  
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topics raised within the interviews. Participants were asked to provide some contextual 
information on their role in the organization and their contact with biodiversity offsets, 
and who else within or outside their organization they interacted with as part of their 
workflow.  
The core of the interview asked participants for their perceptions of the barriers and 
enablers within the offset process that influence the environmental outcomes delivered 
by biodiversity offsets. Finally, participants were asked to summarise what they 
considered to be the key issues that needed to be addressed to improve biodiversity 
offsetting in Australia.  Interviews lasted for up to one hour, and were digitally recorded 
with the permission of the participant, or otherwise transcribed by hand during the 
interview. Handwritten notes were also taken during each interview. Digital recordings 
were professionally transcribed between May and July 2016. Interview transcripts were 
subsequently provided to all participants, who had the opportunity to check the transcript 
for inaccuracies or ambiguities and make any necessary revisions.   
I analysed interview data by coding passages of text from interview transcripts into 
thematic categories corresponding to stages in the offset policy process (adapted from 
Martin et al. 2016): (1) design and proposal, (2) assessment and approval; (3) 
implementation; (4) monitoring and evaluation; and (5) outcomes. Within each of these 
stages, I further coded responses into broad domains adapted from Whitten et al. (2012) 
which reflect the components that underpin and influence the design, assessment, 
approval and implementation of biodiversity offsets (Figure 7.1).   
 
Figure 7.1. Domains which underpin an effective biodiversity offset market, after Whitten et al. 
(2012).  
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Results and discussion 
Policy actors 
Offset transactions under the EPBC Act broadly follow the ‘broker’ model as identified 
by Coggan and colleagues (2013a), whereby contracts and negotiations between the 
regulator, the industry proponent and the offset provider may be (but not always) 
facilitated by an offset broker. Here, I build upon the model outlined by Coggan et al. 
(2013a) to illustrate how policy actors behave and are influenced by policy settings under 
the EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy within Australia’s federal system of 
governance (Figure 7.2). The interactions between these actors, as shaped by 
informational, organizational, institutional and political incentives (Figure 7.1), will 
ultimately influence policy performance. Biodiversity offsetting is prone to agency 
problems including adverse selection and moral hazard (Chapter Six, Maron et al., 2016), 
which may arise due to ambiguous or inaccurate counterfactual assumptions (Maron et 
al., 2013; Maron et al., 2015; Salzman and Ruhl, 2010; Whitten et al., 2012), inadequate 
data to inform the estimation of counterfactuals (Maseyk et al., 2017), or ‘bureaucratic 
slippage’ (Clare and Krogman, 2013; Freudenburg and Gramling, 1994) resulting from 
incremental discretionary decisions made by regulators (Braithwaite, 2011; Coslovsky et 
al., 2011; Macintosh and Waugh, 2014).  
Environmental approvals under the EPBC Act follow a self-referring system, whereby 
industry proponents are required to report actions which may have a significant impact 
on a MNES to the federal regulator16 (Macintosh, 2004, 2009b). Should the Minister (or 
delegated authority) decide an action requires approval under the Act, it becomes a 
‘controlled action’17 and is moved into the assessment and approval process under the 
Act18. Proponents then subcontract out the ecological work required for the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) to third-party consultants. Biodiversity offsets only apply to 
‘controlled action’ decisions (Australian Government, 2012) and must not be considered 
                                                 
16 EPBC Act, Part 7 Section 68: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s68.html  
17 EPBC Act, Part 7 Section 75: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s75.html  
18 EPBC Act, Part 9  
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at the referral stage19 (but see Macintosh and Waugh, 2014). Should offsets be included 
as a condition of approval20, the proponent will either conduct the offset design and 
negotiation with third party offset providers in-house, or they will engage with a broker 
to facilitate the process [I2, I4, G5].  
 
Figure 7.2 Depiction of biodiversity offset governance under the EPBC Act, as derived from 
literature review and analysis of interview data. Solid single arrows indicate contractual 
relationships, with the arrow pointing away from the agent (A) towards the principal (P). The 
agent is the liable party in the contract. Dashed single arrows indicate contractual relationships 
which are uncertain, insecure or time-limited. Dotted double arrows indicate non-contractual 
relationships (including working relationships among intermediaries working for either the 
proponent or the landholder). Actors in italics were interviewed as part of the analysis (as per 
Table 7.1), whereas other actors were mentioned by respondents but not interviewed. 
                                                 
19 EPBC Act, Part 7, Division 2, Section 75(2)(b): 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s72.html  
20 EPBC Act, Part 9, Division 1, Section 134: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s134.html  
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Brokers can fulfill several functions (Coggan et al., 2013a), including assisting with 
determining offset requirements, identifying and negotiating with offset providers, 
facilitating discussions with the regulator, and conducting monitoring and reporting of 
the offset after it is secured [B1, LF2]. Government-created and owned offset brokers 
operate at the state level in Australia (e.g New South Wales Biobanking, Victoria’s 
Bushbroker and the former EcoFund in Queensland), however the brokers operating at 
the federal level are commercial enterprises.  
Brokers are generally contracted by experienced, well-resourced proponents who are 
highly exposed to financial or reputational risk, or who have otherwise decided that 
engaging an expert broker will be more cost-effective than designing the offset entirely 
in-house or by negotiating with multiple intermediaries [I2, I4]. Developing an offset 
proposal requires environmental, legal and financial expertise, and several contracts 
between the regulator, proponent, offset provider, and the parties responsible for 
protection and management of the offset site (Figure 7.2). The proponent and the offset 
provider may both engage with separate intermediaries to provide independent advice, 
though this is dependent on the financial resources available to each party [LF1, LF3]. 
The presence of a broker can significantly reduce the transaction costs incurred during 
the offset policy process and particularly for large developments which require offsets for 
multiple MNES (Coggan et al., 2010 Coggan et al., 2013a; 2013b).   
The offset provider may be a private landholder who is contracted by the proponent to 
protect and manage part or all of their property for the MNES requiring offsets. 
Landholders who negotiate with proponents for offset delivery may seek their own legal 
and financial advice, with or without the assistance of a broker. Should a landholder hold 
a mortgage over their property, the financial institution issuing the mortgage must 
approve the conditions placed on the property as part of the offset contract [LF1, LF2, 
LF4, B2]. In rare circumstances, a proponent may hold private property which has been 
purchased specifically for the provision of offsets, and will manage the site with in-house 
expertise rather than engaging with third party offset providers [I1, LF3]. Some NGOs 
also act as offset providers, by purchasing land using a revolving fund mechanism, 
securing the property with a covenant (Fitzsimons and Carr, 2014; Hardy et al., 2016), 
and then on-selling the property to new owners who are likely to abide by the conditions 
of the covenant. 
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Under the EPBC Act, the proponent is liable for the purchase, management and security 
of a biodiversity offset until the expiry of the management plan attached to the conditions 
of approval for an action21. The Minister specifies the period for which the approval has 
effect at their discretion22, meaning that the conditions of approval and their required 
duration are highly bespoke [G13]. Interview data indicated that the duration of 
management required under approved conditions (including biodiversity offsets) in 
practice can vary anywhere between two and twenty years [LF3, G9, G10]. Security is 
achieved by a legally binding agreement, such as a covenant (Fitzsimons, 2015; 
Fitzsimons and Carr, 2014; Hardy et al., 2016), between the offset provider and the 
authority (usually state or local government) administering the covenant.  The proponent 
may sub-contract out the on-ground management of the offset to another third-party (e.g 
an NGO), if it is deemed that the offset provider lacks the sufficient expertise to manage 
the offset to the standard required by regulator. Following the expiry of the proponent’s 
EPBC Act conditions of approval, responsibility for management of the offset may be 
vested to the state or local government, or to the offset provider under the terms of its 
agreement with the covenanting authority [N1, LF4, B2, G1, G2, G9, G10]. Unless 
specifically stipulated in the EPBC Act conditions of approval or the terms of the 
covenant, monitoring and evaluation of outcomes delivered by the offset are not 
guaranteed (May et al., 2016).  
Policy process 
Here describe factors within each stage of the policy process which I identified from 
interview data as influencing the efficacy of biodiversity offsetting under the EPBC Act. 
Figure 7.3 summarises key factors over each of the following policy stages (1) to (5) (as 
adapted from Martin et al., 2016). 
1. Design and proposal 
Brokers and legal and financial intermediaries considered that the commercial viability 
of an offset proposal was fundamental to its success. A commercially viable offset 
                                                 
21 EPBC Act, Part 9, Division 2, s 142(1): A person whose taking of an action has been approved under 
this Part must not contravene any condition attached to the approval. 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s142.html  
22 EPBC Act, Part 9, Division 1, s 133(2)(e): 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s133.html  
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arrangement provides mutually beneficial financial outcomes for a proponent and the 
landholder, whilst still meeting regulatory requirements for compliance. For example, an 
offset can be designed such that a landholder may continue operate their business (e.g 
cattle grazing), while also making a financial return from protecting and managing parts 
of the property for biodiversity conservation [B1]. Landholders with a mortgage on their 
properties must obtain mortgagee consent from the financial institution issuing the loan 
before entering into an offset contract: 
“…where there’s a mortgage on the property, often that is the biggest obstacle to 
getting the offset secured” [LF2] 
Respondents indicated that financial institutions frequently decline mortgagee consent, as 
offset agreements are perceived to detract from the value of a property [LF1, LF2, B1, 
B2].  Government staff had limited engagement with this part of the policy process, and 
there was a perception held by other stakeholders that there was a lack of understanding 
within government about the “commercial reality” of biodiversity offsetting [B2]. This 
issue appeared to be a source of conflict once the offset proposal was presented to 
government assessments and approval staff:  
“…we’re trying to achieve an environmental outcome, the proponent’s trying to 
achieve a project that is economic …so you end up with this butting heads” [G6] 
Some government respondents expressed an appreciation of the issue, but noted that ‘win-
win’ situations between the environmental and economic values of a property are not 
always possible or desirable [G11, G12]. The issue of mortgagee consent was said to be 
not yet “on the radar” within the regulator [G1].  
Intermediaries and NGO offset providers emphasized the importance of identifying 
landholders who had sufficient understanding of biodiversity offsets, the expertise 
required to undertake the necessary on-ground management, and who could be trusted to 
abide by the conditions of approval [B3, N1, LF1]. Understanding and trust between 
proponents and offset providers was similarly required, to ensure that each party received 
a mutually beneficial arrangement [LF3]. Some legal and financial intermediaries noted 
that the asymmetry in resources and information between large proponents, the 
proponent’s intermediaries, and landholders (often farmers) have led to detrimental 
financial outcomes for landholders [LF1, LF4].  
  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Biodiversity offset policy process under the Australian EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy (2012), with key factors influencing its efficacy 
identified through the current research
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A lack of alignment between Federal and State biodiversity offset policies, and changes 
in policy requirements was said to create uncertainty for proponents trying to understand 
their regulatory requirements [I1, N2, G9, G12, B2]. Bilateral agreements are in place 
between the Federal Government and most states to ensure there is no unnecessary 
duplication in conditions placed on the proponent by federal and state regulators 
(Australian Government, 2014b; Standing Committee on the Environment, 2014). 
However, the overall policy goals and definitions of what is a ‘suitable offset’ differ 
between federal and state biodiversity offset policies (Maron et al., 2015), hence these 
differences still add complexity to the process [G9]. Industry, consultant and broker 
respondents indicated general support of the EPBC Act Environmental Offset Policy 
(2012) framework, though frequent changes in state-level policy requirements over the 
course of the offset design phase still caused delays and additional expense [I1, I2, C2, 
B2].  
Industry respondents with responsibility for offset design and negotiation indicated that 
their workflow is facilitated by support of upper management within a business [I1]. This 
willingness to maintain good relationships with the regulator and ensure compliance with 
environmental conditions appeared to be relevant for proponents who required a ‘social 
license’ to operate [C2, G1, G3, G4, G11] (Kagan et al., 2003).  
2. Assessment and approval 
The degree of co-operation, mutual understanding and trust between proponents, 
government staff and consultants was considered to strongly influence the speed and ease 
of the assessment and approval process [G1, G3, G5, G9]. Government respondents 
frequently cited an engaged, policy literate proponent with high ecological capacity 
(either in-house or contracted to a consultant); and the early provision of high quality 
ecological information as key enabling factors in this stage:  
 “…the confidence you have in the offset being delivered, for me is largely based 
on the information that the proponent’s providing and their engagement in the 
assessment process.” [G3] 
The capacity and policy literacy of proponents was said to be “highly variable” [G5], but 
influenced by the frequency of their exposure to biodiversity offsets (Coggan et al., 
2013b) and business size. Residential developers were generally considered by 
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government respondents to be the least engaged [G1, G3, G7, G10], while some (but not 
all) larger companies with in-house ecological expertise were said to display high 
capacity and engagement [G5]. Government respondents indicated that proponents with 
low policy literacy or those who failed to negotiate in good faith took up considerable 
time in their workflow, to the point where sometimes “you might as well do it [the EIA 
and offset proposal] yourself” [G1].  
It was noted that the proper assessment of development impacts on MNES and the 
associated offset proposal is ultimately reliant on the information provided by the 
proponent to the regulator [G4, C2]. The inevitability of asymmetric information was 
acknowledged [G4], as well as potential for this to be exploited [N1, C2, G1, G8]: 
“There is a lot of scope for gaming that particular tool [the loss-gain calculator], 
and a lot of consultants will seek to find an outcome favourable to their client.” 
[C2] 
Government respondents indicated they draw on multiple sources of information to cross-
check and validate the information provided by proponents, including: expertise of 
colleagues within the Division or elsewhere within the Department (e.g wildlife, parks, 
marine), published scientific data23 (when accessible) and occasionally direct contact with 
academic researchers. Although it was noted that the Department has a high level of in-
house ecological expertise, the capacity to access this information is limited by short 
deadlines, physical separation between Branches, and the loss of corporate knowledge 
due to high staff turnover and recent voluntary redundancy rounds [C2, G1, G2, G5, G6].  
The environmental outcomes eventually delivered by a biodiversity offset largely hinges 
on the details specified within the conditions of approval. The workflow of government 
staff within the Department is largely taken up by drafting conditions, negotiating 
conditions with proponents, and varying conditions post-approval. Conditions were 
identified as a source of conflict and frustration for government staff responsible for 
assessments, post-approvals and compliance and enforcement, and for non-government 
respondents. Government staff working on assessments have limited time and 
                                                 
23 The Department of the Environment and Energy has no access to paywalled scientific journals, though 
some government interviewees indicated they occasionally sourced journal articles from colleagues who 
had library access through their University enrolment, or by contacting the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet [G7]. 
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information available to write conditions, and they often face intense negotiations with 
proponents, and received variable feedback on the clarity and enforceability of conditions 
from colleagues working in post-approvals and compliance and enforcement [G7, G11, 
G12].  It was however noted that condition writing had improved since the introduction 
of  the  Environmental  Offsets  Policy  in  2012,  the  outcomes-based  conditions  policy
(Commonwealth  of  Australia,  2016a),  and  informal  “communities  of  practice”  had 
facilitated interaction and feedback between staff in different Branches [G5, G6].
Non-government respondents expressed concern over a lack of clarity and consistency in 
conditions of approval [N2, N3, I2], which they perceived to be due to a lack of interaction 
within the Department, and an inadequate understanding of how conditions translated to 
on-ground actions:
  “…all our offset conditions are all completely different, every single one of them. 
So just a lack of consistency with, it depends on who in the approvals section you 
talk to [within  the  regulator]. It’s  hard  to  come  up  with  a  process  when  
you’ve  got  to adapt it to every different approval you’ve got” [I3]
Government respondents indicated a preference  for as many details about the offset as 
possible to be “locked down” [G8] within conditions prior to approval, but this appeared 
to  not  be  standard  practice.  Since  “not  all  assessments  get  done  in  the  time  available”
[G1],  conditions  of  approval  may  simply  require  a  proponent  to  “develop  an  offset 
management plan” [G1], and specific offset requirements may instead be tied to project 
commencement rather than approval:
“I’ve heard across Branches where approval is given with certainly an amount of 
work needed to be done on that offset side of things” [G7]
In  addition,  proponents  who  rely  on  federal  approval  to  access  project  finances  may 
request  that  specific  offset  requirements  be  organised  post-approval.  This  practice  of
“backloading conditions” [G1, G6, G8, N3] is problematic as it limits the ability for the 
Department  to  keep  track  of  the  environmental  outcomes  expected  from  a  project 
approval, and it reduces the degree of power and leverage held during negotiations with 
proponents:
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“… when it gets to the pointy end of timelines and statutory timelines are running 
out and decisions have to be made and there’s multi-billion or million dollar 
projects on the line, often it’s easier for delegates and others to give proponents 
the benefit of the doubt and assume that they’ll come around and follow through 
on what’s agreed.” [G8]   
Biodiversity offsets are now routinely required as part of conditions of approval under 
the EPBC Act 24. If significant residual impacts on a MNES are likely to remain after 
avoidance and mitigation measures are taken, and offsetting is judged to be “appropriate 
and feasible”, the Minister or delegated authority will approve the action with offsets as 
part of its conditions if it is considered acceptable with “regard to the likely impact on 
environmental matters protected, together with economic and social factors” (Australian 
Government, 2012). Government respondents indicated that “…under the Act it’s very 
hard to refuse a project on the basis that you can’t find an offset” [G7], due to this 
requirement to make approval decisions in the context of ecologically sustainable 
development (ESD, Pittock et al., 2015; Productivity Commission, 1999). However, ESD 
is meant to maximise economic and social welfare within a sustainability constraint, 
meaning that this interpretation of the EPBC Act is inconsistent with its legislative intent 
(Macintosh, 2015).  
Some government respondents expressed concern about the current or impending scarcity 
of suitable land available for direct offsets (“we’re literally just going to run out of offsets” 
[G4]), and suggested the availability of direct offsets for an MNES is not usually known 
prior to approval: 
“…the more and more we become comfortable with using the offsets policy, the 
assessment officers are saying yes you can impact that if you offset this somehow, 
approved, handed over to the post approvals officers…[the proponent] may then 
turn around and say actually there’s no offsets” [G12] 
It was also indicated that in situations where it is known there is a scarcity of land 
available for offsets prior to approval, the offset policy may not be strictly adhered to25: 
                                                 
24 80% of controlled actions approved since October 2012 require offsets as part of the conditions of 
approval (K Miller, pers comm). 
25 The EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy requires an offset package to comprise minimum of 90% 
direct offsets, maximum of 10% other compensatory measures. Direct offsets must “provide a measurable 
conservation gain for an impacted protected matter” and typically involve the protection and management 
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“…if something is unoffsettable in direct terms you can look to do virtually all of 
your offset in indirect terms and compensatory terms [as a financial 
contribution].” [G8] 
3. Implementation  
Following regulatory approval of the action, proponents may commence their 
development and the ‘on ground’ activities required to deliver the biodiversity offset. 
There may be considerable delay between approval and project commencement, as 
commodity price fluctuations can put a development on hold for several years or 
indefinitely [C1, LF1, G4]. Many approved projects and associated offsets therefore do 
not proceed, though the Department doesn’t currently have data which can differentiate 
between conditioned impacts to MNES and offset requirements, and the actual impacts 
and offsets which eventuate (Department of the Environment and Energy, 2016). 
Non-government respondents expressed frustration over the tendency for conditions of 
approval to focus disproportionately on quantification of offset requirements, rather than 
the complexities associated with implementation [I3, C3, B1, N2]: 
 “…there’s so much focus on the numbers game and then in two words [the 
conditions] say oh it’s got to be a secure “something”. Well that process is actually 
really the most important part.” [I3] 
In cases where conditions of approval cannot be feasibly translated on ground, due to 
ambiguity or changed circumstances, conditions may be varied by the regulator in its 
post-approvals function26.  In many cases the circumstances are genuine, and engaged 
proponents will seek alternative offset arrangements and present the new proposal to the 
regulator for approval. However, interview data suggested there was a perception that 
some proponents lobbied for condition variations in an attempt to shirk regulatory burden 
[G6, G7, G8, N1]. 
                                                 
of land. Other compensatory measures are financial contributions which are “anticipated to lead to 
benefits for the impacted protected matter, for example funding for research or educational programs” 
26 EPBC Act, Part 9, Division 1, s 143: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s143.html  
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Some respondents expressed concern that condition variations can lead to diminished 
environmental outcomes, either due to inadequate internal discussions within the 
regulator or direct lobbying from proponents: 
 “…we only hear anecdotally when things are varied… often our conditions are 
the best we can get from a proponent…I haven’t heard of an instance where it’s 
necessarily better [for the MNES]. It’s just, I don’t know, easier rather than better” 
[G7] 
“…it’s just death by a thousand cuts where [proponents] keep coming back to [the 
regulator] and I just saw this one that took 2 years. [The proponent] finally got 
existing parkland accepted as an offset” [N1] 
The shift in power from the regulator to the proponent after approval was noted again, as 
it was suggested that the compliance and enforcement Branch “have limited statutory 
power about what they can and can’t push back on”27 should a proponent try to “weasel 
out” of their regulatory obligations [G8].   
4. Monitoring and evaluation 
A key criticism of biodiversity offsetting is its lack of demonstrable outcomes in Australia 
and internationally (Curran et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2016; Martin et al., 2016; May et 
al., 2016; The Senate Environment and Communications References Committee, 2014). 
Previous studies have highlighted inadequate monitoring and reporting (Bernhardt et al., 
2005; Hornyak and Halvorsen, 2003; May et al., 2016; Reiss et al., 2009; U. S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2005), non-compliance with conditions and  under-
delivery of offset requirements (Ambrose et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2013; Brown and 
Veneman, 2001; May et al., 2016; National Research Council (U.S.) and Committee on 
Mitigating Wetland Losses, 2001; Robertson and Hayden, 2008; Sudol and Ambrose, 
2002; Tischew et al., 2010), and difficulties with accessing data in order to conduct an 
evaluation (Lindenmayer et al., 2017; May et al., 2016). A key part of each interview was 
therefore aimed at establishing the extent to which the respondent was involved with the 
                                                 
27 The EPBC Act provides sufficient statutory power under ss 142-142B and 143-145A, but using this 
power may be politically difficult  
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monitoring and evaluation of offsets, and their perspectives on the efficacy of this stage 
of the offset process (Appendix 4.2.) 
Some respondents stated that monitoring and reporting of offsets occurred routinely and 
as required by the regulator [LF3, I4, C2, N1, B1]:  
 “…it has been made very clear to us by the regulators and our consultants that 
the monitoring and reporting are essential components” [I4] 
Respondents who held a positive view of current offset monitoring and reporting 
arrangements were often directly involved in this process [B1], or worked closely with 
proponents who were eager to visibly demonstrate the environmental outcomes being 
delivered by offsets [I1, I2, I4, C2, LF2, LF3]. Some respondents who had close 
experience with offset monitoring and reporting were highly critical of its adequacy: 
“You will have proponents that have never had an offset that’s been visited by a 
monitoring or compliance person…. they know [the monitoring report] just goes 
to the department and that never gets audited and cross-referenced…if you’re a 
savvy proponent could just be writing something on a bit of paper, submitting it 
and that would just never get picked up.” [N3] 
Non-government respondents indicated that compliance and enforcement may not occur 
due to inadequate resources [I2, C3] or an unwillingness to pursue instances of non-
compliance linked to large, highly politicized projects and proponents [N1, N3, LF2]: 
“…[there’s a] perception that there’s probably not sufficient resources put into 
compliance from the regulators” [I2] 
The resourcing, information and staff capacity required to monitor offsets and other 
environmental conditions under the EPBC Act is daunting, given the sheer number of 
listed MNES and the historical accumulation of approved projects28 [G1, G8]. Individual 
projects may have over 100 conditions, and several management plans attached to 
conditions that are thousands of pages long.  Following the tabling of an ANAO audit 
                                                 
28  At the time of data collection (February to March 2017), it was reported that around 4,500 approved 
projects are prioritised for compliance and enforcement effort by the Department, of which approximately 
1,000 are controlled actions (and so may require offsets as conditions of approval) [G10]. The 2013-2014 
ANAO audit reported that at September 2013 there were 635 approved controlled actions under the EPBC 
Act, with around  
8000 conditions attached to them to protect 1,282 MNES. 
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into the Department’s management of compliance under the EPBC Act (ANAO, 2014) a 
risk based approach to prioritizing compliance and enforcement effort was introduced 
(Nicol et al., 2014). Prior to this, it was suggested that “our [the Department’s] monitoring 
function didn’t really exist” [G10]29.  Government respondents support for the risk based 
approach used to prioritise compliance and enforcement effort, and indicated there had 
been substantial improvements since its introduction [G5, G10]. However, focusing on 
“high risk” projects may give “good” proponents and offset providers a perception that 
the Department’s compliance effort “doesn’t exist” [N1]: 
“…we shot our first annual report off…didn’t even hear back from them [the 
regulator]” [N1] 
Government respondents working in an assessments capacity noted that although they 
may receive feedback on the quality and enforceability of approval conditions, they rarely 
learned of what (if any) environmental outcomes the conditions had ultimately delivered 
[G2. G3, G7]. Monitoring reports delivered by proponents to the Department technically 
contain the information required to evaluate offset outcomes, but this data is not readily 
accessible [G3, G5, G7, G8]. It was said that the resources required to collate this 
information into a centralised database would exceed the Department’s current capacity.  
5. Outcomes 
Several respondents suggested it was simply too early to know what environmental 
outcomes have been delivered by many approved offsets given the time lags associated 
with the approval process, project commencement, offset establishment and the 
ecological responses to management [LF3, C2, G3, G6, G12]. Notwithstanding this 
caveat, the interview data suggests that the Department currently does not have the 
capacity to evaluate the collective efficacy of biodiversity offsets approved under the 
EPBC Act. 
Many government respondents expressed concerns about the long-term security and 
management of approved offset sites [G1, G7, G9, G11, G12]. It was emphasized that 
while conditions of approval can regulate impacts to MNES and require the proponent to 
                                                 
29 The findings of the 2002-03 ANAO audit (2003) originally led to the creation of the compliance and 
enforcement team. The 2006-07 ANAO report (2007) also found deficiencies in compliance and 
enforcement.  
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identify an offset site and ensure it is secured, the Federal Government had limited role 
beyond the expiry of the offset management plan attached to the conditions: 
 “…there isn’t necessarily great formal management after that. And there certainly 
isn’t tracking in outcomes terms I don’t think” [G9]  
Government respondents indicated that long-term responsibility for offsets is typically 
taken on by a state or local government, either by being transferred into public 
conservation estate [G9, G12] or secured on private land via a covenant [G2]. 
Covenanting programs vary substantially across State and Territories, are administered 
by different legislations, and provide varying degrees of permanence (Fitzsimons, 2015). 
The Federal Government cannot force another jurisdiction to agree to or honour a 
conservation covenant, and so government respondents indicated there was a reliance on 
negotiating offset agreements between proponents and a state or local government where 
the likelihood of a covenant being broken is low: 
“…what we need is our assessment people [to] make sure that they have certainty 
that the regulatory environment is going to work for that particular outcome…they 
must have a commitment from council that council are actually going to deal with 
it, they are going to enforce the covenant” [G10] 
Perversely, this practice is likely reducing the additionality and permanence of outcomes 
delivered by terrestrial offsets by reducing the averted loss component of the conservation 
gain (Maron et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2015; Maseyk et al., 2017). It was said to be “really 
common” [G12] for proponents to have difficulties in securing an offset site because the 
state or local government won’t agree to a covenant, and as such become non-compliant 
with their conditions through no fault of their own. In these cases, a new offset site would 
need to be identified, or else the proponent may be conditioned to provide monetary 
compensation in lieu of a direct offset [G12]. Hardy and colleagues (2016) found only 
limited cases where covenant agreements were released or breached, but the findings 
presented here suggest that a bigger problem may be the reluctance or inability to secure 
offsets with a covenant in the first place.  
Respondents expressed very low confidence in state and local government’s ability to 
protect and manage offset sites in the long term, due to a lack of resources or a desire to 
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not impose tenure restrictions which may limit future economic development on the site 
(Adams and Moon, 2013):  
“…enforcement [of the covenant] lies with the council and so some councils 
won’t even agree to them…they run off the smell of an oily rag, some of them. 
And often conservation’s not a priority for many councils like they just don’t 
care.” [G7] 
“…no covenant is secure… so when we say you must protect the area in 
perpetuity, there’s no such thing. So yeah covenants get removed, councils choose 
not to enforce, state government choose not to enforce. That’s the reality” [G10] 
Interviewees suggested that the lack of Federal control over offset secured under State or 
Local legislation may risk long term environmental outcomes:  
“… in the short term it’s probably fine, in the medium term your risks grow and 
in the longer term you’ve got no idea what’s going to happen with it…It is just a 
systemic failure that would build over time.” [G9] 
Although the EPBC Act provides statutory power for the Commonwealth to enter into 
legally binding conservation agreements with proponents for “protection and 
conservation” of MNES  30, it was indicated that these agreements are not necessarily 
secure from actions taken by a state or local government [G10]31.  
Persistent risks, and opportunities for improvement  
This research identified a range of factors which enable or inhibit the environmental 
outcomes delivered by the biodiversity offset policy process under the Australian EPBC 
Act Environmental Offsets Policy (2012). Most of these factors (Table 7.2) had little to 
do with policy design, or with the specific details of the loss-gain calculator used 
estimate offset requirements (Chapter Five, Gibbons et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2015). 
The calculator can be “gamed” to produce a more favourable outcome for proponents, 
and further refinements and guidance may reduce the scope for its misuse (Maseyk et 
                                                 
30 EPBC Act, Part 14, ss 304 to 312 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s304.html 
31  EPBC Act, Part 14, s 312(1): “A provision of a conservation agreement has no effect to the extent (if 
any) to which it is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, or of a State or Territory.”  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/s311.html  
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al., 2017). However, there are several other factors and critical junctures within the 
offset policy process which can lead to detrimental environmental outcomes (Figure 7.3, 
Table 7.2). 
Interviewees revealed that financial institutions can be a major barrier to the successful 
negotiation of offset agreements, and suggested this was due to a lack understanding of 
biodiversity offsets within the financial sector [LF2].  Legal and financial intermediaries 
indicated that they are increasingly negotiating biodiversity offset agreements for clients 
who had previously operated in the carbon market: 
“…there was a lot of hope and potential around the carbon farming initiative, 
when that sort of tanked then those businesses were looking at other business 
models and biodiversity offsets is one of them” [LF4] 
Given this shift in market activity and the commercial potential of biodiversity 
offsetting (under certain circumstances), there is an opportunity for the financial sector 
to improve its bottom line through increased knowledge of biodiversity offset 
agreements.  
Several respondents argued that greater emphasis needed to be placed on the legal, 
financial and governance components of biodiversity offsetting [B1], and suggested that 
focusing primarily on the “front end” assessment of ecological impacts and offset 
requirements [I3, C3, G4] can be to the detriment of environmental outcomes delivered 
through implementation:  
 “You’ll spend $100, 000 on a biodiversity assessment to make sure the numbers 
on one side match the numbers on the other side, whereas that money should really 
just go into managing a property” [C3] 
The Department is under considerable pressure to move projects through the assessment 
phase quickly so that proponents can commence their developments (Department of the 
Environment and Energy, 2016; Macintosh and Waugh, 2014; Standing Committee on 
the Environment, 2014).
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Table 7.2. Summary of factors influencing the environmental outcomes delivered by the biodiversity offset policy process under the EPBC Act 
Environmental Offsets Policy (2012), as derived from interview data. 
Informational Organisational Institutional Political 
Asymmetric information  
Degree of support of business 
higher management 
Federal government has limited 
role in offset security 
Capacity for offset loss-gain 
calculator to be gamed 
Quality of environmental impact 
assessment 
Social license to operate 
Policy uncertainty and 
inconsistency 
Consideration of ESD in offset 
decisions 
Inadequate access to spatial data 
and information systems within the 
government 
Interaction between government 
staff 
"Focal species approach" of EPBC 
Act  
Pressure on regulator to provide 
approval to ensure project 
financing  
Public register of offsets High government staff turnover 
Lack of covenent security and 
enforcement by States 
Shift in power from regulator to 
proponent after approval 
Government compliance effort not 
visible to all proponents 
Short timeframes and high 
government staff workload 
Liability rests on proponent not 
offset provider 
Condition backloading and 
variations 
Financial institutions have limited 
understanding of offsets 
 Disproportionate focus on 
assessment stage 
Inequitable resourcing between 
government assessment and 
compliance functions 
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The Department invests most of its resources into the assessments function rather than 
compliance, but total staffing has decreased over the last financial year (Senate Standing 
Committee on Environment and Communications Legislation Committee, 2015, 2016) 32,33. 
The complexities and inefficiencies of environmental impact assessment in Australia is well 
understood (Macintosh, 2010b, 2010a), and it appears unlikely that a greater focus on 
implementation and outcomes will occur in the near term. The Federal Government has 
released a policy on outcomes-based conditions (Commonwealth of Australia, 2016a) which 
specify the environmental outcome required for compliance, but at this stage the use of such 
conditions it is not mandatory. 
The most common suggestion from respondents to improve biodiversity offsetting in 
Australia was for a “landscape scale” or “strategic” approach. These two terms were used 
interchangeably, but were generally used to describe an approach to offsetting which 
required: 
• Operation across larger spatial and temporal scales than current arrangements; 
• Coordination, alignment and/or strategic partnerships between multiple parties 
external to the Department, including state governments, local governments, 
proponents, NGOs and management agencies; 
• Improved coordination and integration within the Department;  
• Long term strategic oversight and coordination; 
• Better alignment between federal, state and local legislation which governs 
environmental protection and planning. 
                                                 
32 The staffing level for compliance and enforcement sections of the Division was budgeted at 29.5 (full time 
equivalent) for 2015–16 financial year. The budgeted staffing level for the 2016–17 financial year is 30.7 (full 
time equivalent).  The staffing level for the assessment and approval sections of the Division was budgeted at 
61.7 (full time equivalent) for the 2015–16 financial year. The budgeted staffing level for the 2016–17 
financial year is 60.7 (full time equivalent). 
33 As at 31 April 2015 there were 140.1 (Full Time Equivalent) staff engaged in assessment, investigation, 
compliance and enforcement, and the Department will continue to maintain capabilities across the function of 
environmental assessments and approvals.  
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A “strategic” approach to biodiversity offsetting was said to ensure both long-term 
environmental outcomes [B1, N1, C2, G3, G6, G9, G11], and exploit economies of scale 
[B1, I3]. The EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy (2012) applies only to listed MNES, 
hence offsets are not required to improve or maintain outcomes for biodiversity “as a whole” 
[N1, G2, G9]. Respondents noted that the “focal species approach” (Lambeck, 1997; 
Lindenmayer et al., 2002; Possingham et al., 2002) of the Act constrained the ability to 
deliver conservation benefits at the landscape scale, in favour of “piecemeal” outcomes [N1, 
I3, C3, B1]. Nevertheless, several government staff, brokers, industry proponents and 
consultants reported that a “good” offset delivered positive outcomes for MNES in addition 
to species and communities not listed under the EPBC Act, and attempted to co-locate offsets 
alongside existing protected areas to improve landscape connectivity.  Government staff 
reported that their efforts to achieve such outcomes were often hampered by a lack of easy 
access to spatial data which could indicate the locations of existing offsets, protected areas, 
critical habitat and wildlife corridors [G4, G8]. Proponents and brokers indicated that 
Australian governments could assist in enabling a “strategic” approach through improved 
coordination and guidance: 
“…the nirvana would be strategic leadership from the regulators with a shopping list 
of already approved and higher priority areas to secure that you can basically pick off 
the shopping list” [I2] 
However, some respondents indicated they are already designing and implementing large-
scale, “strategic” offsets in a commercially viable matter in absence of government 
intervention, and in collaboration with businesses who are otherwise industry competitors 
[B1, I3]. 
The Australian Government has stated that information on registered offsets (e.g spatial 
data, information relating to MNES and ongoing management actions) would be made 
publicly available “where it is appropriate to do so”, and would “allow strategic planning, 
and streamline processes with state and territory requirements and schemes” (Australian 
Government, 2012). A Senate Committee report recommended in 2014 that the Department 
“expedite the development of a publicly available nationally coordinated register of 
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environmental offsets.” (The Senate Environment and Communications References 
Committee, 2014). However, such a register has yet to be developed. Interview respondents 
were generally supportive of a public register of offsets, as it would promote transparency 
and accountability [N1, N3, G5, I2], enable a “strategic” approach [G7, G13], and enhance 
the legitimacy of biodiversity offsetting in the eyes of the Australian public [G1, G3]:  
 “I think it’s useful for everyone…it’s less work for the proponents, less work for 
consultants. Landholders who want to put an offset up can see what the market value 
is and how that changes over time. And it’s better for us and a better environment 
outcome. It ticks all the boxes.” [G7] 
Some risks of a public register were noted, including landholder privacy concerns, land price 
speculation [B1, G4], unintentional or deliberate misinterpretation of information held in the 
register [G3, G8], and government exposure to political repercussions resulting from public 
awareness of offset performance [G3, G5].  
Another suggested mechanism for enabling a “strategic” or “landscape scale” approach was 
a national offset trust fund, which could be paid into by proponents (whose offset liability 
would then be severed) [G10]. However, industry proponents and brokers were skeptical of 
the Federal Government’s ability to effectively and efficiently operate such a fund [I3, B1, 
B3, G10], based on experience in other jurisdictions and a perception that the money would 
shift into consolidated revenue. One government respondent suggested that a national offset 
trust fund could be used to strategically purchase around Australia: 
“So what we do as the federal government, we take responsibility for it. We establish 
these corridors, we set up these places and so on. It’s like a national reserve scheme.” 
[G10] 34   
However, such an approach would shift offset liability and risk on the Federal Government, 
which “wouldn’t be looked on very favourably” [G10]. Interviewees expressed support for 
an independent authority to administer such a fund [B1, N2]. Some respondents argued than 
                                                 
34 Federal Government investment in the expansion of the National Reserve System ceased in 2013. 
http://www.environment.gov.au/land/nrs/management  
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an offset fund must be liquid if it is to be effective, which would require that the ‘like for 
like’ offset policy requirement be relaxed35 [N1]. This approach may lead to additional risks 
as the connection between the impact and the promised compensation would be diminished 
[G1, G9] (Maron et al., 2016; Salzman and Ruhl, 2000), but such risks could be mitigated by 
effective oversight from an independent authority.  
Conclusions 
Biodiversity offsetting in Australia operates within a highly complex system of governance, 
with diverse policy actors operating across multiple jurisdictions.  The current institutional, 
organisational and political environment incentivizes poor environmental outcomes from 
biodiversity offsetting, due to persistent information asymmetry, inadequate (real or 
percieved) regulatory oversight, ambiguous responsibility for long term offset security 
management, and lack of transparency and public accountability. The EPBC Act provides 
sufficient statutory power to overcome many of the issues identified in this research, 
including: outcomes based offset conditions specified prior to approval; decisions which 
ensure offsets truly are “appropriate and feasible” before an impact on a MNES is deemed 
acceptable; effective long-term security and management, and effective compliance and 
enforcement of conditions. Given the plethora of research which has previously highlighted 
the disconnect between the Act’s legislative intent and its interpretation by decisionmakers 
(Macintosh, 2004, 2009a, 2015; Macintosh and Waugh, 2014), there appears to be little 
political appetite to use this power to improve outcomes for Australia’s environment.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
Conclusions and future directions 
“During the past two decades we have been lulled into complacency by  
the allure of “win-win” solutions and we have assumed rather too quickly  
that simple policy tools can solve complex policy problems”  
Roldan Muradian et al. (2013).  Payments for ecosystem services  
and the fatal attraction of win-win solutions. Conservation Letters 6(4): 274–279. 
 
 “For those concerned with making positive changes towards a less unsustainable world,  
the state has to be engaged with, its positive potentials explored and developed,  
its flaws examined for signs of possible improvement,  
and its dynamics and characteristics understood in their particularity.” 
John Barry and Robyn Eckersley (2005) W(h)ither the Green State?  
The State and the Global Ecological Crisis 
 
The conservation of biodiversity is a complex, ‘wicked’ problem which is frequently at odds 
with the growth of the human economy (Czech, 2008; Game et al., 2014). This seemingly 
irreconcilable conflict has motivated the search for ‘win-win’ policy solutions (Muradian et 
al., 2013; Ostrom et al., 2007; Phelps et al., 2012b) where biodiversity can be maintained 
alongside economic development, instead of restricting human activities that are detrimental 
to the environment. While it can be possible to simultaneously achieve positive social, 
environmental and economic outcomes, these situations are highly context specific and will 
generally rely on a combination of policy instruments (Dovers and Hussey, 2013; 
Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Jordan et al., 2013; Muradian et al., 2013; Young and 
Gunningham, 1997). As policy diversity increases, so does the number and diversity of actors 
participating in environmental governance (Agrawal and Lemos, 2007; Jordan et al., 2005; 
Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Liverman, 2004; Lockwood et al., 2010; Newell et al., 2012), 
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hence policy implementation and ex post evaluation becomes increasingly complex and 
detached from any simple expectations held during policy design and ex ante evaluation.  
This thesis has examined the challenges and complexities associated with the design, 
implementation and evaluation of policies which aim to reduce or redress the effects of 
deforestation: a major driver of biodiversity loss globally. I considered regulatory and 
market-based policy instruments implemented in Australia, an advanced and politically 
stable economy, and sought to evaluate what outcomes, opportunities and risks these policies 
present for biodiversity conservation.   
Chapter Two described the contemporary drivers of, trends in, and policy responses to 
deforestation in Australia, by drawing on existing literature and new empirical findings. I 
showed that deforestation is primarily driven by the expansion of pasture for livestock 
grazing, but this expansion is mediated by broader macroeconomic and climatic trends. At a 
national level, there has generally been a decline in deforestation in Australia over time, 
however this is tightly linked to the amount of primary forest remaining and availability of 
forest regrowth.  
Close to 17 million hectares of forest has been cleared across Australia since 1972, with the 
vast majority (58%) occurring in the state of Queensland. Over the past four decades, there 
has been a shift in the intent, framing, and style of policies introduced to combat deforestation 
in Australia. Previously incentivized by governments (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2000; 
Seabrook et al., 2006), deforestation was recognized to be detrimental to soil health in the 
1980’s, and regulatory policies to reduce deforestation were first introduced in an effort to 
combat salinity and desertification. Concerns about ecologically sustainable development 
and biodiversity conservation motivated the introduction of further regulatory controls over 
the 1990’s and 2000’s  
However, since 2010, most Australian states have wound back regulatory controls on 
deforestation in favour of self-regulation and voluntary compliance. This trend towards 
deregulation has continued after the publication of Chapter Two as Evans (2016). The current 
(mid-2017) Queensland Government attempted to re-strengthen the Vegetation Management 
Act 1999 (VMA) after it was relaxed in 2013, but the Bill failed to pass through Parliament 
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in 2016 (Reside et al., 2017). The New South Wales Government has repealed the Native 
Vegetation Act 2003 and introduced a new Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 and the Local 
Land Services Amendment Act 2016. The new policy framework relies heavily on 
biodiversity offsets and voluntary compliance under self-assessable clearing codes, and 
permits high risk clearing activities without regulatory oversight (Evans and Maron, 2016). 
Although the science is clear on the need to reduce deforestation in Australia (Evans, 2016; 
Reside et al., 2017), the politics are certainly not. Further, there is scarce evidence of the 
effectiveness of various policy responses to deforestation over the last three decades, whether 
they be regulatory or market-based instruments.   
The marked drop in the rate of deforestation in Queensland following amendments to the 
VMA in 2007 was hailed as the “end of broad scale land clearing” in Australia (Kehoe, 2009; 
McGrath, 2007). Yet how much of this trend can be attributed to the policy change relative 
to macroeconomic, climatic, biophysical and institutional drivers has never been empirically 
tested. In Chapter Three, I conducted such an evaluation using a novel statistical framework 
that has a greater capacity than traditional regression methods to detect changes in complex 
systems. I found that the bent-cable model is a promising technique for detecting a policy 
effect while controlling for other drivers, and there is some evidence of a policy-induced 
shifts in the deforestation rate as expected in 2000 with the introduction of the original VMA, 
and with the subsequent amendments in 2007. However, the current model fits are not 
sufficiently robust to support these findings with confidence, due to an inadequate number 
of data points (local government area, LGAs) and extreme spatial variation in trends in, and 
responses to, deforestation within and between local government areas. While deforestation 
in some LGAs increased in 2000 and decreased in 2007 as predicted by the policy changes, 
other LGAs followed the completely opposite trend. In yet more LGAs, deforestation 
remained either consistently high or low throughout the time series (1988 to 2014).  
The level of detail and methodological sophistication required to quantitatively estimate 
policy impact in Chapter Three provides a hint as to why ex-post evaluation of conservation 
policies is still rare. Although the technical barriers to evaluation are well understood (Baylis 
et al., 2016; Ferraro, 2009; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Miteva et al., 2012), the cultural 
and political impediments to an “effectiveness revolution” in conservation are not as widely 
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acknowledged (Curzon and Kontoleon, 2016; Keene and Pullin, 2011; Kleiman et al., 2000). 
There is also a tendency to move onto designing and implementing new, “innovative” policy 
instruments before it is known whether existing policies are effective.  
In the late 1990’s and early 2000's, there was a surge of interest in market-based instruments 
for conservation in Australia (Evans, 2016; Gunningham and Young, 1997; Young et al., 
1996). Biodiversity offset policies are now in place across the country (Maron et al., 2015; 
Miller et al., 2015), and carbon farming was established in 2011 soon after the introduction 
of a national carbon pricing scheme (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011; Evans et al., 2015; 
Macintosh, 2013). The high level of policy activity and the allure of ‘win-win’ outcomes 
stimulated academic interest in how such policies could be designed to maximise potential 
biodiversity outcomes (Bekessy and Wintle, 2008; Carwardine et al., 2015; Crossman et al., 
2011; Evans et al., 2015; McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Nelson et al., 2008; ten Kate et 
al., 2004).  
Chapter Four of this thesis examined the potential for carbon farming policy to incentivize 
the restoration of degraded agricultural landscapes in Queensland, where much of the grazing 
is on marginal land (ABARE, 2009; Marinoni et al., 2012) and threatened ecological 
communities such as Brigalow (Acacia harpophylla) have been reduced to less than 10% of 
their original extent. Assisted natural regeneration (ANR) of native vegetation that is subject 
to regular, costly clearing for pasture in largely unprofitable areas presented as a likely ‘win-
win’ outcome. We found that ANR was a far more cost-effective carbon farming 
methodology than the more commonly considered environmental plantings (Carwardine et 
al., 2015; Crossman et al., 2011; Paul et al., 2013), and is the superior option for biodiversity 
(Dwyer et al., 2009; Fensham and Guymer, 2009).  Although we sought to make more 
realistic assumptions about and market conditions and establishment costs than previous 
studies (Crossman et al., 2011; Paul et al., 2013; Polglase et al., 2013), our quantitative 
analysis nevertheless assumes “rational” economic behavior and policy stability, and ignores 
the socio-cultural barriers to adoption of carbon farming policy (Kragt et al., 2017; 
Macintosh, 2013; Torabi et al., 2016). Policy changes and political events over the past five 
years have clearly illustrated why future work needs to focus on the social and institutional 
barriers to participation in voluntary environmental schemes.  
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The initial work on Chapter Four began in 2012, when the Australian carbon price was set at 
AUD$23 t CO2e
-1, and excitement over the potential of the carbon market to deliver for 
biodiversity was at fever-pitch. By the time Evans et al. (2015) was accepted for publication, 
Australia was onto its third Prime Minister in three years, and the national carbon pricing 
mechanism had been abolished (Bailey et al., 2012). The Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) 
transitioned into the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF), and a reverse auction mechanism is 
now used to distribute payments from a total pool of AUD$2.55 billion (Australian 
Government, 2014). Individuals and organisations may submit bids that outline an emissions 
reduction project (which may follow vegetation methodologies approved under the CFI), and 
the lowest bids are selected by the Clean Energy Regulator (CER). The ERF has been roundly 
criticized as ineffective and inefficient (Blakers and Considine, 2016; Burke, 2016), as the 
majority of successful bids are low-cost, avoided deforestation projects where the 
additionality is highly questionable. Adverse selection of low-quality projects through the 
ERF (Burke, 2016) is common in environmental markets, including agricultural subsidy 
schemes (Ferraro, 2008) and biodiversity offsetting (Chapter Six, Maron et al. 2015). 
My carbon farming case study highlights how even with the best intentions, the outcomes 
anticipated during policy design may not survive the rest of the policy process. Biodiversity 
offsetting (Chapters Five to Seven) is another good example. In Chapter Five, I described the 
mathematical framework that underpins the Australian Government’s EPBC Act 
Environmental Offsets Policy, which was designed to give effect to its ‘no net loss’ policy 
goal. The offset metric described in Chapter Five is rare in its explicit quantification of 
biodiversity gains relative to a counterfactual scenario (Ferraro, 2009; Maron et al., 2013), 
and so correctly estimates the benefit gained by an offset action in addition to what would 
have occurred in the absence of the impact and offset. By considering a discount rate which 
reflects the probability of species extinction rather than pure societal time preference, offset 
requirements calculated using the metric scale up as the degree of threat faced by a species 
increases, thus incentivizing greater avoidance, mitigation and offset measures for 
endangered species and ecosystems. This work was adopted as federal policy in Australia 
(Australian Government, 2012; Miller et al., 2015), and informal discussions with 
government staff suggest that the large impact the ‘ecological time preference’ discount rate 
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has on offset calculations is influencing threatened species listing decisions. Whether the 
higher offset requirements calculated using the new metric are translating into better 
outcomes for threatened species and ecological communities, however, is much less clear. 
Inspired by my glimpse into the messiness of real-world policymaking (Lubell, 2013, 2015) 
during my time spent with the Australian Department of the Environment, I sought to 
examine biodiversity offsetting through a policy lens. Chapter Six draws on published work 
(Maron et al., 2015, 2016; Martin et al., 2016) and agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kiser, 
1999; Shapiro, 2005) to develop an understanding of the behavior of policy actors in 
biodiversity offset governance. I argued that the implausible crediting baselines employed by 
Australian biodiversity offset policies not only risk entrenching or worsening biodiversity 
decline, but constitutes evidence of adverse selection (Burke, 2016; Ferraro, 2008). Policies 
that rely on historical or unobservable counterfactual baselines are at risk of being gamed 
(Salzman and Ruhl, 2010) such that the economic cost borne by proponents is reduced, and 
similarly the political pressure on regulators is lessened (Clare and Krogman, 2013; 
Freudenburg and Gramling, 1994). The unfortunate outcome for biodiversity is a lower than 
expected ecological compensation for approved development impacts. To what extent the 
promised biodiversity outcomes from offsets translate to what happens on the ground is, 
however, frequently unknown.  
The final empirical Chapter of this thesis (Chapter Seven) aimed to build on the preliminary 
investigation of biodiversity offset governance in Chapter Six, by drawing on qualitative data 
from semi-structured interviews with key informants who have direct experience with the 
implementation of the EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy (2012) in Australia. I 
identified a range of informational, institutional, organizational and political factors which 
enable or inhibit the environmental outcomes delivered by the current biodiversity offset 
policy process. The majority of these factors had little to do with policy design, or the 
specifics the loss-gain calculator (Chapter Five, Gibbons et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2015). 
Information asymmetry, inadequate regulatory oversight, uncertain long-term offset security 
and management, and lack of transparency and public accountability all contribute to an 
institutional and political environment which incentivizes the under-delivery of 
environmental outcomes from offsetting.  
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Biodiversity offset policy is promoted as a market-based solution which can deliver 
environmental outcomes more effectively and efficiently than ‘traditional’ regulation 
(Boisvert et al., 2013; ten Kate et al., 2004). However, the information requirements, 
transaction costs, and sheer complexity of the governance arrangements required to give 
effect to the ‘no net loss’ goal of biodiversity offsetting casts this claim into considerable 
doubt. Biodiversity loss is irreversible and subject to highly uncertain threshold effects, hence 
requires a precautionary policy approach (Gunningham and Young, 1997; Perrings and 
Pearce, 1994). A policy mix which is primarily underpinned by ‘traditional’ regulation may 
well be a more effective and efficient option than current biodiversity offset policy 
arrangements.  
Future research directions 
This thesis has described the evolution of contemporary policy responses to deforestation in 
Australia, and in doing so has illustrated that the intent, framing, and style of policies has 
generally shifted in each of the last four decades. Deforestation increasingly imperils 
threatened species and ecological communities, endangers marine ecosystems with pollution 
and sedimentation, and worsens climate change (Evans, 2016; Reside et al., 2017). The 
current trend towards deregulation and self-regulation of native vegetation clearing is at odds 
with the severity and irreversibility of these ecological impacts. Future work should examine 
the social, political and environmental consequences of this policy style over the next decade, 
and the prospects for a policy mix which is effective, efficient and equitable.  
Evaluating the effect of regulatory policies on deforestation in Queensland was hampered by 
the limited number of available data points, and the considerable variation in deforestation 
trends and responses within and between local government areas that was unexplained by the 
macroeconomic, climatic, biophysical and institutional variables tested in the analysis. 
Expanding our analysis to the national scale will likely improve the capacity to detect any 
effect of policy interventions on deforestation, though may present additional complexities 
given the considerable variation in timing and scope of regulatory policies across different 
Australian states. Spatially explicit information on the broad vegetation groups (Nelder et al., 
2017), primary land use (ABARES, 2010) and landholder compliance behaviours (Bartel and 
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Barclay, 2011) within each local government area could provide further insight into the 
‘unexplained’ variation in deforestation behavior and strengthen our quantitative evaluation 
approach.  
The environmental outcomes delivered from biodiversity offsetting is influenced not by 
metric design alone, but by a range of informational, institutional, organizational and political 
factors throughout the policy process. Future work should examine the biodiversity offset 
policy process and the actions and incentives of policy actors in other jurisdictions, to 
establish what lessons from Australia may generalize elsewhere, and in contrast, what aspects 
may be specific to a particular institutional, social and political context. A further useful 
contribution would be to investigate how financial institutions perceive biodiversity 
offsetting, and what may lead them to withhold mortgagee consent for an offset agreement. 
Although several interviewees suggested that financial institutions lack sufficient knowledge 
and understanding of biodiversity offsetting, it is possible that experiencing the rise and fall 
of the Australian carbon market has caused financial institutions to become more risk-averse 
to new and emerging markets.  
The relaxation of regulatory controls on deforestation and concurrent rise in ‘new’ 
environmental policy instruments in Australia has occurred in the context of declining public 
investment in environmental protection (ACF, 2016). With this change in policy style, the 
governance of natural resources has increasingly been shifted from being the exclusive 
domain of the state, towards the private sector and voluntary community groups. This 
governance transition is occurring largely without the awareness of many non-state actors, 
and without an understanding of what risks and opportunities this new regime presents for 
the conservation of biodiversity. The current biodiversity offset policy settings in Australia 
are likely entrenching or worsening biodiversity decline, while the capacity and willingness 
of the state to engage in environmental protection appears to be deteriorating. Whether the 
private and voluntary sectors are sufficiently motivated to make up for this investment 
shortfall is not yet clear. My findings suggest widespread stakeholder interest in securing 
biodiversity offsets that delivers improved environmental and economic outcomes at the 
landscape scale. While the concept of “strategic” offsetting has been discussed in the 
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academic literature and policy for some time, there are few examples of how it may translate 
in practice. Several respondents from the private sector described how they are already 
designing and implementing offsets to be commercially viable, and establishing large-scale 
offsets in collaboration with businesses who are otherwise industry competitors. As such, the 
innovation and self-organisation displayed by private enterprise to deliver strategic offset 
outcomes warrants future research attention.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One 
Chapter Two Supplementary Material 
 Forest extent and change spatial data were derived from Landsat MSS, TM & ETM+ 
satellite imagery (Australian Department of the Environment, 2015) from 23 epochs as 
described in Table A.1 below.  
Table A.1. Conversion deforestation and forest extent data from epochs to annual values 
Epoch 
Time between 
epochs (yrs) 
Assigned to years: 
1972 5 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976 
1977 3 1977, 1978, 1979 
1980 5 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 
1985 3 1985, 1986, 1987 
1988 (early) 2 1988, 1989 
1989 (end) 1 1990, 1991 (3 months)  
1991 (early) 2 1991 (3 months), 1992 (3 months) 
1992 3 1992 (9 months), 1993, 1994 
1995 3 1995, 1996, 1997 
1998 2 1998, 1999 
2000 2 2000, 2001 
2002 2 2002, 2003 
2004 1 2004 
2005 1 2005 
2006 1 2006 
2007 1 2007 
2008 1 2008 
2009 1 2009 
2010 1 2010 
2011 1 2011 
2012 1 2012 
2013 1 2013 
2014 1 2014 
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Annual values from 1972 to 2004 were derived by averaging the deforestation estimate from 
an epoch over the number of years between it and the following epoch, as per advice from 
the Australian Department of the Environment (S Reddy, pers comm). Note that due to 
change in sensor from Landsat MSS and Landsat TM in 1988/89, satellite imagery was taken 
earlier than usual in 1988 and 1991, and later than usual in 1989 – hence this data had to be 
proportionally assigned to years 1990, 1991 and 1992. Further details are provided in Furby 
(2002). 
Literature cited  
Australian Department of the Environment. (2015). Human Induced Forest Extent & 
Change (version 11). Canberra. 
Furby, S. (2002). Land cover change: specifications for remote sensing analysis. National 
Carbon Accounting System Technical Report No. 9. Commonwealth of Australia. 
 
  
 
Appendix Two 
Chapter Three Supplementary Material 
Appendix 2.1 Additional details on regulatory policies for controlling 
deforestation in Queensland, 1988-2014 
 
Table A2.1: Policy changes corresponding to Figure 3.2 
 Year Policy name Details 
(a) 1995 Land Act 1994 
Introduced to control native vegetation clearing on leasehold and State lands. 
Clearing on freehold still regulated by local governments 
under the Local Government Act (LGA) 1993 and the 
Planning and Environment Act 1990 
(b) 2000 
Vegetation Management Act 1999 
(VMA) 
Enabled state-level regulation of native vegetation clearing on freehold land. 
Clearing of regrowth vegetation still allowed. 
(c) 2003  
A moratorium on tree clearing applications imposed by the Queensland 
Government in May 2003 
(d) 2004 
Vegetation Management and Other 
Legislation Bill 2004 
 
Regulation of vegetation clearing on leasehold and State land removed from the 
Land Act 1994 and placed under the VMA. A ballot for clearing permits totalling 
500,000 hectares was held in September 2004. Provided $150 million of financial 
assistance over five years 
(e) 2006  
All clearing permits issued under the ballot held in 2004 expired on 31 December 
2006. 
(f) 2009 
Vegetation Management and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2009 
VMA amended to protect 'high value regrowth' regrowth (vegetation not cleared 
since 31 December 1989) 
(g) 2012  
Review ordered into the enforcement of the VMA; all investigations into 
noncompliance suspended 
(h) 2013 
Vegetation Management Regulation 
2012 under the Vegetation 
Management Framework Amendment 
Act 2013 
Introduced a series of self-assessable codes for vegetation clearing, removed 
regulations on 'high value' regrowth clearing, introduced permitted clearing for 
necessary environmental clearing, high and irrigated high value agricultural 
clearing 
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Appendix 2.2. R code and output for covariate selection process 
#final df 
newdf<-read.csv("newdf4_new_Evans13June_qld.csv") 
newdf <- data.frame(newdf[ ,-1]) 
newdf_ayy <- data.frame(newdf[ ,c(1,2,6)]) 
 
#qld lgas 
qldlgas<-read.csv("qlflgasforanalysis_13June.csv")  
 
########Climate covariates 
 
lgaclimate<-read.csv("lgaClimate.csv")  
lgadem<-read.csv("lga_dem_ndvi.csv")  
 
#select out the LGAs we're analysing 
qldlgaclimate<-merge(lgaclimate, qldlgas, by=intersect(names(lgaclimate), 
names(qldlgas))) 
qldlgadem<-merge(lgadem, qldlgas, by.x="LGA_CODE11", by.y="LGA_CODE") 
 
#add ayy (response variable y[it]) 
ayyqldlgaclimate<-merge(qldlgaclimate, newdf_ayy, by=intersect(names(lgacl
imate), names(newdf_ayy))) 
ayyqldlgadem<-merge(qldlgadem, newdf_ayy, by.x="LGA_CODE11", by.y="LGA_COD
E") 
 
#Log transform climate variables 
ayyqldlgaclimate$logAnnualMinMonthRain<-log10(ayyqldlgaclimate$AnnualMinMo
nthRain+1) 
ayyqldlgaclimate$logAnnualMaxMonthRain<-log10(ayyqldlgaclimate$AnnualMaxMo
nthRain+1) 
ayyqldlgaclimate$logAnnualRain<-log10(ayyqldlgaclimate$AnnualRain+1) 
ayyqldlgaclimate$logVap<-log10(ayyqldlgaclimate$AnnualMeanVpd09) 
 
####Scatterplots 
## Untransformed rainfall and vapour pressure 
plot(qldlgaclimate[, c(2:5)]) 
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cor(qldlgaclimate[, c(2:5)]) 
##                            Year   AnnualRain AnnualMinMonthRain 
## Year                1.000000000 -0.004828387         0.09340903 
## AnnualRain         -0.004828387  1.000000000         0.36668961 
## AnnualMinMonthRain  0.093409030  0.366689608         1.00000000 
## AnnualMaxMonthRain -0.041190610  0.889617485         0.18610639 
##                    AnnualMaxMonthRain 
## Year                      -0.04119061 
## AnnualRain                 0.88961748 
## AnnualMinMonthRain         0.18610639 
## AnnualMaxMonthRain         1.00000000 
#ayy, year and log transformed rainfall and vapour pressure 
plot(ayyqldlgaclimate[, c(2,13:17)]) 
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#All rain and vapour variables pertain to moisture, and none stands out 
#as an obvious choice. WE CHOOSE VAPOUR PRESSURE. 
 
 
 
 
 
##Temperature 
## Untransformed temperature 
plot(ayyqldlgaclimate[, c(2,13, 7:10)]) 
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cor(ayyqldlgaclimate[, c(2,13, 7:10)]) 
##                          Year        ayy AnnualMeanMinTemp 
## Year               1.00000000 -0.1841749       -0.02188517 
## ayy               -0.18417486  1.0000000       -0.40106774 
## AnnualMeanMinTemp -0.02188517 -0.4010677        1.00000000 
## AnnualMinMinTemp  -0.04240353 -0.3730308        0.94286401 
## AnnualMeanMaxTemp  0.02034789 -0.3887173        0.70818730 
## AnnualMaxMaxTemp   0.07129730 -0.2006276        0.28036365 
##                   AnnualMinMinTemp AnnualMeanMaxTemp AnnualMaxMaxTemp 
## Year                   -0.04240353        0.02034789       0.07129730 
## ayy                    -0.37303079       -0.38871727      -0.20062755 
## AnnualMeanMinTemp       0.94286401        0.70818730       0.28036365 
## AnnualMinMinTemp        1.00000000        0.53479279       0.07170248 
## AnnualMeanMaxTemp       0.53479279        1.00000000       0.82098644 
## AnnualMaxMaxTemp        0.07170248        0.82098644       1.00000000 
#Log transform 
ayyqldlgaclimate$logAnnualMeanMinTemp<-log10(ayyqldlgaclimate$AnnualMeanMi
nTemp+1) 
ayyqldlgaclimate$logAnnualMinMinTemp<-log10(ayyqldlgaclimate$AnnualMinMinT
emp+1) 
ayyqldlgaclimate$logAnnualMeanMaxTemp <-log10(ayyqldlgaclimate$AnnualMeanM
axTemp+1) 
ayyqldlgaclimate$logAnnualMaxMaxTemp<-log10(ayyqldlgaclimate$AnnualMaxMaxT
emp+1) 
 
##ayy, year and log transformed temperature 
plot(ayyqldlgaclimate[, c(2,13, 18:21)]) 
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cor(ayyqldlgaclimate[, c(2,13, 18:21)]) 
##                             Year        ayy logAnnualMeanMinTemp 
## Year                  1.00000000 -0.1841749          -0.02394022 
## ayy                  -0.18417486  1.0000000          -0.36793368 
## logAnnualMeanMinTemp -0.02394022 -0.3679337           1.00000000 
## logAnnualMinMinTemp  -0.05636583 -0.3033580           0.90757342 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp  0.02121855 -0.3730941           0.70875948 
## logAnnualMaxMaxTemp   0.07112957 -0.1945425           0.29200122 
##                      logAnnualMinMinTemp logAnnualMeanMaxTemp 
## Year                         -0.05636583           0.02121855 
## ayy                          -0.30335801          -0.37309411 
## logAnnualMeanMinTemp          0.90757342           0.70875948 
## logAnnualMinMinTemp           1.00000000           0.49771370 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp          0.49771370           1.00000000 
## logAnnualMaxMaxTemp           0.04923780           0.83031241 
##                      logAnnualMaxMaxTemp 
## Year                          0.07112957 
## ayy                          -0.19454247 
## logAnnualMeanMinTemp          0.29200122 
## logAnnualMinMinTemp           0.04923780 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp          0.83031241 
## logAnnualMaxMaxTemp           1.00000000 
#None of temp variables stands out as an obvious choice. 
#WE CHOOSE MEANMAXTEMP (highest corr with response ayy). 
########Biophysical covariates 
 
Appendices 
 
245 
 
##Untransformed elevation 
plot(ayyqldlgadem[,c(21,5:10)]) 
 
cor(ayyqldlgadem[,c(21,5:10)]) 
##                    ayy  elev_mean elev_media  elev_stdev    elev_min 
## ayy         1.00000000 0.02855343 0.05356424 -0.07107317  0.07944516 
## elev_mean   0.02855343 1.00000000 0.96746196  0.35055171  0.77298668 
## elev_media  0.05356424 0.96746196 1.00000000  0.12652407  0.82481262 
## elev_stdev -0.07107317 0.35055171 0.12652407  1.00000000 -0.16233502 
## elev_min    0.07944516 0.77298668 0.82481262 -0.16233502  1.00000000 
## elev_max    0.07153512 0.59647558 0.44577600  0.80609237  0.11493058 
## elev_range  0.05087606 0.39582254 0.23235147  0.84490271 -0.14230368 
##              elev_max  elev_range 
## ayy        0.07153512  0.05087606 
## elev_mean  0.59647558  0.39582254 
## elev_media 0.44577600  0.23235147 
## elev_stdev 0.80609237  0.84490271 
## elev_min   0.11493058 -0.14230368 
## elev_max   1.00000000  0.96690896 
## elev_range 0.96690896  1.00000000 
#Untransformed slope 
plot(ayyqldlgadem[,c(21,11:16)]) 
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cor(ayyqldlgadem[,c(21,11:16)]) 
##                     ayy  slope_mean  slope_medi   slope_stde   slope_mi
n 
## ayy         1.000000000 -0.03058673 -0.04887301 -0.001940041 -0.0768446
1 
## slope_mean -0.030586728  1.00000000  0.92959860  0.949089978  0.0587080
2 
## slope_medi -0.048873013  0.92959860  1.00000000  0.776482499  0.1558698
2 
## slope_stde -0.001940041  0.94908998  0.77648250  1.000000000 -0.0586083
7 
## slope_min  -0.076844608  0.05870802  0.15586982 -0.058608371  1.0000000
0 
## slope_max   0.034588532  0.66269723  0.52211208  0.772201198 -0.2319268
7 
## slope_rang  0.034672973  0.66243607  0.52177180  0.772052776 -0.2330879
9 
##              slope_max  slope_rang 
## ayy         0.03458853  0.03467297 
## slope_mean  0.66269723  0.66243607 
## slope_medi  0.52211208  0.52177180 
## slope_stde  0.77220120  0.77205278 
## slope_min  -0.23192687 -0.23308799 
## slope_max   1.00000000  0.99999929 
## slope_rang  0.99999929  1.00000000 
##All elevation variables are highly correlated with each other,  
##and same with slope variables, so select mean and range for now 
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#Log transform slope and elev mean and range 
ayyqldlgadem$logelev_mean<-log10(ayyqldlgadem$elev_mean+1) 
ayyqldlgadem$logelev_range<-log10(ayyqldlgadem$elev_range+1) 
ayyqldlgadem$logslope_mean <-log10(ayyqldlgadem$slope_mean+1) 
ayyqldlgadem$logslope_rang<-log10(ayyqldlgadem$slope_rang+1) 
 
plot(ayyqldlgadem[,c(21:25)]) 
 
cor(ayyqldlgadem[,c(21:25)]) 
##                      ayy logelev_mean logelev_range logslope_mean 
## ayy           1.00000000   0.09355166     0.1390674    0.06358031 
## logelev_mean  0.09355166   1.00000000     0.5245611    0.07242372 
## logelev_range 0.13906743   0.52456115     1.0000000    0.54859437 
## logslope_mean 0.06358031   0.07242372     0.5485944    1.00000000 
## logslope_rang 0.11090982   0.48167175     0.9197467    0.67160320 
##               logslope_rang 
## ayy               0.1109098 
## logelev_mean      0.4816717 
## logelev_range     0.9197467 
## logslope_mean     0.6716032 
## logslope_rang     1.0000000 
##None stands out as obvious choice, so 
##CHOOSE JUST ELEV_MEAN for interpretability 
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##NDVI 
#look at ayy vs ndvi 
plot(ayyqldlgadem[, c(21, 17:19)]) 
 
cor(ayyqldlgadem[, c(21, 17:19)]) 
##                    ayy ndvi_mean  ndvi_stdev ndviSD_mea 
## ayy         1.00000000 0.1098183  0.06964855 -0.1898965 
## ndvi_mean   0.10981828 1.0000000  0.27468511  0.3399635 
## ndvi_stdev  0.06964855 0.2746851  1.00000000 -0.1384215 
## ndviSD_mea -0.18989645 0.3399635 -0.13842150  1.0000000 
#Log transform 
ayyqldlgadem$logndvi_mean<-log10(ayyqldlgadem$ndvi_mean+1) 
ayyqldlgadem$logndvi_stdev <-log10(ayyqldlgadem$ndvi_stdev+1) 
ayyqldlgadem$logndviSD_mea<-log10(ayyqldlgadem$ndviSD_mea+1) 
 
##ayy, year and log transformed NDVI 
plot(ayyqldlgadem[, c(21, 26:28)]) 
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cor(ayyqldlgadem[, c(21, 26:28)]) 
##                      ayy logndvi_mean logndvi_stdev logndviSD_mea 
## ayy            1.0000000    0.1363419     0.1059620    -0.1691899 
## logndvi_mean   0.1363419    1.0000000     0.2923990     0.3763235 
## logndvi_stdev  0.1059620    0.2923990     1.0000000    -0.0794819 
## logndviSD_mea -0.1691899    0.3763235    -0.0794819     1.0000000 
##CHOOSE NDIV_MEAN for interpretability 
 
 
 
#Examine selected climate and biophysical variables together 
select_dem<-ayyqldlgadem[, c(1,21,22,26)] 
select_clim<-ayyqldlgaclimate[, c(1,2,13,17,20)] 
 
plot(select_dem[-1]) 
Appendices 
 
250 
 
 
cor(select_dem[-1]) 
##                     ayy logelev_mean logndvi_mean 
## ayy          1.00000000   0.09355166    0.1363419 
## logelev_mean 0.09355166   1.00000000   -0.1421020 
## logndvi_mean 0.13634188  -0.14210203    1.0000000 
plot(select_clim[ ,2:5]) 
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cor(select_clim[ ,2:5]) 
##                             Year        ayy      logVap 
## Year                  1.00000000 -0.1841749 -0.03429284 
## ayy                  -0.18417486  1.0000000 -0.29181861 
## logVap               -0.03429284 -0.2918186  1.00000000 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp  0.02121855 -0.3730941  0.29744465 
##                      logAnnualMeanMaxTemp 
## Year                           0.02121855 
## ayy                           -0.37309411 
## logVap                         0.29744465 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp           1.00000000 
#merge 
select_newdf<-merge(select_dem[-2], select_clim, by.x="LGA_CODE11", by.y="
LGA_CODE") 
 
 
 
 
###Land tenure 
tenure<-read.csv("proptenure_tencov_14-6-17_qldonly.csv")  
tenure<-tenure[,c(2,6)] 
select_newdf<-merge(select_newdf, tenure, by.x="LGA_CODE11", by.y="LGA_COD
E") 
 
#Plot with land tenure 
plot(select_newdf[,c(5,2,3,6,7,8)]) 
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cor(select_newdf[,c(5,2,3,6,7,8)]) 
##                              ayy logelev_mean logndvi_mean     logVap 
## ayy                   1.00000000   0.09355166    0.1363419 -0.2918186 
## logelev_mean          0.09355166   1.00000000   -0.1421020 -0.5563906 
## logndvi_mean          0.13634188  -0.14210203    1.0000000  0.4686681 
## logVap               -0.29181861  -0.55639061    0.4686681  1.0000000 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp -0.37309411  -0.20994323   -0.6007638  0.2974447 
## tencov                0.40014492   0.09059084    0.5522605 -0.2487662 
##                      logAnnualMeanMaxTemp      tencov 
## ayy                            -0.3730941  0.40014492 
## logelev_mean                   -0.2099432  0.09059084 
## logndvi_mean                   -0.6007638  0.55226053 
## logVap                          0.2974447 -0.24876616 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp            1.0000000 -0.84803929 
## tencov                         -0.8480393  1.00000000 
##with VAPOUR in the mix, NDVI doesn't provide additional information 
 
 
 
 
##Macroeconomic covariates 
 
macrodf<-read.csv("macro_df_march2016.csv")   
 
##Broad macro variables 
plot(macrodf[,c(1,3,5,6,17,19,20,21)]) 
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cor(macrodf[,c(1,3,5,6,17,19,20,21)]) 
##                           Year      GDPreal        TOT        FTOT 
## Year                1.00000000  0.022366065  0.6231801 -0.80163985 
## GDPreal             0.02236607  1.000000000 -0.1514287  0.02221356 
## TOT                 0.62318014 -0.151428718  1.0000000 -0.23000222 
## FTOT               -0.80163985  0.022213560 -0.2300022  1.00000000 
## Ag_val_add_percGDP -0.90649169 -0.079940970 -0.4294145  0.83579318 
## oil_USD             0.27029412 -0.268715619  0.6456314 -0.16604924 
## coal_AUD            0.76181960 -0.135916955  0.7863692 -0.61394550 
## pop_dens            0.99617527 -0.004184176  0.6686562 -0.77176732 
##                    Ag_val_add_percGDP    oil_USD   coal_AUD     pop_den
s 
## Year                      -0.90649169  0.2702941  0.7618196  0.99617526
7 
## GDPreal                   -0.07994097 -0.2687156 -0.1359170 -0.00418417
6 
## TOT                       -0.42941453  0.6456314  0.7863692  0.66865623
5 
## FTOT                       0.83579318 -0.1660492 -0.6139455 -0.77176732
0 
## Ag_val_add_percGDP         1.00000000 -0.0768725 -0.6750377 -0.89001390
0 
## oil_USD                   -0.07687250  1.0000000  0.5844126  0.31272952
5 
## coal_AUD                  -0.67503773  0.5844126  1.0000000  0.77074410
2 
## pop_dens                  -0.89001390  0.3127295  0.7707441  1.00000000
0 
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#CHOOSE GDPREAL, OILUSD, % AG to GDP TO MINIMIZE CONFOUNDING WITH YEAR  
 
 
 
##Farm variables 
plot(macrodf[,c(1,8,10,11)]) 
 
cor(macrodf[,c(1,8,10,11)]) 
##                       Year Gross_farm_value  Crops_ex Livestock_ex 
## Year             1.0000000        0.9891603 0.9566678    0.9335221 
## Gross_farm_value 0.9891603        1.0000000 0.9705191    0.9436573 
## Crops_ex         0.9566678        0.9705191 1.0000000    0.9146534 
## Livestock_ex     0.9335221        0.9436573 0.9146534    1.0000000 
#Check livestock exports 
select_macro<-macrodf[,c(1,17,19,20,11)] 
 
##add ayy 
select_macro_ayy<-merge(select_macro, newdf_ayy , by=intersect(names(selec
t_macro), names(newdf_ayy))) 
 
plot(select_macro_ayy[-6]) 
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cor(select_macro_ayy[-6]) 
##                          Year Ag_val_add_percGDP    oil_USD   coal_AUD 
## Year                1.0000000         -0.8293058  0.8369721  0.6962969 
## Ag_val_add_percGDP -0.8293058          1.0000000 -0.7003019 -0.6440887 
## oil_USD             0.8369721         -0.7003019  1.0000000  0.8435394 
## coal_AUD            0.6962969         -0.6440887  0.8435394  1.0000000 
## Livestock_ex        0.8820347         -0.6339391  0.6918659  0.4672437 
## ayy                -0.1841749          0.1624686 -0.1601019 -0.1589144 
##                    Livestock_ex        ayy 
## Year                  0.8820347 -0.1841749 
## Ag_val_add_percGDP   -0.6339391  0.1624686 
## oil_USD               0.6918659 -0.1601019 
## coal_AUD              0.4672437 -0.1589144 
## Livestock_ex          1.0000000 -0.1468161 
## ayy                  -0.1468161  1.0000000 
select_macro_ayy$logAg<-log10(select_macro_ayy$Ag_val_add_percGDP) 
select_macro_ayy$logoil<-log10(select_macro_ayy$oil_USD) 
select_macro_ayy$loglive<-log10(select_macro_ayy$Livestock_ex) 
 
plot(select_macro_ayy[c(1,7:10)]) 
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cor(select_macro_ayy[c(1,7:10)]) 
##               Year        ayy      logAg     logoil    loglive 
## Year     1.0000000 -0.1841749 -0.8596448  0.8230612  0.9061581 
## ayy     -0.1841749  1.0000000  0.1740008 -0.1386798 -0.1520259 
## logAg   -0.8596448  0.1740008  1.0000000 -0.7395789 -0.6865213 
## logoil   0.8230612 -0.1386798 -0.7395789  1.0000000  0.6733363 
## loglive  0.9061581 -0.1520259 -0.6865213  0.6733363  1.0000000 
##remove coal (too similar to oil) and livestock (too similar to year) 
 
select_macro_ayy_<-select_macro_ayy[ ,c(-6,-7)] 
 
########Combine final covariates 
 
select_macro$logAg<-log10(select_macro$Ag_val_add_percGDP) 
select_macro$logoil<-log10(select_macro$oil_USD) 
select_macro$loglive<-log10(select_macro$Livestock_ex) 
 
 
finaldf_ayy<-merge(select_macro, select_newdf,  
                   by=intersect(names(select_macro), names(select_newdf))) 
 
finaldf_ayy<-finaldf_ayy[ ,c(-2,-3,-4,-5)] 
 
#Macro 
plot(finaldf_ayy[,c(1,8,2,3)]) 
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cor(finaldf_ayy[,c(1,8,2,3)]) 
##              Year        ayy      logAg     logoil 
## Year    1.0000000 -0.1841749 -0.8596448  0.8230612 
## ayy    -0.1841749  1.0000000  0.1740008 -0.1386798 
## logAg  -0.8596448  0.1740008  1.0000000 -0.7395789 
## logoil  0.8230612 -0.1386798 -0.7395789  1.0000000 
 
 
 
#Geographical (biophysical and institutional) 
plot(finaldf_ayy[,c(8,6,11)]) 
Appendices 
 
258 
 
 
cor(finaldf_ayy[,c(1,8,6,11)]) 
##                       Year         ayy logelev_mean        tencov 
## Year          1.000000e+00 -0.18417486   0.00000000 -3.449718e-21 
## ayy          -1.841749e-01  1.00000000   0.09355166  4.001449e-01 
## logelev_mean  0.000000e+00  0.09355166   1.00000000  9.059084e-02 
## tencov       -3.449718e-21  0.40014492   0.09059084  1.000000e+00 
 
 
 
 
#Climate 
plot(finaldf_ayy[,c(8,9,10)]) 
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cor(finaldf_ayy[,c(1,8,9,10)]) 
##                             Year        ayy      logVap 
## Year                  1.00000000 -0.1841749 -0.03429284 
## ayy                  -0.18417486  1.0000000 -0.29181861 
## logVap               -0.03429284 -0.2918186  1.00000000 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp  0.02121855 -0.3730941  0.29744465 
##                      logAnnualMeanMaxTemp 
## Year                           0.02121855 
## ayy                           -0.37309411 
## logVap                         0.29744465 
## logAnnualMeanMaxTemp           1.00000000 
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Appendix 2.3: Local government areas  
Table A2.2: Local government areas in Queensland  
LGA 
Code 
LGA Name 
 Area of LGA 
(ha)  
 % forest in 
1972  
Included in 
analysis Li 
30250 Aurukun  734,721 63.3 y 
-
1.85 
30300 Balonne  3,110,618 27.7 y 1.56 
30370 Banana  2,854,631 38.4 y 1.14 
30410 Barcaldine  5,352,067 14.1 y 0.34 
30450 Barcoo  6,182,501 0.5  -     -    
30760 Blackall Tambo  3,038,906 28.7 y 0.53 
30900 Boulia  6,095,581  -     -     -    
31000 Brisbane  133,809 45.8 y 2 
31750 Bulloo  7,376,280 0.5  -     -    
31820 Bundaberg  643,564 53.7 y 1.99 
31900 Burdekin  504,342 36.8  -     -    
31950 Burke  4,003,921 4  -     -    
32070 Cairns  411,511 70 y 0.97 
32250 Carpentaria  6,412,490 4.8 y 
-
1.97 
32260 Cassowary Coast  468,499 62.2 y 1.99 
32270 Central Highlands  5,983,489 41.9 y 0.68 
32310 Charters Towers  6,837,355 48.5 y 
-
0.89 
32330 Cherbourg  3,160 65.9 y 1.63 
32450 Cloncurry  4,798,313 0.6  -     -    
32500 Cook  ######## 61.6 y 
-
1.71 
32600 Croydon  2,948,710 6.3 y 
-
1.24 
32750 Diamantina  9,466,685  -     -     -    
32770 Doomadgee  183,516 2.5  -     -    
33100 Etheridge  3,920,102 28.1  -     -    
33200 Flinders  4,119,266 14.9 y 
-
0.04 
33220 Fraser Coast  710,250 64.7 y 1.99 
33360 Gladstone  1,046,579 47.4 y 2 
33430 Gold Coast  133,168 47 y 2 
33610 Goondiwindi  1,925,549 24.4 y 2 
33620 Gympie  688,454 51 y 1.99 
33800 Hinchinbrook  280,135 52.9 y 0.72 
33830 Hope Vale  110,475 58.5 y 0.81 
33960 Ipswich  108,849 30 y 2 
33980 Isaac  5,871,984 37.8 y 0.07 
34420 Kowanyama  254,317 14.1  -     -    
34570 Lockhart River  357,806 75.5  -     -    
34580 Lockyer Valley  226,874 44.7 y 2 
34590 Logan  95,810 51.2 y 2 
34710 Longreach  4,057,171 3.6 y 0.97 
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34770 Mackay  760,120 56.7 y 0.6 
34800 McKinlay  4,073,371 0.1  -     -    
34830 Mapoon  54,799 61.3  -     -    
34860 Maranoa  5,871,136 42.4 y 0.89 
35010 Moreton Bay  203,330 58.5 y 2 
35250 Mornington  124,421 36.7  -     -    
35300 Mount Isa  4,318,804 0.9  -     -    
35600 Murweh  4,069,849 51 y 0.59 
35670 Napranum  199,791 62.4 y 0.64 
35760 North Burnett  1,966,677 41.6 y 1.74 
35780 
Northern Peninsula 
Area  105,691 59.3  -     -    
35790 Palm Island  7,063 43.3  -     -    
35800 Paroo  4,761,641 17.3 y 0.69 
36070 Pormpuraaw  442,884 27.7  -     -    
36150 Quilpie  6,742,331 11.3 y 
-
0.06 
36250 Redland  53,625 51.1 y 2 
36300 Richmond  2,658,022 3 y -2 
36360 Rockhampton  1,831,174 44.6 y 1.47 
36510 Scenic Rim  424,807 26.9 y 2 
36580 Somerset  537,328 40.7 y 1.98 
36630 South Burnett  838,170 28.8 y 2 
36660 Southern Downs  711,172 31.4 y 2 
36710 Sunshine Coast  312,071 56.2 y 2 
36810 Tablelands  6,479,381 36.4 y 
-
0.92 
36910 Toowoomba  1,295,773 23 y 2 
36950 Torres  88,271 38.9  -     -    
36960 Torres Strait Island  48,924 29.7  -     -    
37010 Townsville  372,738 60.7 y 1.85 
37300 Weipa  1,082 11.2  -     -    
37310 Western Downs  3,793,849 30.5 y 2 
37340 Whitsunday  2,380,438 37.2 y 
-
0.25 
37400 Winton  5,381,439  -     -     -    
37550 Woorabinda  39,028 50 y 1.69 
37570 Wujal Wujal  1,118 80.8  -     -    
37600 Yarrabah  15,884 78.7  -     -    
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Appendix 2.4: Prior distributions and model variations 
We specify the following Bayesian prior distributions: 
𝑏0, 𝑏1𝑘 , 𝑏2𝑘, 𝑏3, 𝑎𝑘 ∼ 𝑁(mean = 𝑚1, var = 𝑢)  for all 𝑘
𝒯 ∼ 𝑁(mean = 𝑚2, var = 100)
ℓ𝛾 ∼ 𝑁(mean = log 5.5 , var = [log 10]
2)
𝑣−2, 𝜎𝜏
−2, 𝜎𝛾
−2, 𝜎𝑘
2, 𝜎𝑘0
−2 ∼ Gamma(1, 0.01)  for all 𝑘
 
where 𝑚1 = 16 and 𝑢 = 100 are the hyperparameter values for 𝑏0, but 𝑚1 = 0 and 𝑢 = 10 
for the other slope parameters; and 𝑚2 corresponds to the model variations below. We chose 
our hyperparameter values above based on preliminary (exploratory) model fits, some of which 
appear in Appendix 2.5.  
Key variation (a): Timing of “bend” 
To test whether the “bend” occurs around the year 2000 at the introduction of the original 
VMA, or around 2007 after the VMA amendments came into effect, we specify the  
hyperparameter values as 𝑚2 = 2000 and 𝑚2 = 2007, respectively.  
Key variation (b): Spatial adjacency weighting 
To test if weighting spatial adjacency by land tenure similarity affects model fit, as compared 
to unweighted spatial adjacency, we specify the CAR structure in Level 2 of the modeling 
framework as:  
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛽10𝑖 ∣ {𝛽10𝑗: 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗} ∼ 𝑁 (mean =
∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝛽10𝑗
∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑗
, var =
𝜎10
2
∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑗
)
 unweighted case:   𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝟏{𝑖, 𝑗 share border}  for all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
weighted case: 𝑤𝑖𝑗 =
𝟏{𝑖, 𝑗 share border}
∣ 𝐿𝑖 − 𝐿𝑗 ∣ +0.00001
  for all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
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Other variations 
Minor variations were considered and adopted for our final models if goodness-of-fit could be 
improved: 
• alternative specification of prior distributions, e.g. bivariate joint prior for 𝜏𝑖 and log 𝛾𝑖 
o not adopted 
• alternative hyperparameter values 
o not adopted 
• alternative model parametrization in the WinBUGS implementation 
o not adopted 
• reduced model complexity by taking log 𝛾𝑖 = ℓ𝛾 for all 𝑖  
o adopted 
• reduced model complexity by removing redundant driver variables 
o see Appendix 2.5 
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Appendix 2.5: Justification for discarding model covariates 
In addition to state-level scatterplots in Appendix 2.2, LGA-specific as well as year-specific 
scatterplots (e.g. year 2014 shown below) were additionally inspected. 
 
From such inspection, land tenure was subsequently removed from consideration as a driver 
variable due to its redundancy with temperature throughout 1988 to 2014. 
The remaining drivers were more formally assessed through preliminary model fits using 
WinBUGS or R-INLA (Rue et al., 2009). Preliminary WinBUGS results suggested that Ag and 
Oil were highly redundant. Oil was kept for further assessment by R-INLA. Sample R-INLA 
results appear below. A smaller DIC value and effective number of parameters together suggest 
better goodness-of-fit. Thus, GDP was kept as the sole driver variable in our final models that 
are reported in Chapter 3 and summarised in Appendix 2.6.
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Unweighted CAR and iid year effect, multiple drivers and year:  
summary(result495_21) 
##  
## Fixed effects: 
##                mean     sd 0.025quant 0.5quant 0.975quant    mode kld 
## (Intercept) 13.5073 8.3423    -2.9157  13.5077    29.9085 13.5091   0 
## GDP         -0.0278 0.0203    -0.0677  -0.0278     0.0121 -0.0278   0 
## oil         -0.0097 0.0351    -0.0788  -0.0097     0.0594 -0.0097   0 
## temp        -0.0635 0.0629    -0.1863  -0.0637     0.0605 -0.0641   0 
## vap          0.0813 0.0569    -0.0304   0.0812     0.1932  0.0810   0 
## elev        -0.0555 0.0541    -0.1617  -0.0556     0.0513 -0.0558   0 
## Year        -0.0099 0.0042    -0.0181  -0.0099    -0.0017 -0.0099   0 
 
## Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) ...: -4.243 
## Effective number of parameters .........: 73.84 
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Unweighted CAR and iid year effect, single driver and year:  
summary(result495_2) 
##  
## Fixed effects: 
##                mean     sd 0.025quant 0.5quant 0.975quant    mode kld 
## (Intercept) 16.5864 3.9808     8.7707  16.5862    24.3954 16.5864   0 
## GDP         -0.0268 0.0155    -0.0572  -0.0268     0.0036 -0.0268   0 
## Year        -0.0115 0.0020    -0.0154  -0.0115    -0.0076 -0.0115   0 
 
## Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) ...: -9.363 
## Effective number of parameters .........: 71.45 
Appendices 
 
267 
 
Appendix 2.6: Goodness-of-fit values for final models 
Table A2.3. Model fits36 for identically parametrized models: GDP and year are only covariates, with 
LGA-specific incoming and outgoing slopes, LGA-specific 𝜏𝑖, but common γ. Note that small deviance 
together with small 𝑝𝑉 imply good fit. As all four models involve the same number of parameters, the 
deviance can be used to compare all four against each other. In contrast, we do not use  𝑝𝑉 to compare 
between a Simple and a Weighted model, because weighting appears to cause a drastic increase in the 
instability37 of the WinBUGS numerical approximation algorithms. 
Model variation 
hyperparameter 
𝑚2 
Spatial weight 𝑤𝑖𝑗 
Posterior median 
deviance 
𝑝𝑉 
estimate38 
Simple CAR 2000 
1{𝑖, 𝑗 share border} 
-929.5 369616.0 
Simple CAR 2007 -926.45 350471.5 
Weighted CAR 2000 
𝟏{𝑖, 𝑗 share border}
∣ 𝐿𝑖 − 𝐿𝑗 ∣ +0.00001
 
-1487.0 556042.4 
Weighted CAR 2007 -1516.0 535166.6 
 
                                                 
36 The results reported in Chapter 3 and these Supplementary Materials are based on locally converged models, 
which may differ from the global best fit. Having a mere 50 LGAs in the dataset was the likely reason for 
WinBUGS to exhibit (a) unstable estimates of 𝑝𝑉 and (b) difficulty in locating the global best fit; indeed 
multiple local minima are inherent in the bent-cable model deviance (Chiu et al., 2006; Chiu & Lockhart, 2010). 
37 As suggested by the unusually large 𝑝𝑉 estimates. 
38 Computed by dividing the posterior variance of the deviance by two (Gelman et al., 2013). 
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Appendix 2.7: Influence of land tenure similarity weighting on spatial 
estimates 
 
Figure A2.2. Estimates (posterior medians) of spatial random effects  𝛽10𝑖 for unweighted model (left, 
median deviance ~ -930) and weighted model (right, median deviance ~ -1500). Smaller deviance 
indicates better goodness-of-fit. 
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Appendix 2.8: LGA-level time series (n = 50) 
Figure A2.3: LGA-level time series 𝑦𝑖𝑡 (n = 50) after detrending (black), with LGA-level bent-cable 
estimate (red) and fitted population-level bent cable (green). 
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Appendix Three 
Chapter Four Supplementary Material 
Appendix 3.1: Methodologies and carbon accounting under the Carbon 
Farming Initiative (CFI) 
Two offset methodologies for assisted natural regeneration (ANR, also known as managed 
regrowth) are available under the Australian Carbon Farming Initiative (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2013a, 2013b). Generation of carbon credits via ANR requires one of more of the 
following activates to be undertaken: (a) the exclusion of livestock, (b) the management of 
the timing and the extent of grazing, (c) the management, in a humane manner, of feral 
animals, (d) the management of plants that are not native to the project area, (e) the cessation 
of mechanical or chemical destruction, or suppression, of regrowth vegetation.  A project 
which employs the Native Forest from Managed Regrowth methodology (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2013a) must include (e), and may also involve one or more of (a) to (d). The 
Human-Induced Regeneration of a Permanent Even-Aged Native Forest methodology 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2013b) differs in that any one or more of (a) to (e) may be 
undertaken. 
The two ANR methodologies currently available under the CFI differ in how carbon 
abatement is calculated.  The Human-Induced Regeneration of a Permanent Even-Aged 
Native Forest methodology assumes a zero baseline for carbon stocks, whereas the Native 
Forest from Managed Regrowth methodology accommodates baseline scenarios that allow 
for fluctuations in carbon stocks. The FullCAM model (Richards and Evans, 2004; FullCAM, 
Richards, 2001), which forms the basis of the RMT, is required to calculate abatement where 
a non-zero, dynamic baseline for carbon stocks is assumed. Despite this difference, our 
findings are still broadly applicable to the two ANR methodologies recognized under the 
CFI. Dynamic baselines will generally be small compared to sequestration potential, and will 
almost always be lower than the carbon stock at project commencement. Estimation of 
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biomass accumulation as modeled by FullCAM has recently been updated (Paul et al., 2013), 
so the carbon sequestration rates we use here should be regarded as conservative.  
Australia’s national greenhouse gas accounting system and the CFI are imperfectly aligned, 
which means that methodologies cannot be wholly classified as Kyoto-compliant or non-
compliant.  For a CFI project to be considered for Kyoto compliance, the project proponent 
must submit an application to be assessed by the Australian Clean Energy Regulator 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2012a, 2011). Activities listed under the two ANR 
methodologies under the CFI fall under the Kyoto definition of reforestation 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011); however, the Clean Energy Regulator maintains 
authority over decisions pertaining to the interpretation of the CFI Act (2011), regulations 
and methodology determinations in relation to the crediting of projects.  
Appendix 3.2: Deriving an estimate of the establishment cost for ANR 
Schirmer and Field (2000) estimated costs of establishing an assisted natural regeneration 
project, including fencing materials, fencing labour and transport of fencing materials for 1 
ha, 10 ha and 50 ha projects. We ignore the project management and monitoring costs 
considered by Schirmer and Field (2000) in deriving an initial establishment cost at t=0 as 
these annual costs are considered elsewhere in our calculations (see Equation 6 in 
manuscript).  
Table A3.1. Costs of an assisted natural regeneration (ANR) project. Adapted from Schirmer and 
Field (2000) 
Cost description 
Cost/ha for 1ha 
project 
($) 
Cost/ha for 
10 ha 
project 
($) 
Cost/ha for 
50 ha 
project 
($) 
Fencing materials @ $2550/km* 1020 357 153 
Fencing labour @ 44 hours/km = 
$660/km 
264 92 40 
Spot spraying for weeds 3 times @ 
$75/ha/application 
225 225 225 
Transport @ $0.52/km for 500 km = 
$572 total** 
260 26 5 
Total cost per hectare 1769 700 423 
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* Project areas are assumed to be square in shape and to require fencing on all sides,for the purposes of 
providing a consistent comparison 
** Site is assumed to be 50 kilometres from nearest fencing supplier and the office location of the nearest 
revegetation professional. Farmer transports fencing materials at $0.52/kilometre; revegetation professional 
makes 5 site trips at $0.52 per kilometer. 
We derived an estimated establishment cost for ANR for a 100ha project to suit the spatial 
scale of our analysis (1km2) by fitting a power relationship (Figure A3.1, R2 = 0.996) to the 
cost estimates for a 1ha, 10ha and 50ha project as provided by Schirmer and Field (2000). 
Table A3.2. Derived estimate of an ANR establishment cost for 100 ha project area. 
Project area 
(ha) 
Cost/ha Predicted cost/ha 
Adjusted for 
inflation (2.9% pa 
between 2000 and 
2013) 
1 1769 1728.7  
10 700 740.8  
50 423 409.7  
100  317.5 459.8 
 
 
Figure A3.1. Fitted relationship used to derive establishment cost estimate for ANR 
y = 1728.7x-0.368
R² = 0.9955
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Appendix 3.3: Supplementary results 
 
Figure A3.2. Break-even carbon prices for each land use averaged over all eligible sites.  Discount 
rates (from top panel) are 1.5%, 5% and 10%. Project duration is 100 years.  
 
 
Appendices 
 
277 
 
 
Figure A3.3. Effects of discounting and project duration on carbon sequestration supply (top panel, T=100; bottom panel, T=25). The y-axis 
is restricted to $200 per t CO2-e or less for ease of interpretation. 
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Figure A3.4. Effects of discounting and project duration on area viable for carbon farming (top panel, T=100; bottom panel, T=25). The y-
axis is restricted to $200 per t CO2-e or less for ease of interpretation. 
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Appendix 4.1: Sample interview questions 
1. Could you describe your current role, and contact with offsets in this role? 
2. From your perspective, what do you consider to be a “good” or “successful” biodiversity 
offset outcome? 
3. Do you think that the offsetting arrangements you’re involved would meet the definition of a 
“suitable offset” as defined by the EPBC Act Environmental Offsets Policy? Why/why not? 
“Suitable offsets must deliver an overall conservation outcome that improves or maintains the 
viability of the protected matter”  
Australian Government (2012) Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 Environmental Offsets Policy 
4. Thinking now about the implementation of biodiversity offsetting: Which parts of the offset 
process are you involved in, which parts are conducted by other parts of the Department? 
5. From your perspective, what are some of the key things needed for the biodiversity offsetting 
process to go smoothly? 
6. What are some reasons that process might not go smoothly? 
7. Thinking now about monitoring and evaluation of biodiversity offsetting: What role does 
your branch/section play in monitoring, reporting and evaluation of biodiversity offsetting? 
8. Do you think there is adequate monitoring and evaluation of biodiversity offsetting? 
Why/why not? 
9. In your view, what are 3 key things needed to improve biodiversity offsetting in 
Australia/under the EPBC Act? 
10. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
If you have any questions or would like any further information on this research project, please 
contact either myself or one of my supervisors, Karen Hussey or Stuart Whitten: 
Megan Evans 
PhD Candidate 
Email: megan.evans@anu.edu.au    
Mobile: +61 418 984 248  
Professor Karen Hussey  
Primary PhD Supervisor  
Email: k.hussey@uq.edu.au  
Phone: +61 7 3443 3112 
Dr Stuart Whitten 
PhD supervisor 
Email: stuart.whitten@csiro.au 
Phone: +61 2 6246 4359 
 
Ethics Committee Clearance: 
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Human Ethics Protocol 2015/274).  If you have any concerns or complaints about how 
this research has been conducted, please contact: 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au
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Appendix 4.2: Participant Information Sheet 
Project Title: Stakeholder perceptions on the efficacy of biodiversity offset policy in 
Australia 
 
Researcher: 
 
My name is Megan Evans, and I am a PhD candidate student from the Fenner School of 
Environment and Society within the College of Medicine, Biology and Environment at the 
Australian National University. I am undertaking a PhD research project on the role of key 
actors within the processes of biodiversity offset policy implementation. This research is 
funded by an Australian Postgraduate Award and a CSIRO top-up scholarship (Grant ID: 
27226). 
 
General Outline of the Project: 
 
Description and Methodology: The overall aim of the research is to gain an understanding 
of what the key barriers and enablers are to achieving effective, efficient and equitable 
biodiversity offset policy. This research will explore the views of different policy actors 
involved in the implementation of biodiversity offset policy, and seek to understand the 
extent to which existing institutional structures are aligned in favour of achieving positive 
environmental outcomes through offsetting.  Perceptions of key policy actors in Australia 
will be elicited through semi-structured interviews. 
 
Participants Approximately 25 semi-structured interviews will be conducted with key policy 
actors, including policy administrators, project proponents, market intermediaries and third-
party offset suppliers. Participants will be identified using a snowball sampling approach. 
 
Use of Data and Feedback: This research will be presented as an ANU PhD thesis for the 
Fenner School of Environment and Society. It is the intention that at least two peer-reviewed 
publications will be prepared once the project is completed. As a participant in this research, 
you will be offered an electronic version of the publications once they are published, as well 
as a shorter project summary. You will be able to contact me at any time to discuss the 
research. 
 
Participant Involvement: 
 
Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal: Your participation in this research project is 
voluntary and you may, without any penalty, decline to take part or withdraw from the 
research at any time until the work is prepared for publication without providing an 
explanation. You are free to refuse to answer any questions.  If you do choose to withdraw, 
the data from your interview will be destroyed and not used. 
 
What does participation in the research request of you? Your participation in this 
research would be in the form of a semi-structured interview. This will involve me (Megan 
Evans) asking you a series of questions, but in a flexible manner – for example, we may not 
go through all of the questions I have prepared, or we may discuss some issues in more detail  
 283 
 
 
 
 
than others, depending on where the interview takes us.  With your consent, I will record the 
audio of our interview, and I may also take handwritten notes during the interview. Once the 
interview is completed, the audio recording will be transcribed by professional transcribing 
service. I may contact you again to cross-check the transcription and my notes with you, to 
make sure I have adequately and accurately captured your views as expressed in the 
interview. Information provided during our interview as well as interviews with other 
participants will be analysed to gain an understanding of what are the key issues important 
for different policy actors to enable the successful implementation of biodiversity offset 
policy.   During the data analysis phase, I will cross-check and discuss the key themes arising 
from the interview data with my supervisors, Prof Karen Hussey (UQ) and Dr Stuart Whitten 
(CSIRO). 
 
Location and Duration: The interview may take place either in person or over the phone if 
an in-person interview is not possible. The total length of the interview is expected to be 
about an hour, and the total time requested of you in this research is two hours (accounting 
for time taken to arrange the interview, and any follow-up correspondence). 
 
Remuneration: Participation in this research is voluntary, and no incentives will be provided 
for participation. 
 
Risks: The risk to you as a participant in this research is expected to be low, due to the nature 
of the research and the steps which will be taken to minimise risks. Your personal and 
financial circumstances (or of the organisations you represent) will not be discussed, unless 
such information is volunteered by you. Neither you nor the specific organisation you 
represent will be identified during the research, and instead will simply be classified by 
sector. Your name and the notes from the interview will be kept confidential to minimize 
identification risk. 
 
Benefits: It is unlikely that you will personally benefit from participating in this research, but 
we anticipate that this research will provide practical insights to the policy community, 
particularly those groups interested in, or responsible for, the implementation of the EPBC 
Act Environmental Offsets Policy. 
 
Confidentiality: 
 
Confidentiality:  The procedures for confidentiality will comply with the Commonwealth 
Privacy Act of 1988 and the ANU Responsible Conduct of Research Policy. Your privacy 
will be protected as far as the law allows. Your name and the name of your organisation will 
not be disclosed. Collected data will be securely stored, and interview notes will not be kept 
in the same place as participant’s details. Pseudonyms will be used in the reporting of 
research to ensure minimal risk of participant identification. 
 
Data Storage: 
 
Where: All interview notes and transcriptions will be stored in a locked cabinet at the ANU. 
An online backup using the secure Dropbox domain will be used. This online data will be 
copied to an external hard drive and deleted from Dropbox after data analysis. The data  
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collected will be stored for 5 years on a hard drive after the date of research publication in 
order to comply with ANU guidelines. 
 
How long: Data will be stored for a period of at least five years from the date of research 
publication. 
 
Destruction of Data: At the end of the storage period, the data will be destroyed. 
 
Queries and Concerns: 
 
Contact Details for More Information: If you have any questions or would like any further 
information on this research project, please contact either myself or one of my supervisors, 
Karen Hussey or Stuart Whitten: 
 
 
Megan Evans 
PhD Candidate 
Email: 
megan.evans@anu.edu.au 
Mobile: +61 418 984 248 
Professor Karen Hussey 
Primary PhD Supervisor 
Email: k.hussey@uq.edu.au 
Phone: +61 7 3443 3112 
Dr Stuart Whitten 
PhD supervisor 
Email: 
stuart.whitten@csiro.au 
Phone: +61 2 6246 4359 
 
Ethics Committee Clearance: 
 
The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee.  If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been 
conducted, please contact: 
 
Ethics Manager 
The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 
Email: Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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